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Abstract

THE SHAPING OF MANAGERS’ SECURITY OBJECTIVES THROUGH INFORMATION
SECURITY AWARENESS TRAINING
By: Mark A. Harris, Ph.D.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2010
Chair: Dr. Gurpreet Dhillon, Professor
Department of Information Systems

Information security research states that corporate security policy and information security
training should be socio-technical in nature and that corporations should consider training as a
primary method of protecting their information systems. However, information security policies
and training are predominately technical in nature. In addition, managers creating security
policies rely heavily on security guidelines, which are also technically oriented. This study
created a series of information security training videos that were viewed by four groups of
managers. One video discussed the socio-technical aspects of security, another discussed only
the social aspects of security, the third detailed only the technical aspects of security, and the
fourth was a control video unrelated to information security. Each group was shown the video,
and after this viewing, each group’s values toward information security were ascertained and
converted into security objectives following Keeney (1992)’s value-focused thinking approach.
Each group’s list of security objectives were used as the input to Schmidt (1997)’s ranking
xi

Delphi methodology, which yielded a more concise and ranked list of security objectives. The
results thus obtained, indicate that manager’s objectives towards information security are
affected by the nature and scope of the information security training they receive. Information
security policy based on each group’s value-based security objectives indicate that manager’s
receiving socio-technical training would produce the strongest information security policy when
analyzing the value-focused thinking list of security objectives. However, the quality of security
policy decreases when analyzing the ranked Delphi list of security objectives, thus providing
mixed results. The theoretical contribution of this research states that technically oriented
information security training found in corporations today affects manager’s values and security
objectives in a way that leads them to create and support technically oriented security policies,
thus ignoring the social aspects of security. The practical contribution of this research states that
managers should receive socio-technical information security training as a part of their regular
job training, which would affect their values and lead to socio-technical information security
policy based on the manager’s socio-technical security objectives. The methodological
contribution of this research demonstrates the successful use of the value-focused thinking
approach as the input to the ranking of the Delphi methodology.

xii

1. Introduction

1.1 Background:

This research investigated how different kinds of information security training affect the nature
and scope of information security policies within a firm. Maximizing information security
within an organization starts with the creation of information security policies. They are the
security objectives for protecting the firm’s information systems (Karyda et. al., 2005). For
example, many firms have security policies regarding acceptable computer use, e-mail, and
passwords (Rotvold, 2008). Information security training, also known as security awareness
training, is a method of educating all employees on how best to protect the firm’s information
systems. For example, employees may learn about viruses and worms, or how to recognize
phishing e-mails. The goal is for employees to utilize what they learned in training in real-time
working, so that the organization optimizes the security of its information systems.

Why are information security policies and training so important? Security policies and training
are important today because companies now rely heavily on information systems in almost every
aspect of the business, making information security vital to corporate success. Information
systems aid business strategy, organizational design, management control systems, the creation
and maintaining of competitive advantages, and much more. The technological aspects of
information systems give firms a presence on the Internet, make telecommuting possible, aid in
unified communication of multiple media, create virtual meeting places, and much more. A
1

firm’s information systems also include its data repositories, where sensitive corporate
information, such as intellectual property and customer data may be kept. Because of the
dependency on information systems and the potential high cost of disruptions or breaches, a top
priority of any modern company is protecting its information systems. Information security
policies are the backbone for protecting information systems and information security training is
the mechanism used to educate employees about security policies.

The importance of security policies emerges without question when weighed against the billions
of dollars that are lost each year from firms inadequately protecting their information systems.
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 2006 survey reported that businesses lose 5% of
their revenue to fraud each year, which equates to a $652 billion in total losses (ACFE, 2006). In
the 2008 version of the survey, those numbers had increased to 7%, or $913 billion in total
losses, indicating a sharp rise in the magnitude of the problem (ACFE, 2008). Organizations
must do everything they can to protect their information systems. The risks of not doing so can
be more costly and last longer than the immediate monetary loss caused by the crisis, in the form
of collateral damage to the company’s reputation and trust with stakeholders (ACFE, 2006).

Now that we accept the importance of information security policies and training for the
protection of information systems and know that failing to do so properly can cost billions of
dollars, what is this research attempting to demonstrate that can forward the cause of information
security? This research attempted to demonstrate that the nature and scope of information
security training a manager receives affects the nature and scope of the information security
policies they will create. Previous research has demonstrated that socio-technical solutions are
the best way to maximize information security (Backhouse & Dhillon, 1996; Dhillon and
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Backhouse, 2000, 2001; Trompeter & Eloff, 2001; Siponen, 2001; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006;
Dhillon, 2007). Socio-technical solutions refers to a mix of technical aspects of security- such as
access controls, virus detection, and encryption, as well as social aspects of security- such as
having an ethics program and a strong security culture. If the nature and scope of information
security training is socio-technical, will the manager’s value-based objectives toward
information security be socio-technical and what impact would socio-technical security
objectives have on information security policy? These are fundamental questions this research
attempted to answer.

Four different training videos were created and given to four different groups of managers, or
future managers. The training consisted of a socio-technical video, social only video, technical
only video, and control video. Using the value-focused method developed by Keeney (1992),
each group developed a list of value-based security objectives that were then ranked using a
ranking Delphi method developed by Schmidt (1997). Analysis of the data thus obtained
demonstrates that socio-technical training given to managers will yield a stronger mix of sociotechnical policies than social only training, technical only training, or no training at all.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 describes the current problem that is
to be addressed by this research. Section 1.3 and 1.4 describe the argument and research
questions used to justify this research. Section 1.5 describes the definitions of common terms
used throughout this research, such as information security and information security policies.
Section 1.6 describes the remaining chapters of this research.

3

1.2 Current Problem:

Many researchers have stated that a socio-technical approach is best for maximizing information
security and have stressed the importance of social aspects for information security (Backhouse
& Dhillon, 1996; Straub & Welke, 1998; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000, 2001; Trompeter &
Eloff, 2001; Siponen, 2001; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Dhillon, 2007). Recognizing the social
aspects of information security can be known as the socio-technical or socio-organizational
perspective (Siponen, 2001). For example, Dhillon (2001, p. 147) stated that the “socioorganizational perspective is the way forward if security of information systems is to be
achieved.” If recognizing social and technical aspects of information security is so important,
one would expect organizations to have socio-technical information security policies and
information security training. However, current research has reported that information security
policies lack social aspects of security (Rotvold, 2008; CWS, 2010; Fulford & Doherty, 2003).
For example, Rotvold (2007) reported 24 top security policies in use by organizations and only
two were socially related policies, concerning ethics and social engineering. Ethics policies were
used in 60.4% of the organizations and social engineering policies were used in 14.3% of the
surveyed organizations. The top policies used by organizations were acceptable use policy
(89%), e-mail policy (84.6%), and password policy (78%). In other research, the Cybersecurity
Watch Survey 2010’s top three security policies were password policy, acceptable use policy,
and Internet monitoring policy (CWS, 2010). Of the more than 30 top security policies reported
by the survey, over 90% used technical solutions. Fulford & Doherty (2003)’s research also
demonstrated the lack of social aspects security in their list of security policies which are
currently being used by organizations.

4

The content of information security training is predominately adopted from information security
policies (Rotvold, 2007; CSI, 2006, 2007). Rotvold (2007) reported that security policies were
the number one topic of security training. The CSI Survey (2006, 2007) also reported
information security policies as a top topic of information security training. In discussing the
content of information security training, Straub and Welke (1998, p. 451) stated that the content
should include “employee policies…and other topics that have a bearing on preventing misuse of
system assets.” If information security policies are technically oriented, then so will be the
information security training.

To further complicate the problem, researchers call for information security training to be a
primary method for protecting information systems (Straub & Welke, 1998; Solms & Solms,
2004; May, 2008; Rezgui and Marks, 2008). Practitioners seem to be following the advice. The
2010 Cybersecurity Watch Survey reported that information security training was a top method
for protecting information systems (CWS, 2010). What this means is that organizations are
using information security awareness training as a primary means of protection, but their
information security polices and policy-based training lacks social aspects of security. Those
creating information security policies need to create socio-technical policies so that the
information security training is socio-technical and information security is maximized.

Corporate information security policy is created at the strategic level of the organization by
managers that have very little experience or knowledge of creating security policy (Hone &
Eloff, 2002). The authors’ state that those creating the policy often lack the knowledge to be
able to do so. Their “lack of skills and understanding” in developing a security policy often
compels the authors to “turn to other organization’s policies, commercially available sources or

5

templates available from public sources, such as the Internet, for answers to their questions” (pp.
402-403). Among the commercially available options are checklists or standardized guidelines.
According to Ernst & Young’s 2008 Global Information Security Survey, 70% of those
organizations surveyed used standardized guidelines to create security policies and that number
is expected to increase (GISS, 2008). However, we know that checklists or guidelines have
many shortcomings, including the lack of flexibility to changing business environments and lack
of attention paid to social aspects of security (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Dhillon &
Backhouse, 2001). Managers that lack the knowledge to create socio-technical information
security policies and end up creating security policies based on standardized checklists will
inevitably fail to maximize information security by not including social aspects of security.

1.3 Argument:

The fundamental argument of this research argues that the nature and scope of information
security training that managers’ receive impacts the nature and scope of the information security
policies they create (figure 1.1).

Information
Security
Training

Information
Security
Policy

Figure 1.1: Fundamental Argument

The nature and scope of training can be socio-technical, social only, or technical only. It is also
possible that managers will receive no training at all. Managers that create information security
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policies will be influenced differently depending on which type of training they receive, or if
they receive no training at all. That influence will affect the nature and scope of the security
policies they create. For example, managers receiving socio-technical information security
training will create socio-technical information security policies.

A more detailed argument involves the manager’s values and objectives toward information
security, where the nature and scope of the information security training a manager receives
shapes the manager’s values (see figure 1.2). The training shapes their beliefs (values) about
how to best protect information systems. The manager’s values then impact their individual
objectives toward securing information systems. The manager’s objectives then impact the
nature and scope of the information security policies they create. Another way of thinking about
it is that training affects a manager’s beliefs and those beliefs influence the manager’s goals and
those goals influence the policies they create. For example, managers that receive sociotechnical information security training will be influenced by the training to alter or reinforce their
core beliefs about protecting information systems with socio-technical aspects of security. These
socio-technical oriented core beliefs about how to protect information systems will impact their
objectives for doing so. Their socio-technical oriented value-based objectives will then impact
the nature and scope of the information security policies they create. In this example, the
policies thus created would be socio-technically oriented.

7

Nature &
Scope of
Information
Security
Training

Impacts
Individual
Objectives

Shapes
Values

Impacts
Nature &
Scope of
Information
Security
Policies

Figure 1.2: Detailed Argument

1.4 Research Questions:

The focus of this research leads to the following two research questions:

1. To what extent are manager’s values towards securing information systems influenced by
the nature and scope of information security training they receive?
2. To what extent do value-based objectives influence the nature and scope of information
security policy?

The first research question will address the relationship between the first and second boxes of the
detailed argument (figure 1.2). Will the training shape their core beliefs about how to protect
information systems? For example, will socio-technical training, technical only training, or
social only training lead to predominately socio-technical values, predominately technical values,
or predominately social values? This first research question will also ascertain the values of
managers that receive no information security training.

The second research question will address the relationship between the third and fourth boxes of
the detailed argument (figure 1.2). Influenced by the manager’s value-based objectives for
securing information systems, what will be the nature and scope of the security policies they
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create? Will they create socio-technical policy, technical policy, social policy, or something
else?

1.5 Definitions:

This section gives a more detailed definition of the terms and phrases already introduced and
used throughout this research. There are other terms or phrases that are not used throughout this
research, but are particular to certain sections or chapters. Those terms and phrases are defined
and described in those sections or chapters, where they are more relevant.

1.5.1 Information Systems:

An information system, as described by Dhillon (2007), is the system that handles information at
three levels – technical, formal, and informal. Within an organization, the technical system is the
organization’s information technology infrastructure and consists primarily of hardware,
software, data and network components. It is everything that supports the flow and processing of
information. The formal system consists of rules and procedures, such as security strategy,
policies, and processes (Dhillon, 2007). Acceptance of the formal system’s rules and procedures
by the people is a social process, which is part of the informal system. The informal system
consists of social constructs, such as culture, norms, beliefs, attitudes and informal
communication. An information system is the system that handles information in and across
these three systems.
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1.5.2 Information Security:

Information security, also known as information systems security, refers to the protection of an
information system at three levels: technical, formal, and informal. There must be coordination
between the three systems for the effective management of information security. At the
technical level, information security is concerned with technological solutions to security, such
as using firewalls, biometric scanners for authentication and anti-virus software. At the formal
level, information security is concerned with creating organizational structures and processes to
ensure security and integrity (Dhillon, 2007). This includes the creation of proper responsibility
structures, maintaining integrity of roles, and creating and verifying proper business processes
(Dhillon, 2007). At the informal level, information security is concerned with the social aspects
of security, such as creating and maintaining a security culture, integrity of employees, trust
relationships, and ethicality.

1.5.3 Information Security Policy:

Karyda et. al (2005, p. 247) state that “an IS security policy includes the intentions and priorities
with regard to the protection of the IS, usually referred to as security objectives, together with a
general description of the means and methods to achieve these objectives.” At a high level,
corporate security policy describes the overall security vision in the form of security objectives.
These objectives are abstract in nature and written in generalized terms, such as the statement of
the need to ensure that sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access. At a lower level,
procedurally oriented policies are derived from the corporate level policies to reflect the means
for achieving the higher level objectives. To continue the previous example of protecting
sensitive data from unauthorized access, a procedurally oriented policy might be to create a
10

password policy that protects such data. Other procedurally oriented policies might be to require
all employees to have passwords at least 8 characters long and to change their passwords every
30 days. There may be multiple procedurally oriented policies for each corporate level policy.

1.5.4 Information Security Training:

Information security training, also known as security awareness training, is a method of
educating all employees on how best to protect an organization’s information systems. Training
most often reflects the procedure oriented security policies. The most effective information
security training will address threats posed by technically oriented aspects of security as well as
socially oriented aspects of security.

A goal of security awareness training is to create overall security awareness. According to
Rezgui & Marks (2008), the meaning of security awareness falls into two categories. The first
are those that consider security awareness to mean “attracting users’ attention to IS security
issues” and the second considers security awareness to mean “the user’s understanding of IS
security and optimally, committing to it” (p. 244). Whether computer security awareness
training makes employees only aware of security issues or makes them fully understand and
committed to upholding this security can depend on many factors, such as the quality of the
training and the employees themselves. There is research that suggests using theories from
psychology and sociology to create training in certain ways can lead to better absorption by
employees and can increase the likelihood of employees following security policy (Siponen,
2000; Thomson & Von Solms, 1998). However, this research on the effect of information
security training on information security policies is focused on the nature and scope of the
training and not the delivery method or psychological acceptance of the training.
11

1.6 Thesis Structure:
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter one of this research is the introduction, where the
relationship between information security training and information security policy is introduced.
This chapter includes the author’s argument and definitions of key terms used throughout this
research. Chapter two is a literature review that investigates information security training,
information security policies, technical and social aspects of security, and how manager’s
objectives lead to practice. Chapter two concludes with a discussion of how the literature review
is relevant to this research. Chapter three discusses the methodology of this research, starting
with the creation of the training videos and a description of the experimental design and
participants. The value focused research methodology is reviewed and discussed along with the
ranking Delphi methodology. Chapter four describes the execution and analysis of the value
focused method data collection and discusses the relevant results. Chapter five describes the
execution and analysis of the ranking Delphi method and the relevant results. Chapter six
discusses the key findings and the relevance to information security research. Chapter seven
concludes this research by summarizing the study and the key findings, along with any research
limitations.
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2. Literature Review

2.1 Introduction:
This dissertation investigates how the nature and scope of information security training affects
the nature and scope of information security policies within a firm. The central argument is that
training affects policies, so it is important to review literature pertaining to information security
training and information security policies. But before reviewing training and policies, it is
important to review the nature and scope of training and policies, which involve the social and
technical aspects of security. The argument believes that the particular type of training a
manager receives will affect the policies he or she creates, so it is also important to establish a
link between a manager’s security objectives and the security policies he or she creates. These
areas will be reviewed in the following sections, starting with a review of socio-technical
security. Information security policy and information security training will then be reviewed.
The discussion will link these topics and discuss the connection with creating information
security policies. The final section is the conclusion that relates the overall literature review to
this dissertation’s argument and research questions.

2.2 Socio-technical Security:
Social aspects of security refer to human related aspects of organizations that need to be taken
into consideration in order to maximize information security. This can include many concepts,
such the responsibility, integrity, trust and ethicality (RITE) of individuals as described by
Dhillon and Backhouse (2000). Social aspects of security can also include norms, security
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culture, beliefs, and attitudes within organizations (Dhillon, 2007). The research below
demonstrates the need for information security to go beyond merely focusing on technological
solutions to security threats and highlights the need for the recognition of social aspects of
security.

But before reviewing research related to the social aspects of security, it is important to briefly
describe the technical aspects of security. Most organizations rely heavily on the technical
solutions to security threats, as they are often the first line of defense. Examples of technical
solutions to security threats include hardware and software firewalls, antivirus software,
password usage, smart cards and much more. The goal of this section is to demonstrate the
importance for information systems security research to go beyond the sole reliance on technical
solutions to security threats and to incorporate the social aspects of security as well.

Over 30 years ago, Bostrom and Heinen (1977) called for systems development to include the
social aspects of organizations. The socio-technical system (STS) was introduced in a paper
discussing the redesign of management of information system’s methodologies. The authors
argued that system designers created flawed systems because they failed to recognize the
importance of the social aspects of organizations. They describe a socio-technical system as
“two jointly independent, but correlative interacting systems” (p. 17). The technical system is
concerned with processes, tasks, and technology, while the social system is concerned with the
attributes of people (attitudes, skills, and values), the relationships of people, reward systems,
and authority structures (Bostrom and Heinen, 1977). The outputs of the system “are the result
of joint interactions between these two systems” (p. 17). The authors go on to discuss areas
where designers fail to recognize social aspects of organizations. The focus of this research may
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have been on correcting failures in MIS development, but the recognition of the concept of there
being a socio-technical system that must be considered in IS development is important for all
subsequent information systems research.

Siponen’s (2001) research analyzed three approaches to developing security for information
systems. The approaches are called information/database modeling approaches, responsibility
approaches and security-modified information systems development approaches and are
classified into four generations. First and second generations focus on checklists and technical
solutions. The third and fourth generations include modeling and socio-technical solutions
respectively.

Information/database

modeling

approaches

includes

“research

on

the

organizational and conceptual level, along with methods covering database security” (p. 9).
There are very few studies using this approach. Responsibility modeling refers to the use of
responsibility as a basis for ensuring secure information systems development. Securitymodified information system development approaches “refer to any approach that is modified
from an information system or development approach” (p. 3). The third and fourth generations,
which include responsibility modeling and security-modified information system development
approaches, have an intellectual origin in data modeling, information systems and computer
science (p. 17). The authors concluded that the most commonly held organizational role of
information systems security was the technical view, which ignores the social aspects of
security. “There is a lack of aforementioned approaches which recognize the social aspects of
information systems, i.e. socio-technical and social organizational roles of information systems
security” (p. 22). Social aspects of information systems security is part of the fourth and latest
generation of secure information systems development.
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In a (2001) paper by Dhillon and Backhouse, the authors map the current directions in
information systems security research. The authors did so by using the Burrell and Morgan
(1979) framework and four paradigms: functionalist, interpretative, radical humanist, and radical
structuralist.

Functionalists often derive their approaches from the natural sciences.

Interpretivism “is concerned with the subjective understanding that individuals ascribe to their
social situations” (p. 129). The radical paradigms oppose the regulation view of society and
advocate radical change.

The authors concluded that there was a noticeable trend in information systems research which
was moving away from the functionalist and technical view point, but not in information systems
security research. They write that much of the information systems security research up to this
date had been “classified under the functionalist paradigm and the theorists have treated security
as something tangible and concrete” (p. 147). Information system security should not be
considered in a mechanistic manner and doing so would relegate inter-organizational and intraorganizational social relationships as incidental (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001). The authors
suggest that if security of information systems is to be achieved, then the socio-organizational
perspective is the way forward.

In other research, Trompeter and Eloff (2001) recommend that ethical aspects of security should
be considered as important as the technical and functional aspects of security. Information
security ethical principles should be incorporated with the inception, development, and
maintenance of an organization’s IT system and should govern security controls and measures
(Trompeter & Eloff, 2001). The guiding principles should “include the right of both the
individual and the organization to privacy, to property of their information and to the obligation
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to uphold this socio-ethical commitment” (pp. 286-387). “The creation of a socio-ethical
awareness of infosec (information security) that takes cognizance of the human dimension will
help organizations and clients alike...” (p. 390).

Developing a strong security culture has also been linked to more secure information systems. A
security culture “reflects the values and beliefs of information security shared by all members at
all levels of the organization” (D’Arcy & Greene, 2009, p. 147). In a study of 105 computer
using professionals, D’Arcy and Greene (2009) investigated the relationship between security
culture and security policy compliance and security extra-role behavior. Compliant behavior
refers to a user’s compliance with security policies and regulations. Extra-role behavior refers to
behaviors that go beyond the job description and are not part of the formal job duties. Examples
of extra-role behavior include attending voluntary security training, promoting safe computing
practices, and speaking out about inefficient security controls. The results of the survey provided
strong evidence that security culture contributes to both compliant user behavior and extra-role
behaviors. The authors state that “developing a security culture that consists of top management
commitment to security and ongoing security communication is extremely beneficial in
promoting both a compliant and proactive security-conscious user population” (p. 154).

In other security culture research, Vroom and von Solms (2004) stress the importance of a strong
security culture and suggest ways of changing the culture. The authors propose to address
security culture through three aspects of organizational behavior- the individual, the group and
the formal organization. Individuals are unique and bring multiple characteristics into the
organization.

Individual attitudes, motivation, job satisfaction, etc. is influenced by

organizational forces and the behavior of an individual is important for developing a culture
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(Vroom & von Solms, 2004). Groups are made up of individuals and have their own values and
norms. Groups develop characteristics beyond those of the individual. The formal organization
can be compared according to characteristics common to them, such as the size of the
organization (Vroom & von Solms, 2004). The behavior of the individual, group, and formal
organization influences each other and are not mutually exclusive. In order to change culture,
changes need to take place at all three levels. The authors suggest the best way to change the
security culture is to change the shared values and knowledge of the group. Investigating the
cultural influences on the group and changing them separately will slowly start to alter group
behavior. The altered group behavior will then influence individual behavior, which will have an
eventual effect on the formal organization. The authors suggest that changing one aspect “will
filter through the organization at a formal and individual level and the culture will eventually
change into a secure one” (p. 197).

Security culture is important for ensuring appropriate behavior, according to von Solms and von
Solms (2004). The author’s research investigates the integration of security polices, education
and security culture. Management creates security polices and defines what they expect from
group members within the organization. Groups are defined as collections of individuals that
have shared basic assumptions. The group members must accept the policies created by
management and agree that they benefit the organization. Managers can dictate the behavior of
employees by “expressing collective values, norms, and knowledge, by defining specific policies
and procedures” (p. 277). Security policies can be expressed in the group’s beliefs, which form
the security culture. Educating new group members then helps cultivate the security culture by
teaching new members the group beliefs, which they will embrace as part of the group’s basic
shared assumptions. Aligning information security policies with the security culture and
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educating employees on a continuous basis is one way of positively affecting employee
behavior.

In a paper about organizational culture and security culture, Ruighaver et al. (2007) suggest that
information security is generally a management problem and an organization’s security culture
reflects how management handles the problem. The authors argue that “technical security
measures and security policies will often need to be (re)designed to support an organization’s
security culture” (p. 56). Suggesting that security culture is influenced by organizational culture,
the authors investigate security culture using an eight dimensional framework developed by
Detert et al. (2000) to study organizational culture. The framework was used to highlight aspects
of security culture along the eight dimensions using empirical case study research from
information systems. Based on the relation of security culture to organizational culture within
the framework, the authors highlighted several aspects of good security culture. Below are some
select findings (Ruighaver et al., 2007):

1. “Organizations with a high-quality security culture should place an emphasis on longterm commitment and strategic management” (p. 58);
2. a degree of trust and accountability needs to be established with employees;
3. employees with responsibility over particular aspects of security should be given a strong
sense of ownership;
4. responsibility and accountability for security decision making should be clearly defined
in policies;
5. educating employees about their roles and responsibilities is important; and
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6. good security culture should find a balance between internal and external focus, where
there is awareness of the external environment and its threats, as well as an awareness of
the internal environment.

Other aspects of security culture, such as attitudes, norms and shared expectations did not fit into
the framework, but were also considered important by the authors.

In research aiming to improve user security behavior, Leach (2003) discusses six factors that
have strong influence over people’s security behavior and three steps organizations can take to
improve behavior. The threats include user errors and negligence, such as forgetting to apply
security procedures, and deliberate acts, such as emailing sensitive data without protection. The
factors that influence security behavior come from an organization’s culture and practices and
can be divided into two areas: (1) encompassing the users’ understanding of what behaviors the
company expects of them, and (2) the factors which influence the user’s personal willingness to
constrain their behavior to stay within accepted norms (Leach, 2003). The user’s understanding
of expectations are described by what they are told, what they see being practiced by others
around them, and their experience built on decisions they made in the past. Personal willingness
to comply with expectations are described by people’s personal values and standards of conduct,
sense of obligation towards their employer and the degree of difficulty they experience in
complying with the company’s procedures.

Not all of these factors which affect how people behave can be influenced by the organization,
such as an employee’s personal values. However, organizations can focus on the three key
factors they can influence. The author suggests organizations should focus on the behavior
demonstrated by management, the user’s security common sense and decision-making skills, and
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the user’s psychological contract with their employer. Below is a summary of concepts related
to these three factors (Leach, 2003):

1. ensure senior management and junior staff have good security behavior;
2. provide feedback on the correctness of security behavior;
3. reward staff for good security;
4. give additional training to staff that demonstrate bad security behavior;
5. teach the user’s the principles they need to make good decisions;
6. provide continuous feedback and support;
7. create a strong security culture to motivate staff to behave consistently; and
8. discuss security regularly with management and staff.

The author suggests that leadership is the key to creating a more secure environment. Top
management must support the security goals and lead by example.

In other research about socio-technical aspects of security, Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) move
beyond the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of information with a paper that
introduces a concept known as RITE. The authors suggest that information system security
needs to change to not only addressing the data, but the changing organizational context as well.
Organizations have focused much of their attention on CIA, where the authors define
confidentiality as restricting data access to those who are authorized, integrity as preventing
unauthorized modification of data, and availability as preventing unauthorized withholding of
data or resources. If information systems are to be secure, there needs to be considerations
beyond CIA. The authors suggest “inculcating a subculture where responsibility, integrity, trust
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and ethicality (RITE) are considered important and are the first steps towards securing the
information assets” (p. 127.)

Responsibility refers to individuals understanding their responsibilities and knowledge of roles
within the organization, which also includes individual accountability. Responsibility is
important in situations where formal guidance and rules are absent. Integrity refers to the
integrity of the person employed by the organization. Before employees are given access to
sensitive information, they should be properly screened. However, the integrity of an individual
can change over time, such as when personal factors change. An economic recession,
foreclosure, bankruptcy, divorce or many other such factors can lead a once honest employee
down the wrong path. Organizations need to consider how they will continue to reassess the
integrity of individuals as time passes.

Trust refers to a mutual system of trust between the individual and the organization. “Division
of labor demands that your colleagues should be trusted to act in accordance with company
norms and [the] accepted and agreed [upon] patterns of behavior” (p. 128). Today’s
organizations have less supervision, which gives employees more control. Mutual trust plays an
important role in such environments. However, trust has a half life that needs to be reassured
periodically. Ethicality goes beyond company rules and policies and into an area where rules do
not exist. When a situation arises within an organization where a rule or policy stating how to
handle the situation does not exist, individuals need to rely on some form of appropriate ethical
norms. Responsibility, integrity, trust and ethicality (RITE) of individuals and confidentiality,
integrity, and availability (CIA) of information are important for this dissertation because they
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are core socio-technical aspects of information security that will be used to support this
dissertation’s argument.

In a book describing socio-technical security by Dhillon (2007), the author writes about
maintaining the integrity of three vital systems of information systems security: the formal,
informal and technical systems. The formal system within organizations represents the rules,
regulations, governance, policies, procedures, or processes. The informal system represents
social norms, security culture, beliefs, and attitudes of people. The technical system uses
technology (computers) to automate parts of the formal system.

There must be coordination between the three systems to effectively manage information
systems security. Dhillon describes the coordination among the three systems with an analogy of
a fried egg. The yolk represents the technical system, which is held in place by the rules and
regulations of the formal system. The formal system is the thin membrane holding the yolk. The
white of the egg represents the informal system. The analogy “suggests the appropriate
subservient role of the technical system within an organization” and “also cautions about the
consequences of overbureaucratization of the formal systems and their relationship to the
informal systems” (p. 5).

Managing security involves using controls with all three systems, meaning the controls
themselves can be formal, informal, or technical. For example, a technical control might require
a password or retinal scan to gain access to a computer. Expanding or shortening the
organizational hierarchy is an example of formal control and giving security awareness training
to employees is an example of an informal control (Dhillon, 2007). Controls must complement
one another and Dhillon recommends “an overarching policy that determines the nature of
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controls being implemented and therefore provides comprehensive security to the organization”
(p. 6).

In other research by Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006), the authors used the value-focused thinking
method to interview 103 managers about their values in managing information systems security.
This approach yielded 9 fundamental objectives for information systems security and 16 means
objectives for achieving them within an organization. Of the 9 fundamental objectives, 7 are
social objectives and 2 are technical objectives. The two technical objectives are to maximize
access control and data integrity. The seven social objectives are to enhance management
development practices and the integrity of business process, maximize privacy and
organizational integrity, provide adequate human resource management practices, develop and
sustain an ethical environment, and promote individual work ethic. The authors suggest that
overall information security that primarily focuses on the technical aspects of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability (CIA) of information is inadequate and that socio-organizational
objectives must be taken into consideration. This paper was included in the socio-technical
section of this literature review because of the result’s socio-technical implications, but it is also
important to this dissertation in that it used the value-focused thinking method in its
methodology. The value-focused thinking method by Keeney (1994) is the same method used in
this dissertation and will be described further in the next chapter.

In summary, the importance of social aspects in addition to technical aspects in information
systems research is nothing new, as reported by Bostrom and Heinen in 1977. However, it took
over 20 years before Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) reported a trend toward social aspects in
mainstream information systems research. In the same paper, Dhillon and Backhouse state that
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mainstream information systems security research had yet to make the transition and that socioorganizational aspects of security must be acknowledged in order to maximize security. Since
that time, mainstream research has made that transition and social aspects of security are now
considered an important part of overall security. For example, Trompeter and Eloff (2001)
called for ethical principles in the development of information systems and security standards.
Ruighaver et al. (2007) discussed the importance of a security culture in relation to the
organizational culture and listed several aspects of good security culture, such as having an
emphasis on employee responsibility and accountability, trust and security education. Also
related to security culture was Leech’s (2003) paper that suggested multiple ways of positively
influencing employee behavior, by actions like managers leading by example by displaying good
security practices of their own. D’Archy and Greene (2009) found that security culture
contributes to compliant user behavior and extra-role behaviors. Dhillon (2007) reported the
necessity of considering the social aspects of the informal system along with the formal and
technical systems for achieving maximum security. Of particular importance to this research is
the Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) paper describing the significance of responsibility, integrity,
trust and ethicality (RITE) of individuals. Also of interest to this research is the use of the valuefocused approach in demonstrating the importance of socio-organizational objectives in Dhillon
and Torkzadeh’s (2006) paper.

2.3 Information Security Policy:

Baskerville and Siponen (2002)’s paper describes a three level division of security policy: highlevel policy, low-level policy, and meta-policy. At the highest level, “security policy is a highlevel overall plan embracing the general security goals and acceptable procedures” (p. 338).
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Policies at this level are generalized and more abstract than at the lower level. Lower level
policies are derived from the high-level policies and are specific policies designed to support the
objectives outlined at the highest level. Where a high level policy might describe a particular
resource that needs to be protected and those responsible for protecting it, a lower level policy
would describe the particular processes to be used to protect the resource. For instance, a highlevel policy might state that department “A” needs to protect asset “X.” A low-level policy that
reflects the high-level policy might state that password or retinal scan technology needs to be in
place to protect asset “X.”

In the third level of the division of security policies, the authors introduce meta-policy. Metapolicy is “policy about policies.” These policies “declare the organization’s plan for creating and
maintaining its information security policies” (p. 339). Meta-policy describes who is responsible
for making policies, when policy creation is to take place, how policies are made, and how and
when are polices reviewed, modified, or eliminated.

In support of the need for meta-policy, the authors point out that emergent organizations with
changing business environments need meta-policy. Unlike checklist security standards, metapolicy can help organizations adapt their security policies to changes in the business
environment. Checklists are security guidelines that can be used to help create security policies.
However, the authors point out several shortcomings of such guidelines: (1) they fail to
adequately address the fact that organizations are different and require different security policies
(as cited by Baskerville, 1993), (2) they do not consider social aspects of security (as cited by
Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001), (3) they “are broadly written, necessitation ad hoc decision making
and judgment” (as cited by Ferris, 1994, p. 338), and (4) they overlook normal business
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requirements, which may result in conflict between business and security requirements
(Baskerville & Siponen, 2002).

In other security policy research, Karyda et al (2005) explore the processes of formulation,
implementation and adoption of security policy in two different organizations. In both cases, the
companies enlisted external consultants to conduct a risk analysis and create guidelines and
recommendations. Management considered the recommendations and called upon their IT staff
to implement the policies. The authors revisited each firm later to gauge the level of adoption by
the users.

In both cases, the consultants called for creating a security officer and establishing

roles and responsibilities for that person.

The adoption of the security policy had mixed results. The first company had adopted the policy
fairly well and the second company had not. However, the second company did not conduct
security awareness training for their employees. Those employees had a negative attitude toward
the security policies out of fear and lack of understanding. This emphasizes the importance of
having an information security training program to educate employees on security policies. The
first company already had an ethics policy in place and that policy worked well with the new
security policies toward creating a security culture. The authors mentioned the importance of
creating a security culture. In addition to the ethics policy in the first company, the authors did
not report any other social aspects of security as being incorporated into the security policies.
They mentioned roles and responsibilities, but only for the new security position and not for all
the employees. There appears to be little or no consideration for socio-technical aspects of
security in the creation of security policy in this study.
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In other research, Doherty & Fulford (2006) argue that information security policy should be
aligned with the strategic information systems plan (SISP). The “strategic information systems
plan is a critical prerequisite for policy formulation, as it defines the business context in which
information security will be managed and therefore the objectives of, and priorities for, security
management” (p. 57). The strategic information systems plan is typically based on corporate
objectives and the business plan. Aligning the information security plan to the SISP would link
the security plan to the business plan. Mentioned below is how the authors summarized benefits
of alignment- Doherty & Fulford (2006):

1. security can be more proactive instead of reactive to security threats;
2. security policy will have a stronger business orientation;
3. security policy can be adjusted in advance of strategic information systems initiatives;
4. strategic information systems plans can be viewed from a security perspective before
implementation;
5. new systems created by the SISP can incorporate security controls identified by related
security policy; and
6. this raises business manager’s awareness of security threats and countermeasures.

Information security policy risk analysis is the topic of a paper from Spinellis et al. (1999),
where the authors suggest that any information systems security policy should start with a risk
analysis. “The objective of risk analysis is to identify and assess the risks to which the IS and its
assets are exposed in order to select appropriate and justified security safeguards” (p. 122). The
authors list five stages of risk analysis: (1) asset identification and valuation; (2) threats
assessment; (3) vulnerabilities assessment; (4) existing/planned safeguards assessment; and (5)
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risk assessment. A risk analysis methodology, CRAMM, was used to analyze a home-office and
small enterprise scenario. The authors conclude that both environments have security
weaknesses which are common to large enterprises, but the current security infrastructure and
business practices of the smaller firms hinder effective risk management.

As mentioned earlier in research by Baskerville and Siponen (2002) and Dhillon and Backhouse
(2001), checklists (standards) are often used by organizations to create information security
policy. The Ernst & Young’s 2008 Global Information Security Survey researched the use of
security standards in developing security policy. The survey covered nearly 1400 organizations
in more than 50 countries across all major industries. According to the survey, the use of
information security standards has increased to 70% and the belief is that the use of international
information security standards will continue to increase (GISS, 2008). The international
standards used by respondents were ISO/IEC 27001:2005, ISO/IEC 27002:2005, and
Information Security Forum’s (ISF), the Standard of Good Practice for Information Security.
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 is defined as a standard that “provides a model for establishing,
implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving an information
security management system” (p. 11). ISO/IEC 27002:2005 “outlines the potential control
mechanisms which may be implemented based on the guidance provided within ISO/IEC
27001:2005” (p. 11). The Standard of Good Practice for Information Security “addresses
information security from a business perspective, providing a practical basis for assessing an
organization’s information security arrangements” (p. 11).

Undertaking research to discover the content of information security policy, Fulford & Doherty
(2003) questioned managers representing 158 organizations from multiple industries and varying
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organizational size. The authors reported the top items and the percentage of inclusion in their
security policy as: personal use of the information system (45%), disclosure of information
(38%), physical security (37%), violations and breaches (36%), viruses, worms, and trojans
(34%), system access (33%), mobile computing (32%), Internet access (30%), software (25%),
encryption (25%), and contingency planning (17%). Of the 158 organizations surveyed, 76% of
them had a formal written security policy. The authors statistically tested and verified that those
without a security policy were not of the same organizational type.

In summary, in this information security policy literature review, we have learned that
management at the strategic level of the organization is involved in creating the high-level
security policies (Baskerville & Siponen, (2002). In order to create these policies, they gather
information from various sources. These may include standardized checklists, external
consultants, current organizational culture, current security measures, risk analysis, business
objectives and the strategic information systems plan (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Karyda, et
al, 2005; Spinellis, et al, 1999; Doherty & Fulford, 2006). High-level polices are used to create
low level policies, known as corporate and procedure policies in this dissertation. Procedure
policies are more specific policies that are usually created with the input of content specific
professionals and not upper management. For example, technical policies at this level are often
created by information technology professionals or legal considerations may involve lawyers
(Karyda, et al, 2005). The procedural policies are based on the corporate policies, which should
reflect the business plan (Spinellis, et al., 1999). Security policy is also primarily technical and
lacks the social aspects of security. According to Fulford & Doherty (2003), some of the top
items that organizations include in security policy are breaches, viruses, worms, trojans, system
access, software and encryption. Checklists, which are often used as guidelines for security
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policy are also technically oriented and lack social aspects of security (Baskerville & Siponen,
2002; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001). In order to maximize security, social aspects of security
must be considered along with technical aspects (Dhillon, 2007).

2.4 Information Security Training:

Information security training, also called security awareness training in some research, is a
relatively small topic within information systems research. Only a few studies investigate
information security training as the main focus of the research. Like in the case of many topics
within the discipline, there are multiple definitions. Siponen (2000, p. 32) defines “information
security awareness” as “a state where users in an organization are aware of – [and] ideally
committed to – their security mission.” Straub & Welke (1998, p. 450) define security
awareness training as “the training of managers and other professionals in proper use of system
assets.” The authors state that training should review employee policies, such as system
authorizations, conditionalities of use, password management, penalties for security breaches etc.
(Straub & Welke, 1998). “The training should also make participants aware of the general
effectiveness of deterrent, preventive, detective, and remedial countermeasures in lowering
systems risk” ( p. 451). This dissertation defines information security training as a method of
educating all employees on how best to protect an organization’s information systems.

Information security training research primarily falls into two research streams, one researches
the necessity of having a training program and the other researches how to make training more
effective. The necessity of training is important to this dissertation because this research
forwards the suggestion that training of managers can help maximize information security.
Making training more effective is also important to this dissertation because this research creates
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training videos to support the central argument. Very little research has investigated the content
of information security training, but a few studies and surveys were found. The content of
current training is also important for this dissertation because this research argues that current
training is technical in nature and is linked to the information security policies.

In researching the importance of information security training, Rezgui and Marks (2008)
conducted a case study to investigate factors that affect the information security awareness of
staff at an institution of higher education. Through questionnaires, interviews, observation and
documents, the authors collected data and used various coding techniques for analysis. The
research discovered that factors such as conscientiousness, cultural assumptions and beliefs and
social conditions affect university staff behavior and attitude towards work and information
security awareness (Rezgui & Marks, 2008). Of particular interest was the fact that the
university did not have a computer security awareness training program and did not know how
that affected employee security awareness. Rezgui and Marks recommend the establishment of
an information security training program. The problems discovered with employee’s security
awareness are listed below (Rezgui & Marks, 2008, p. 250):

1. “many respondents were not acquainted with basic IS security practices, including how to
change their passwords or how to back up their data;”
2. “users shared passwords;”
3. “operative, unlocked computers were left unattended;”
4. “laptops were not locked and left out;”
5. “users were confused about the existence of an IS policy and none had seen one;”
6. “users did not know how to locate an IS staff member;”
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7. “users could not identify the university IS goals and objectives;” and
8. “users regarded university data as of no interest to them.”

In other research that supports the need for security awareness training, May (2008) developed a
decision model that provides informed alternatives to decision makers who desire to maximize
IS security within an organization. The model is based on Dhillon & Torkzadeh’s (2006) nine
fundamental and sixteen means objectives that are essential in maximizing information systems
security. This decision model consisted of 69 ranked value-driven tasks and associated security
objectives they impact. Of particular interest is that security awareness training was ranked #1 of
the 69 tasks. Therefore, security awareness training was found to be the most important task
associated with maximizing information systems security. According to May’s research,
awareness training impacts 14 sub-objectives, such as ensuring sensitive data is adequately
secured, emphasizing the importance of data privacy and maintaining personal accountability.

The need for security awareness training is nothing new. Straub and Welke (1998) stated that
systems “risk can be managed or reduced when managers are aware of the full range of controls
available and implement the most effective controls” (p. 441). Lacking knowledge can lead to
less effective security. To cope with systems risk, the authors identify an approach that includes
the use of a security risk planning model, security awareness training and countermeasure matrix
analysis. The awareness program involves educating managers and users. The managers should
be educated on the security action cycle, which involves deterrence, prevention, detection and
remedies for computer abuse. Managers should also be educated on “obvious vulnerabilities and
resources which are required to secure systems at some minimal ‘acceptable’ level” (p. 460).
Everyone, including managers and users should receive security awareness training covering
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high level objectives, such as the security action cycle, as well as specific lower level
vulnerabilities and responses. This training should also cover security policies and be offered to
new employees at orientation and veteran employees in refresher programs. While this paper
suggests that managers receive specific training that is in addition to the information security
training, the paper fails to recognize the importance of socio-technical aspects of security.
Instead the authors suggest the use of checklists, which have been shown to be technically
oriented.

In supporting the need for information security training, Von Solms and Von Solms (2004)
create a list of the ten most deadly sins of information security management. In the list is “not
realizing the core importance of information security awareness amongst users” (p. 372). The
authors state that in some companies “no proper awareness programs exist, and users are
unaware of the risks of using the company’s IT infrastructure and the potential damage they can
cause” (p. 375). The consequence of committing this sin, according to the authors, is that “many
information security related intentions will fail to materialize” (p. 375).

In other research demonstrating the importance of security awareness training, Lamour (2008)
used the Solomon four group experimental design to investigate the effects of training on
security practitioners and users. The experimental design consisted of pre-tests and post-tests
for groups that received training as well as control groups that did not receive training.
Practitioners received training on how to secure Cisco routers. Users received training on how to
recognize phishing attacks. The results showed that the practitioner group that received training
nearly quadrupled their scores from pre-test to post-test, from about 25% to near 100%. The
practitioner control group that did not receive training remained at the low 25% level. The user
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treatment group also had a large increase in recognizing phishing attacks. They increased from
40% to over 90% from pre-test to post-test scores. The control group that did not receive
training remained at the low 40% level. These results indicate that training can be useful for
both practitioners and users.

In calling for more research in the area of security awareness training, Schultz (2004) states that
he fears too many security awareness training programs are subpar. “Some simply present
platitudes about security to their captive audiences instead of teaching things that could and
should make a practical difference in each attendee’s daily job” (Schultz, 2004, p. 2). Also,
many programs are out of alignment with business goals and are taught by independent training
organizations, resulting in a “one size fits all” approach (Schultz, 2004). Schultz suggests that
posters, coffee cups, pens, and slogans are overused and have become meaningless and
“gimmicky” (Schultz, 2004). Schultz suggests that research should work to address the
following issues regarding security awareness training: (1) “How can we better measure and then
maximize ROI for security training and awareness?” (p. 2); (2) “How can we better align
security training and awareness efforts with business drivers?” (p. 2); (3) “How to impart users,
system administrators, managers and others the security-related knowledge and skills they really
need?” (p. 2); (4) “How can we enable them to better retain and put into practice what they
learn?” (p. 2); and (5) that there is a need for evidence of success stories.

Another stream of information security training research attempts to make training more
effective. For instance, in researching how people internalize training, Siponen (2000) believes
current methods are descriptive and lack theoretical foundations in motivation and behavior.
From the viewpoint of behavioral theories, a laissez-faire style of leadership and lax management
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attitude concerning security and passing around of circulars are inept and inapplicable in security
procedures (Siponen, 2000). “Successful organizational awareness or education requires more
actions than merely the given of a set of rules” (Siponen, 2000, p. 36). Security guidelines need
to be justified and relevant, in a way that people’s cognitive states can be changed by justifying
each guideline (Siponen, 2000). “End users may change their attitude and motivation towards
the guidelines in the intended way” (p. 36). Siponen suggests a persuasion framework based on
the theory of intrinsic motivation, the theory of planned behavior, and the technology acceptance
model. The practical approaches or principles derived from these theories are morals and ethics,
well-being, a feeling of security, rationality, logic and emotions. The goal is to create justifiable
security guidelines based on these theoretically based principles. Doing so gives management
the best chances that their employees will internalize the guidelines and minimize errors.

In other research about the psychological factors of security training, Thomson & von Solms
(1998) suggest that techniques from social psychology can be applied to security awareness
training to make training more effective. In order to bring a positive change in an employee’s
behavior, the authors suggest using social psychology principles such as changing behavior
directly, using a change in behavior to influence a person’s attitude, and changing a person’s
attitude through persuasion. A security awareness program should teach measures that become
subconsciously entrenched into the end-user, so that they do not have to think in order to
promote security (Thomson & von Solms, 1998). Examples include habitually signing off from
the computer when leaving the office, making sure the screen is not visible to those not
authorized to see it, and making regular backups of important data (Thomson & von Solms,
1998). Based on these principles, the authors make suggestions for conducting security
awareness training. A summary of these suggestions follows (Thomson & von Solms, 1998):
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1. an awareness program should be geared toward groups of similar work levels (upper
management, line employees, etc.);
2. sessions should be divided into a number of short education sessions, to allow
participants to be more relaxed and to retain their full attention;
3. commitment from employees is required at the conclusion of each session;
4. the material adherence should be evaluated, preferably without the participant’s
knowledge. The authors suggest this may be done through observation or each
participant could report what they have done to implement what they have learned in
previous sessions;
5. visible tokens of appreciation should be given to those that adhered to the training
techniques. Tokens should be visible, but not of great monetary value;
6. each session should cover more topics than actually required. Getting commitment for all
topics and then reducing down to what is necessary makes participants feel like the
instructor has given them something and they may be more likely to adhere to the
remaining topics; and
7. the presenter should be an expert and well presented.

How to make security training more effective was the topic of research from Cone et al. (2007),
where the authors describe a video game, CyberCIEGE, that was developed to deliver security
awareness training. The game was designed to make security awareness training more effective,
while holding the trainee’s attention long enough to get the message across. The game uses
adaptable virtual scenarios to allow players to make choices about security in a particular
enterprise environment and see the consequences of their choices, when the environment is under
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attack from hackers, vandals, and potentially well-motivated professionals (Cone et al. 2007).
The authors conclude that the game can be an effective addition to awareness training programs.

In investigating various formats of training, Shaw et al. (2009) reported on the impact of
information richness on online information security awareness training effectiveness. The
authors identify three levels of security awareness: perception, comprehension and projection.
Perception is “to achieve an understanding of the presence or awareness of a threat” (p. 93).
Comprehension refers to the user’s ability to understand and assess the dangers posed by various
security risks. Projection is the ability of users to project or predict the future course of security
attacks.

The research investigates the impact of hypermedia, multimedia and hypertext to increase
security awareness among the three awareness levels. Hypermedia is the richest medium and is
defined as “an interactive medium that can consist of graphics, audio, video, plain text and
hyperlinks, intertwined to create a generally non-linear medium of information” (p. 94).
Multimedia has less richness than hypermedia and more than hypertext. “Multimedia combines
text, image, sound, music, animation, video and virtual reality, but must be accessed in a linear
sequence” (p. 95). Hypertext is the least rich medium and is described as “plain text with the
hyperlink features that does not incorporate feedback capability, multiple cues, language variety
and personal focus” (p. 95).

The authors find positive correlations between the degree of media richness and the
improvement of security awareness among the awareness levels. Hypermedia was the most
effective, followed by multimedia and hypertext. However, there was a negative effect of too
much richness on learning performance at the perception level. The authors suggest media
38

richness is less important for learning at the perception level and most important for advancing to
the comprehension and projection levels.

Only a few studies or surveys were found that investigated information security training in
context with the actual content of training. One was Rotvold (2008), where the author attempted
to discover the current state of security training within organizations by conducting a survey of
144 organizations representing small to large organizations in many sectors. Sixty percent of the
organizations surveyed reported their organizations performed security awareness training, with
44.7% of the 60% reporting it was mandatory. In those 44.7%, attendance was tracked 72.8% of
the time. Given these reported numbers, the actual percentage of employees receiving security
awareness training can be quite low. Training was most frequently offered once a year (45%)
and the training was conducted by IT staff 58% of the time, followed by management which
conducted the training 28% of the time. The top delivery methods for security awareness
training were face-to-face sessions (54%), e-mail messages (53%), online training (47%),
presentations (32%), newsletters (29%), and posters/flyers (28%). The most common general
topic in information security training was security policy. Some of Rovold’s top policy training
topics are ‘acceptable use (89%), e-mail (85%), passwords (78%), backup and recovery (71%),
antivirus (70%), software installation and licensing (67%) and disaster recovery (58.2%). Of the
top 15 topics in information security training, where policies was number one, all were
technically oriented.

In a government sponsored survey, the 2006 CSI\FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey
found that information security policies were the most important topic of information security
training (CSI, 2006). In the 2007 version of the survey, security policies were still a top topic for
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security training (CSI, 2007). The 2008 and 2009 versions of the survey no longer investigated
the primary topics of training.

In summary of current information security training research, this literature review demonstrates
the need for information security training and shows how vulnerable security can be without a
training program. The literature review also demonstrates the characteristics of effective
training, and also describes ways to make it more effective. It does so in the form of theoretical
models or frameworks, though none of these models are tested. These theoretical concepts focus
on learning and obeying through persuasion and motivation to get trainees to remember and obey
the content of the training. Very little research was found that investigated the actual content of
information security training, with Rotvold’s (2008) paper being the only in-depth study.
Rotvold’s study not only revealed to us that security policy was the content of training, but also
listed the security policy topics. The CSI (2006, 2007) surveys also stated that security policy
was a top topic of training, but did not list the actual policy topics.

2.5 Literature Review Discussion:

The nature and scope of information security training and information security policy is
important to this dissertation because research demonstrates that the socio-technical approach is
the best way to maximize the security of information systems (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000,
2001; Trompeter & Eloff, 2001; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Dhillon, 2007; Siponen, 2001).
However, current information security training and information security policy is technically
oriented, and lacking in the social aspects of security (Rotvold, 2008; CWS, 2010; Fulford &
Doherty, 2003). The social aspects of information security are important because they engage
the human element of information systems. While organizations rely heavily on computers and
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other technology to compete, they still need people to use and maintain that technology.
Focusing only on securing the technology and ignoring the people that use the technology is
incomplete security.

To consider the people side of organizations, Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) describe a concept
called RITE, which stands for responsibility, integrity, trust and ethicality of individuals. The
authors state that organizations need to ensure that employees understand their roles and
responsibilities within the organization. The integrity of employees is also very important, as
well as having a trusting relationship between employees and the employer. Organizations
should also consider the ethicality of employees. Ethical aspects of security are just as important
as technical aspects and companies with ethics programs suffer less economic crime (Trompeter
& Eloff, 2001, ECS, 2007). Another social aspect of information security that no organization
should ignore is the creation of a strong security culture (Ruighaver et al., 2007; Dhillon, 2007;
Karyda, et al., 2005; von Solms & von Solms, 2004; Leech, 2003; Vroom and von Solms,
2004). A strong security culture has been linked to such things as compliant user behavior and
employees engaging in security enhancing conduct beyond their mandatory job descriptions
(D’Arcy & Greene, 2009).

If socio-technical security is the best way to protect information systems, then how does an
organization create socio-technical security? They do it through their information security
policies. Information security policy is broken down into corporate security policy and
procedural security policy, which Baskerville and Siponen (2002) call high and low level
security policy. The creation of corporate security policy is the crucial beginning for overall
information systems security because this level of policy affects lower level procedural policy

41

and information security training programs. Corporate security policy describes general goals
for information security, but not the actual means for accomplishing those goals. Procedural
security policy describes the means for carrying out the corporate security policy. Corporate
security policy is used as the template for procedure oriented security policy (Baskerville &
Siponen, 2002). A goal of any organization should be for managers to create socio-technical
corporate security policy so that procedural security policies also become socio-technical.

Once corporate and procedural information security policies are socio-technical, how will
information security training be affected? The connection between information security policy
and information security training is that the topic of training is primarily the procedural security
policies (Straub & Welke, 1998; Rotvold, 2006; CSI, 2006, 2007). Recall that the procedural
security policies are the means for implementing the corporate policies. A part of the
implementation process is to educate the employees about the policies. It is difficult to have
policies and expect employees to follow them if they are not educated about them adequately.
This inadequacy leads to employees/users that lack the proper security knowledge (Rezgui &
Marks, 2008). This is why procedural policies are the primary subject of information security
training. Organizations currently use information security training as a primary way of
protecting their information systems (CWS, 2010).

We know that information systems should be protected with socio-technical solutions and that
information security training is a primary method for protection. We also know that information
security training is based on procedural security policy and that procedural security policy is a
means for achieving corporate security policy. The last piece to the puzzle discusses the creation
of the corporate security policy and possible reasons it is not created with socio-technical
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solutions. Corporate security policy is created at the strategic level of the organization by
managers that have very little experience or knowledge of creating security policy (Hone &
Eloff, 2002; von Solms & von Solms, 2004). Their expertise is usually in some other area, such
as business planning, forecasting, finance, etc. Hone and Eloff (2002) suggest that those creating
the policy often lack the knowledge to do so. Their “lack of skills and understanding” in
developing a security policy often leads the authors to “turn to other organization’s policies,
commercially available sources or templates available from public sources, such as the Internet,
for answers to their questions” (pp. 402-403).

Among the commercially available options available to managers are checklists or standardized
guidelines. According to Ernst & Young’s 2008 Global Information Security Survey, 70% of
those organizations surveyed used standardized guidelines to create security policies and that
number is expected to increase (GISS, 2008). However, we know that checklists or guidelines
have many shortcomings, including the lack of flexibility to changing business environments and
the lack of attention to social aspects of security (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Dhillon &
Backhouse, 2001). It is completely understandable why managers use checklists over 70% of the
time to create security policies. Checklists have become widely used by organizations and are
generally accepted.

In deciding what corporate security polices to create, a manager has many options to consider.
They can use the above option, such as checklists, or they can also rely on their education,
experience and knowledge. Their decision is likely to be based on a combination of all of these,
but should be aligned with what they truly believe will be the most effective way of protecting
their information systems. A manager’s belief system about what they think are the most
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effective ways of protecting their information systems is known as their value system, as
described by Keeney (1992). Keeney’s work with value-based objectives and decision making is
discussed in chapter three’s methodology. Keeney’s research is getting introduced here to help
make sense of the connection between the concepts reviewed in this chapter. A manager’s
internal values about how best to protect their information systems are expressed through their
value-based objectives. Keeney defines value-based objectives as “statements of something that
one wants to strive towards” (p. 34). It is these objectives that managers use to create corporate
security policy. If their beliefs (values) are that socio-technical solutions are the best way for
protecting their information systems, then they will create socio-technical information security
objectives. As seen in figure 2.1, these socio-technical security objectives will influence the
corporate security policy they create. Corporate security policy will then inform procedural
security policy and the information security training will then be socio-technical as well.

Manager's
Security
Objectives

Corporate
Information
Security
Policy

Procedural
Information
Security
Policy

Information
Security
Training

Figure 2.1: Policy to Training Relationship

2.6 Literature Review Conclusion:
There is a downward flowing relationship between a manager’s individual objectives, corporate
security policy, procedural security policy and information security training. This relationship
stresses the importance of the manager’s value-based security objectives on corporate security
policy because of the effect on procedural policy and training. If managers have socio-technical
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value-based security objectives, they will create socio-technical corporate security policies, thus
leading to socio-technical procedural policies and training. A socio-technical approach to
information security is necessary to maximize security. However, security policy and training is
currently technical in most organizations, meaning manager’s value-based security objectives are
currently technically oriented. This research argues that manager’s value-based security
objectives can be influenced to be socio-technical, thus impacting security policy and training in
a positive way.
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3. Theory and Methodology

3.1 Introduction:

The literature review demonstrated the importance of social and technical aspects in maximizing
overall security (Backhouse & Dhillon, 1996; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000, 2001; Trompeter &
Eloff, 2001; Siponen, 2001; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Dhillon, 2007). The review also
outlined the relationship between corporate information security policy, procedural information
security policy and information security training, as well as the importance of all three to overall
information security (Rezgui and Marks, 2008; May, 2008; Rotvold, 2007, 2008; CSI, 2006,
2007; Von Solms & Von Solms, 2004; Straub & Welke, 1998). The problem is that managers
creating information security policy are creating technically oriented policy and minimizing or
ignoring the social aspects of security (Rotvold, 2008; CWS, 2010; Fulford & Doherty, 2003).
This may be because managers often lack the knowledge to create proper information security
policy (Hone & Eloff, 2002). Therefore, this dissertation will attempt to train managers on the
importance of socio-technical information security with the goal of encouraging them to
implement it into their information security policy.

But how do we know that what managers learn in training will be used in the security policy they
create? We know this from the theoretical foundation of value-focused thinking, described by
Keeney (1992) and mentioned in the previous chapters. A manager’s values and value-based
objectives represent the manager’s core beliefs about the decision situation, in this case, about
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what security policies to create to maximize information security. By using the value-focused
thinking approach, this dissertation will ascertain manager’s values about maximizing
information security after watching an information security training video. There will be four
groups of managers and four types of training videos, with each video having a different nature
and scope. Analyzing the group’s values and value-based objectives toward maximizing
information security will help us answer this dissertation’s research questions.

Another important part of this dissertation is determining how the groups will rank their lists of
value-based objectives. An output from the value-focused thinking method is an unranked list of
value-based security objectives for maximizing information security. Because information
security training often receives less than 1% of the security budget and is often the first to get cut
in budget reductions, this dissertation is interested in ascertaining how managers would rank
their value-based security objectives (CSI, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, Rotvold, 2007, 2008). If
budget restrictions mean some value-based security objectives get implemented and some do not,
which do managers feel are most and least important and what implications would their choices
have on overall information security? To determine a ranked list of value-based objectives from
each group of managers, a ranking Delphi methodology is used. The Delphi methodology has
been around for over 50 years and the ranking Delphi methodology was formalized by Schmidt
(1997) and is used to obtain group rankings of objectives that can then be used for decision
making.

The next two sections describe the value-focused thinking method and how it has been used in
research. The following two sections describe the ranking Delphi method and how it has been
used in research, particularly information systems research. The following section describes this
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dissertation’s research method and the four groups of participants. The last section concludes
this chapter.

3.2 Value-Focused Thinking:

Managers creating information security policy are faced with a decision problem. How do they
decide what policies to create that will maximize information security? When faced with a
problem, a typical decision maker considers the alternatives for solving the problem, and then
considers the objectives for evaluating the alternatives (Keeney, 1992). This leads to the
decision maker solving the decision problem by choosing among available alternatives. Keeney
(1994) refers to this type of decision making as alternative-focused thinking and describes it as
reactive and not proactive. “Solving decision problems is the sole aim of alternative focused
thinking” (Keeney, 1992, p. 47).

Values also solve decision problems, but go beyond that narrowed focus by identifying decision
opportunities, also known as problem finding (Keeney, 1994). Keeney introduced value-focused
thinking in 1992 and described values as more fundamental than alternatives that define all a
decision maker cares about in a given decision situation (Keeney, 1992). The idea of
considering values first, before alternatives, is known as value-focused thinking and can be used
to make better decisions. The reason a decision maker is concerned with a decision problem to
begin with is because of consequences. If the decision maker did nothing, there would be
undesirable consequences, thus this is the reason alternatives were generated. The alternatives
presumably have more desirable consequences. The desirability of various consequences is
based on one’s values, so decision making should also be based on one’s values and not
alternatives. “Alternative-focused thinking is designed to solve decision problems,” where
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“value-focused thinking is designed to identify desirable decision opportunities and create
alternatives” (Keeney, 1996, p. 538). Value focused thinking identifies the best possible
outcome and assists in making it a reality versus other approaches which identify the best of
what is available (Keeney, 1992). Value-focused thinking was chosen for this dissertation
because the method identifies values first, which represent how managers truly feel about
maximizing information security. Influencing manager’s core beliefs about how to best
maximize information security is central to this dissertation’s argument. The best way to gauge
the influence of training given to managers is to ascertain their values.

“Value-focused thinking is designed to focus the decision maker on the essential activities that
must occur prior to solving a decision problem” (Keeney, 1994, p. 33). Figure 3.1 shows how
thinking about values is at the core of many decision making constructs. According to Keeney
(1994), value-focused thinking can help uncover hidden objectives, lead to more productive
information collection, improve communication among concerned parties, facilitate involvement
of multiple stakeholders, enhance the creation and evaluation of alternatives, guide strategic
thinking, identify decision opportunities and enhance the coordination of interconnected
decisions (Keeney, 1994). Thinking about values is at the core of all of these.

Value-focused thinking is a process that identifies objectives, where objectives are defined as
“statements of something that one wants to strive toward” (p. 34). Objectives are characterized
by three features: a decision context, an object and a direction of preference. For example, a
security manager might have an objective to “minimize phishing email.” The decision context is
information security. The object is phishing email and the direction of preference is less
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phishing email rather than more. Objectives are further distinguished as either fundamental
objectives or means objectives.

Creating
alternatives
Uncovering
hidden
objectives

Evaluating
alternatives

Identifying
decision
opportunities

Thinking
about
Values

Improving
communication

Guiding
strategic
thinking

Interconnecting
decisions

Facilitating
involvement in
multiplestakeholder
decisions

Guiding
information
collection

Figure 3.1: Thinking about Values:
The Basis for Quality Decision Making (Keeney, 1994)

Fundamental objectives are “the ends that decision makers value in a specific decision
context” and means objectives are “methods to achieve ends” (p. 34). This dissertation’s use of
value-focused thinking yields a list of unranked security objectives for each of the four groups of
participants.

Keeney (1992, p. 57) describes 10 different, but overlapping, methods for identifying objectives
through values, such as using alternatives, consequences, goals, constraints, guidelines and
50

various perspectives. However, Keeney believes the best way to discover one’s values is to ask
for them (Keeny, 1994). If the goal is to obtain a list of objectives related to a decision problem
from decision makers, start by asking them to develop a list of values, known as a wish list. This
is an unranked list of one’s values toward a given decision. For example, a person buying a car
might list low maintenance costs, comfortable ride and safety as some of their core values. Some
means for achieving these values might be good gas mileage, computerized suspension, leather
seats, anti-lock brakes and air bags. Keeney (1999, p. 534) describes three steps for obtaining a
list of fundamental and means objectives: (1) develop a list of values; (2) express values in
common form; and (3) organize the values and indicate relationships.

The first step involves asking people to develop a wish list of values about a certain topic. The
second step involves the researcher converting the values to objectives by restating the values
into a common form. For example, the person purchasing the car might have written down that
they wished for a car that did not cost a lot to maintain. The researcher might restate this value
into the objective “ensure low maintenance costs.” The third step involves separating
fundamental objectives from means objectives. Using the same car example, there may be the
means objectives “ensure car safety,” “ensure the use of anti-lock brakes,” “ensure the use of
front air bags,” and “ensure the use of side air bags.” These can be the means objectives for the
fundamental objective “ensure car safety.”

Value-focused thinking has been used in a wide variety of research, ranging from military to
environmental applications. Sample topics where value-focused thinking have been used include
fighting terrorists (Bullock, et al, 2008), selecting automatic rifles for the Croatian Army
(Peharda & Hunjak, 2008), locating community correction centers (Johnson, 2006),

51

understanding organizational safety (Merrick, et al, 2005), climate change (Keeney &
McDaniels, 2001), Internet commerce (Keeney, 1999), mobile communications (Yoo, et al,
2001), and business process modeling (Neiger & Churilov, 2004). Because value-focused
thinking is a decision making methodology, it can be used in almost any situation where
decisions need to be made, whether a personal decision or an organizational decision. This is
why value-focused thinking has been used in such a wide variety of research topics.

Value-focused thinking has not been widely used in information systems or information security
research. Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) used value-focused thinking when they interviewed 103
managers to assess their values on information security. As discussed in chapter two, the authors
described 9 fundamental objectives and 16 means objectives related to information security. In
the only other information systems research found that used value-focused thinking, Barclay and
Osei-Bryson (2010) used value-focused thinking to evaluate the values of stakeholders of
information systems projects.

The authors proposed a formal method to develop a

comprehensive set of objectives grounded in the views of the project stakeholders (Barclay &
Osei-Bryson, 2010).

3.3 Ranking Delphi Method:

The output of the value-focused thinking method in this dissertation is a robust list of security
objectives for each of the four groups. This list helps answer the research questions about the
affect of training on the values of the participants and the affect of their value-based objectives
on information security policy. Next, we determine which objectives the groups feel are most
important. In a time of budget constraints or when it is just not possible to implement every
security objective listed, which security objectives are important enough to implement and which
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are expendable? To determine the answer to this question, a ranking Delphi method was used to
create a ranked list of security objectives.

The Delphi method originated with the Rand Corporation in the 1950’s and was used to generate
a consensus of opinion from an anonymous group of experts. It was first used by the military to
investigate nuclear arsenal levels. However, the Delphi method can be used to achieve
consensus on just about any non-complex topic, such as developing a list of criteria, forecasting
trends, ranking and answering specific questions about a topic. For complex topics that cannot
be described in a short and precise research question, other methodologies, like scenarios, are
better suited. There are a series of rounds (iterations) with the group members about the topic
that leads to a higher level of mutual agreement. In each round, the participants are told the
results of the previous round and given a chance to change their opinion. Changing one’s
opinion to reflect the group opinion leads to higher group consensus. The anonymity of the
group members eliminates group think and personality conflicts that may otherwise bias results.
Anonymity also makes it easier for group members to change their mind about a topic without
the knowledge of other group members.

The ranking-type Delphi method is a group exercise and group size can vary dramatically
depending on the nature of the topic and the availability of experts. Some topics may only have
a few people in the world considered to be knowledgeable enough to warrant a Delphi study.
Okoli & Pawlowski (2004) suggest adequate group size for a Delphi study is 10-18 participants,
but can be lower depending on group dynamics. Loo (2002) suggests group sizes of 5-10 can be
adequate.
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Because the Delphi method can be applied to multiple forms of research questions, there are
multiple variations of the methodology. This dissertation is interested in ranking the list of
security objectives produced by the groups, so a ranking methodology was chosen. The ranking
Delphi methodology is what is typically used in information systems research. This variation
uses group members to obtain a ranking of key objectives, which can then be used for decision
making. Prior to Schmidt (1997), a problem with the ranking-type Delphi method was the lack
of a formal set of published rules. Researchers followed inconsistent methodologies, lacked
statistical support for many conclusions, and did not follow for a consistent means of reporting
results (Schmidt, 1997). Schmidt (1997) presented “a method based on nonparametric statistical
techniques,

to

conduct

ranking-type

Delphi

surveys,

perform

analysis

and

report

results” (Schmidt, 1997, p. 763). Schmidt’s technique allowed for statistical support of
conclusions, outlined a clear method, and defined a definitive stopping point for the iterations.
Since then, many Delphi studies wishing to employ ranking utilized the ranking-type Delphi
method described by Schmidt. This dissertation chose Schmidt’s technique because of the
methodological improvements over previous techniques and for the rich supply of literature
support for the Schmidt’s method.

Schmidt’s techniques for conducting ranking-type Delphi research follow a three phase
approach. The first phase discovers the issues, the second determines the most important issues
and the third phase ranks the issues. Below are step by step guidelines for conducting rankingtype Delphi Research, as presented by Schmidt (1997). In this dissertation, phase one was
conducted using the value-focused thinking approach, which yielded an unranked list of security
objectives.
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Phase 1: Discovery of Issues

1. Encourage respondents to submit as many issues as possible.
2. Ask for a description of each issue.
3. The researcher consolidates the list, including different terms that appear to mean the
same thing. Put similar terms together and give a consolidated description.
4. Respondents now verify proper mapping and that their ideas are fairly represented.

Phase 2: Determining the Most Important Issues

1. Send each participant a randomly ordered consolidated list from phase 1 (this list was
created with the value-focused thinking method).
2. Participants select at least 10% (more if less than 100 items) of the issues they feel are
most important. Do not ask participants to limit their list to a particular number of
issues. Ask them to list the minimum number and go beyond if necessary.
3. The researcher eliminates all issues not selected by a simple majority of respondents,
which creates a new consolidated list. Groups will have varying lengths of lists.
4. If the list is still too long, conduct phase 2 again with the shortened list.

Phase 3: Ranking the Issues

1. Arrange the paired list in random order and ask respondents to rank all the issues.
Statistics can be used to rank ties, but it’s easier to ask respondents to avoid ties.
2. Apply Kendall’s Method to create a consensual ranking of the individual lists. Kendall’s
coefficient of concordance (W) (Kendall & Gibbons, 1990; Siegel & Castellan, 1988).
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3. After each round in this phase, the researcher must ask the participants if another round
should be conducted to obtain a better consensus.
4. Monitor Kendall’s W (see table 3.1). A leveling off of Kendall’s W indicates lack of
progress from the previous round, so polling should stop. This coupled with verbal group
consensus strongly supports stopping. Consider the actual value of W as the indication of
consensus strength and not the statistical significance of W. A high value indicates
consensus in groups of 10 or less. In groups of 10 or more, a smaller value of W can be
significant. Kendall’s W ranges from 0 (no agreement) to 1 (complete agreement). A
strong consensus is W = .7 and is a good indicator to stop polling.
5. Information to monitor beyond mean ranks: (1) interpretation of Kendall’s W from the
previous round; (2) percentage of respondents placing each item in the top half of their
list; and (3) comments from the participants. The first two convey the degree of
consensus. Do not consider standard deviation as a form of consensus because it cannot
be applied to ordinal level data.

Table 3.1: Interpretation of Kendall’s W. (Schmidt, 1997)
W
.1
.3
.5
.7
.9

Interpretation
Very weak agreement
Weak agreement
Moderate agreement
Strong agreement
Unusually strong agreement

Confidence in Ranks
None
Low
Fair
High
Very high

The Delphi method has been utilized in research for over 50 years, so hundreds of studies were
found utilizing the method. Many of the studies focused on forecasting or developing a
framework and most identified some set of issues or factors pertaining to the topic under study.
Since the Delphi method is used to get a consensus of opinion from an anonymous group, it can
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be utilized in a large variety of disciplines and fields. Recent examples were found in molecular
genetics (Marsden, 2009), medical ethics (Vorm, 2009), psychotherapy (Opie, 2008), ecology
(Prato, 2008), tourism (Lee, 2008), biological conservation (Patrick, 2008), engineering (Miura,
2008) and accident analysis (Kim, 2008).

There were dozens of studies found in information systems/information technology research that
utilized the Delphi method. Table 3.2 lists five of the studies found that utilized the Delphi
method, but did not utilize the techniques for ranking described by Schmidt (1997). Those
studies will now be described in more detail to demonstrate their inconsistencies with Schmidt’s
formal methodology.

Table 3.2: Delphi Method in IS Research
Author
Doke & Swanson
(1995)
Brancheau, et al.
(1996)
Hayne & Pollard
(2000)
Mulligan (2002)
Nakatsu &
Iacovou (2009)

Purpose
Identify decision variables for selecting prototyping in
information systems development.
Identify critical issues facing information systems executives in
the forthcoming 3-5 years.
Identify the critical issues in information systems for the
forthcoming 5 years.
Classify information technology within the financial services
industry
Identify risk factors for domestic and offshore outsourced
projects (two groups)

Group Size
31, 29, 27
78, 87, 83
176, 157
25, 24, 23
15, 15, 15

14, 11, 12

Doke and Swanson (1995) used a ranking Delphi method to identify decision variables for
selecting prototyping in information systems development. Thirty one MIS managers completed
round one of the group iterations, which yielded nine decision variables for selecting
prototyping. Twenty nine participated in the second round, where a tenth decision variable was
added. Twenty seven participated in the third and final round. This ranking method was one of
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the older methodologies that did not utilize Schmidt’s (1997) techniques. Schmidt’s techniques
would not have allowed for the addition of new decision variables in the second round.

In a paper published in MIS Quarterly, Brancheau et al. (1996) forecasted critical issues facing
information systems executives in the forthcoming 3-5 years. Participants were members of the
Society for Information Management (SIM), where 78 participated in the first round, 87 in the
second round, and 83 in the third round. Not all of these participants were the same throughout
the rounds and 108 overall participants were used. Interchanging participants during the
iterations is one of the inconsistencies of previous methodologies. The results of this study
yielded 21 critical issues, where business relationship issues declined and technology
infrastructure issues increased in importance.

In another paper forecasting the critical issues in information systems in the forthcoming five
years, Hayne and Pollard (2000) used a modified Delphi technique. The authors invited 920
members from the Canadian Information Processing Society (CIPS) to join the study and 176
participated in round one. To boost participation, the authors sent out 536 additional requests to
the non-respondents for a total of 712 invitations. Of those 712, 157 participated in round two.
However, the authors do not disclose how many of those that participated in round two did not
participate in round one and how results may be affected by those participants not having had
input in the previous round. The authors reported results on the top 10 upcoming critical issues
facing information systems.

In other research, Mullican (2002) used a Delphi Study to help classify information technology
within the financial services industry. The group was made up of senior information technology
managers from 11 organizations. Round one had 25 participants, round two had 24, and round
58

three had 23 participants. A positive point in the author’s methodology was that while
participation decreased, each remaining participant did participate in the previous round. Since
each round builds on the previous, it is much better to lose participants than it is to add new ones
in later rounds. The results of the Delphi portion of this research produced the initial
specification of a capability-based typology for information technology. The authors used this
specification for a follow-up case study.

In the last study reviewed that did not use Schmidt’s Delphi techniques, Nakatsu and Iacovau
(2009) used a Delphi study to identify risk factors for domestic and offshore outsourced
projects. Two Delphi panels were assembled, one for domestic risk factors and one for offshore
risk factors. The domestic panel started with 17 participants and the offshore panel started with
15 participants. The participants consisted of experienced information technology managers that
engage in outsourcing. In round one of the Delphi study, 15 domestic panelists and 14 offshore
panelists participated. In round two, the same 15 domestic panelists participated, but only 11
offshore panelists participated. In round three, the domestic panel again had 15 participants, and
the offshore panel increased to 12, meaning the additional panelist did not participate in the
previous round. While the authors did calculate a Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W),
they chose to quit the iterations because of their panelist’s busy schedules and not according to a
consensus of the panelists, which is described in Schmidt’s techniques. Neither panel reported
strong consensus, as Kendall’s W was .51 for the domestic group and .53 for the offshore group
after round 3. Both are moderate consensus indicators. In the final results, the authors reported
20 domestic risk factors and 25 offshore risk factors.
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All of the studies just discussed used the Delphi method in information systems research.
However, there was no consistency in the methodology, particularly on when the study should
end. They all went for several rounds, whether it was necessary or not. Only one reported a
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) for measuring consensus, but did not use the
measurement to determine if further iterations should be conducted. The primary reason
Schmidt’s Delphi techniques were chosen for this dissertation is because of the well defined
methodology, versus the inconsistent methodologies just reviewed.

Table 3.3 describes five studies that used Schmidt’s ranking techniques and reported the relevant
information. The Schmidt ranking Delphi method is what is used in this dissertation. The
studies will now be described in more detail.

Table 3.3: Ranking Delphi Method in IS Research (Schmidt, 1997)
Author
Schmidt et al.
(2001)
Keil, et al.
(2002)
Mursu et al.
(2003)
Lee & Anderson
(2006)
Kasi, et al.
(2008)

Purpose
Develops a list of common risk factors of
information technology project failure.
Compares the perceptions of information
technology project risk factors between users
and project managers.
Identify key software project risks in Nigeria.
Identify factors impacting the information
technology project management capability.
Identify the most important barriers to
conducting post mortem evaluations on failed
information technology projects.

Group Size
Group 1: 9
Group 2: 13
Group 3: 19

Kendall’s W
.19, .53, .51
.17, .39, .46, .50
.35, .60, .73

15, 10

.5, .24

11, 5

.142, .256

33, 33, 32

.28

23, 23, 23

.26, .33, .52

Schmidt et al. (2001) used his own methodology to develop a list of common risk factors of
information technology project failure. The authors ran three separate ranking Delphi panels at
the same time, one from the United States (19 panelists), one from Hong Kong (9 panelists), and
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one from Finland (13 panelists). This was done to include cultural differences and to compare
the group’s results. Participants were experienced project managers from each culture. The
initial list of 53 risk factors was created in combination with all 3 groups. The master list was
sent to all three groups to be reduced in size. The United States group reduced the list to 17
items, Hong Kong reduced their list to 15 items, and the Finnish group reduced their list to 23
items. Kendall’s W for the United States group for 3 rounds of ranking was .35, .60, and .73,
ending with strong consensus. Kendall’s W for the Hong Kong group through three rounds of
ranking was .19, .53, and .51. Ranking ended with moderate consensus because round three
failed to significantly increase Kendall’s W, but instead decreased it. The Finnish group needed
four iterations to reach consensus. Kendall’s W for the Finnish group’s four rounds was .17, .39,
.46, and .50, ending with moderate consensus. The iterations were stopped because the fourth
iteration failed to significantly increase Kendall’s W. The authors reported results of the final
rankings from the three groups and compared the group’s rankings to one another. They also
compared rankings to other Delphi studies. This study from Schmidt et al. (2001) is the closest
study in relation to this dissertation. This dissertation also has multiple groups requiring varying
number of iterations to reach consensus.

In research that compares the perceptions of information technology project risk factors between
users and project managers, Keil, et al. (2002) used Schmidt’s Delphi techniques. Fifteen
participants started with an initial list of 53 project risk factors and the list was narrowed to 13 by
majority. The initial list was provided to the participants and they were asked to shorten it
starting with phase two of Schmidt’s technique. This dissertation also starts with Schmidt’s
phase two, as phase one was accomplished by value-focused thinking. The participants first
round of ranking yielded a Kendall’s W of .5. The second round of ranking lost 5 participants
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and Kendall’s W dropped to .24. After contacting participants, the authors concluded that
participants no longer believed a better consensus could be achieved beyond the initial .5, which
indicates moderate agreement. The study was stopped and consensus results were reported at .5,
after the first iteration.

In another study about project risks, Mursu et al. (2003) identified key software project risks in
Nigeria. The 11 participants were project managers representing 11 different companies. The
panel initially created a list of 72 key software lists. That list was then narrowed to 19 risk
factors. The first round of ranking yielded a Kendall’s W of .142, which is not unusual for the
first round. Like the Keil, et al. (2002) study, the second round dropped several participants,
leaving only 5. Kendall’s W increased to .256, which still indicates weak agreement. Because
there was little movement in Kendall’s W and both rounds resulted in weak agreement, the
authors decided to stop the study with questionable results.

Changing research topics to project management capabilities, Lee and Anderson (2006) used a
Delphi method to identify factors that impact capability. The participants consisted of 33
information technology project managers. The authors started with a predetermined list of 35
factors that influence project effectiveness and the group narrowed the list to 13. There were
three iterations of ranking with a final Kendall’s W of .28. This can be considered weak
agreement, but smaller values of Kendall’s W can be considered significant for larger group
sizes. The values of Kendall’s W were not reported after the first two rounds. The authors
reported results as the final list of 13 factors impacting project management capabilities.

The last Delphi study to be reviewed is research from Kasi et al. (2008), where the authors
identify the most important barriers to conducting post mortem evaluations on failed information
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technology projects. The panelists consisted of 23 experienced practitioners. Like the Keil et al.
(2002) research, the authors started with a predetermined list of 31 barriers. The group was
asked to use that list to brainstorm additional barriers, from which they generated 7 more,
forming a total of 38. The panelists then reduced the list from 38 to 19. There were then three
rounds of ranking with Kendall’s W improving from .26 to .33 in the second iteration, and then
to .52 in the third iteration. The authors stated that they believed an additional round would not
produce better results and that they were satisfied with .52, which indicates moderate consensus.
This decision to stop should be a consensus of the group according to Schmidt, but the authors
did not report if the group was consulted in the decision. The authors also did not report if the
number of participants changed in iterations two and three, and the assumption is that they did
not. The final results of 19 ranked barriers to conducting post mortem evaluations of failed
information technology projects was reported.

All of these Delphi studies followed Schmidt’s techniques and reported the step by step process,
making the results easy to comprehend. The studies also reported the relevant information, such
as the size of the initial list, the size of the shortened list and Kendall’s W of the final ranking.
There were other studies that stated they followed Schmidt’s techniques, but failed to report
important data, such as Kendall’s W (Addison, 2003; Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004; Weimer &
Seuring, 2008).

3.4 Research Design:

Value-focused thinking and Delphi studies can consist of any number of groups, with each group
coming to its own conclusion about a topic of interest. Typically, only one group is used to
create objectives or make a decision about a particular topic and that group is usually a group of
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experts, as evident in most studies in the review of research. This dissertation instead assembled
four groups of panelists, each of which developed their own list of security objectives using the
value-focused thinking approach. Each group then ranked those security objectives using
Schmidt’s ranking Delphi method.

The four groups were assembled and asked to watch a 35 minute video, followed by a valuefocused thinking exercise to ascertain the participant’s values about the topic of information
security. There was a socio-technical group, social group, technical group, and control group.
The socio-technical group watched a video describing social and technical aspects of information
security (see table 3.4). The social group’s video covered only the social aspects of information
security for half of the video and the second half was padded with sexual harassment training.
The technical group’s video covered only technical aspects of information security for the first
half of the video and the second half was padded with sexual harassment training. The sexual
harassment part of the videos was added to lengthen the video to 35 minutes to make all groups
equal in video length. Group four was the control group that watched a video about anger
management and sexual harassment, which are topics believed to be unrelated to information
security and would not affect the results. More specific content for each video is discussed in
chapter four.

After watching the video, the participants were asked to write down what they valued as the most
important topics to corporate information security and information security training. Participants
were told to act as if they were managers in charge of maximizing information security and the
effectiveness of information security training program (see appendix A for a full description of
the survey instrument).
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Table 3.4: Experimental Design

Gets Social
Training

No Social
Training

Gets
Technical
Training

No
Technical
Training

Group #1
(Socio-Technical)

Group #2
(Social)

Group #3
(Technical)

Group #4
(Control)

Following Keeney’s (1992) value-focused thinking methodology, the participant’s values were
ascertained and converted to security objectives. The objectives for each individual participant
were then combined into a group master list to be ranked by the participant’s working as a
group. Similar objectives listed by different names were clustered into common form for the
master list. Participants were given an opportunity to review the master list to verify their
original values were converted to objectives properly and described in the master list
accordingly. This process is explained in much more detail in the next chapter.

Ranking the objectives was performed using Schmidt’s (1997) ranking-type Delphi
methodology. Several rounds of anonymous ranking were conducted with each group. Analysis
of the group consensus was measured with Kendall’s W, as determined by using PASW
statistical software (formally SPSS). The outcome of each group was a list of ranked objectives
identifying what the group determined as the most important security objectives in creating an
effective information security awareness program and maximizing overall information security.
This process is explained in detail in chapter five.
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3.5 Conclusion:

Four groups of managers were used to determine the influence of training on security objectives
and the ranking of those objectives. To help panelists think about social and technical aspects of
security before writing down their values about information security, a series of videos were
produced. One group watched a video explaining the importance of both social and technical
aspects of information security. Another group watched a video explaining the importance of
only the social aspects of information security. A third group watched a video of only the
importance of the technical aspects of information security. The fourth group was a control
group to see how managers would perform with no education imparted from a training video.

Keeney’s (1992) value-focused thinking methodology was used to determine the manager’s
values about information security and to create security objectives. Schmidt’s (1997) rankingtype Delphi methodology was used to rank the security objectives to determine their importance.
Both methodologies have a proven research record. The procedure and analysis of these
methodologies and the discussion of the results are in the next chapters. Chapter four discusses
the value-focused thinking analysis and chapter five discusses the ranking-type Delphi analysis.
Chapter six discusses the results and overall implications to information systems research.
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4. Defining Objectives That Inform Security Policy
The objective of this chapter is to illustrate the impact of different kinds of information security
training on information security policy formulation. This was a long process that involved
creating four training videos, collecting data, and following Keeney’s method of converting
values to objectives. Each of these areas will be discussed in detail below.

4.1 Training Video Creation:

Four different training videos were produced that lasted a total of 35 minutes each. One video
covered social and technical topics, another covered only social topics, a third covered only
technical topics and the fourth video was used as a control video and covered none of those
topics. More specific content of each video will be discussed in the following sections and a
more detailed outline of each video can be found in appendix B. The format of the videos
involved a combination of a series of one-on-one interviews with an expert in social and
technical aspects of information security and how-to video lectures. In the expert interviews, the
interviewer asked questions pertaining to socio-technical topics and the expert responded in a
way that explained the topic, thus creating a learning environment for the viewer. The how-to
videos were an assortment of educational lectures on particular topics, such as how to backup
computer data or how to create a secure password. All of the how-to videos are free public
interest videos available to anyone from companies such as Microsoft and Cisco. A more
detailed look at the content of each video is given next.
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4.1.1 Socio-Technical Group Training Video:

The socio-technical training video covered social and technical aspects of information security,
as discussed in the literature review. The overall theme of the video covered Dhillon and
Backhouse’s (2000) confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of data as the starting point
for the technical discussion and the responsibility, integrity, trust, and ethicality (RITE) of people
as the starting point of the social discussion. One question asked by the interviewer that opened
the dialog with the subject matter expert was how to manage the insider threat. The expert
responded by discussing Dhillon’s (2007) formal, informal, and technical systems of information
security, as well as policies, procedures, processes, guiding principles, security culture, legal
systems and standards. Further questioning led to examples of the formal, informal, and
technical systems. Norms and culture were discussed in detail as examples of the informal
system. Rules, regulations and processes were discussed as examples of the formal system.
Access rights, encryption, and passwords were used as examples of the technical system, as
mentioned by Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) and Rotvold (2008). More examples of topics
discussed in this video include responsibility and authority structures, leadership styles,
management commitment, deterrents, resource allocation, user involvement and regulations.

4.1.2 Social Group Training Video:

The social group training video contains the social elements of information security and not the
technical elements. Therefore, to have the video last for 35 minutes to be equal to the length of
the other videos, part of the social video contained filler. This filler video was in the form of
training on sexual harassment and was chosen because the topic is unrelated to securing
information resources and poses the minimum risk of affecting the values of the participants.
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Adding this filler was necessary to make up the time of the missing technical aspects of
information security.

The social aspects of security in this video primarily focused on the responsibility, integrity, trust
and ethicality (RITE) of people from Dhillon and Backhouse (2000). One question asked by the
interviewer was how to manage people and culture. The expert responded by explaining
motivation through good leadership, power of groups, people relationships and positive and
negative intentions. Another interview question asked about tools or techniques that could be
used to teach proper social systems. The expert then explained how to understand silent
messages from groups or organizations, group associations and interactions with others. Other
topics covered in this video include motivating and influencing people through leadership, power
relationships, belief systems influencing attitudes, work situations, personal factors,
opportunities for crime, privacy, social and emotional intelligence and empathy.

4.1.3 Technical Group Training Video:

The technical group training video contained technical aspects of information security and not
the social aspects. Like the social video, filler was needed to make up for the missing content so
that the total video length would be 35 minutes. Sexual harassment was the topic chosen for the
filler video because it is a topic believed to have a minimal influence on the values of the
participants.

The technical part of this video consisted of a series of presentations on multiple technical
security topics. The primary topics covered are those reported by Rotvold (2007) as those
organizations currently include in security awareness training and what Fulford & Doherty
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(2003) reported as those which organizations currently include in their information security
policy. A sample of topics include computer updates, viruses, malware, secure e-mail, data
backup, physical security, encryption, passwords, firewalls and phishing. This video represents
what research suggests is the typical security awareness training video given by most
corporations today.

4.1.4 Control Group Training Video:

The control group video was intended to last 35 minutes like the other videos, but with material
that was believed to have a minimal affect on the participant’s values. Since this video does not
contain any social or technical aspects of security, it had to be filled with unrelated information.
Like the filler used in the social and technical videos, sexual harassment was used as part of the
filler. However, more filler was needed to meet the time requirements. Therefore, a video
segment on anger management was added to extend the total time to 35 minutes. Both topics are
unrelated to social and technical aspects of information security.

4.2 Data Collection:

The four groups in this research were made up of current and future business managers that were
enrolled in a Master’s of Business Administration degree program. Forty-one participants were
randomly assigned to one of the four groups, resulting in three groups of ten and one group of
eleven (see table 4.1 for group dynamics). The forty-one participants represented 31 different
corporations.
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Table 4.1: Group Dynamics
Group

Group
Size

Companies
Represented

10

Male Female Average Average
Age
Management
Experience
(years)
7
3
32
1.7

SocioTechnical
Social
Technical
Control

10
10
11

8
8
9

8
9
7

2
2
2

27
28
30

1.3
.8
1.2

7

Before watching the training video, each group was told that their input was to help maximize
information security and information security training and that they would get to help in
choosing what security topics to include. They were told that information security training is the
method of educating all employees on how best to protect an organization’s information
systems. Each group was presented with one of the four training videos and participants were
allowed to take notes if needed. At the conclusion of the video, participants were asked to write
down and briefly describe what topics they believed are most important if they were a manager
in charge of maximizing information security and the effectiveness of the information security
training program. They were asked to format their answers as if they were creating a wish list
with no constraints.

4.3 Values to Objectives:

According to Keeney (1994), the best way to learn someone’s values about a particular subject is
to ask them to tell you in the form of a wish list. Participants listed what they wished to be
included in an information security program that maximized information security. These wishes
are the participant’s values toward information security. However, the raw data from the
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participants came in many forms. Many included one value in a statement, such as “I think
training should include password use,” but some included several values per statement, such as
“I think training should include password use and virus protection.” Others wrote in paragraph
form that contained even more values. This raw data had to be converted to a common form that
represented single values, which is described in section 4.3.1. An example of a value would be
“I wish training included a topic on passwords.” The values then needed to be converted to
objectives and clustered. An example of an objective could be converting the previous value to
the objective “ensure password protection is fully utilized.” Clustering refers to grouping similar
objectives into a single objective. Many objectives may end up referring to utilizing password
protection, but were stated using different words. In this case, they can be clustered into a single
objective. This involved converting the values into objective statements and clustering similar
objectives. This process is described in section 4.3.2 and results in a final list of security
objectives representative of each group of participants. The socio-technical group was chosen to
demonstrate this process. The next few sections follow the process through to the completion of
five objectives, out of the 72 the group finished with. For a complete conversion process, see
appendices D and E.

4.3.1 Raw Data to Common Form

Participant’s raw data input had to be broken down into a single common form, where only one
value was represented at a time. To simply the statements in the process of converting the raw
data, participant statements were reworded and expressed as wishes. Raw data that contained
multiple wishes were broken down into individual statements. For example, in table 4.2, ST1’s
raw data stated “all computers must be password protected, something as easy as screen saver
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passwords might deter an intruder.” The common form of this statement yields two wishes, “I
wish computers were password protected,” and “I wish screen saver passwords were utilized.” If
there was any confusion, any additional descriptions or elaboration given by the participants was
used to better understand the participant’s intended value. The letters ST is a code that
represents the socio-technical group. The codes S, T, and C were used to represent the social
group, technical group, and control group respectively. The number following the code
represents the number assigned to each participant, 1-10 or 1-11 for the control group. Adding
codes to the original input for each participant makes it easier to trace the final objectives back to
the participant or participants from which they originated. See appendix D for the complete
conversion of all raw data to common form.

Table 4.2: Socio-technical Group Raw Data Conversion to Common Form Sample
Raw data from participant
Issue passwords to all employees.
In order to get access, an employee must enter his or her
password.
All computers must be password protected, something as
easy as screen saver passwords might deter an intruder.
Integrity of the people in the organization, trust between
the organization and the employees are more important
than everything.
Emphasize individual integrity in the video as much as
possible.
Make sure people are familiar with the basic procedures,
passwords, logging in, logging off, not sharing
confidential data, and so forth.

Can you share information, for example, in many
companies in “development and research department for
new products?” Are they allowed to email or share
facts?
Ethics – people need to be ethical and trusting.
The training that would be given to the employee should
involve mutual trust.

Formatted in common form as wishes
ST1: I wish all employees were issued passwords
ST1: I wish passwords were required for access
ST1: I wish all computers were password protected
ST1: I wish screen saver passwords were utilized
ST2: I wish employees had integrity
ST2: I wish for trust between the organization and
employees
ST8: I wish employees were taught about individual
integrity
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with basic
procedures
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with password
policy
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with procedures of
logging in and logging off
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with the policy of
not sharing confidential data
ST7: I wish there were confidentiality policies

ST5: I wish employees were ethical
ST5: I wish employees were trustworthy
ST2: I wish employees received training in mutual trust
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Because success is going to come with employees.
Employees need to trust the company.
Reinforce ethics. There is no need for any of this if
people are not compelled to do unethical things.

ST2: I wish employees knew that trusting the company
leads to success
ST6: I wish ethics were stressed

4.3.2 Clustering and Converting Values to Objectives

The output of the previous section of converting the raw data to values is a list of single values
expressed as wishes from each of the participants for each group. However, many of these
values expressed as wishes are similar to one another. For example, two values from two
different participants in the control group stated “I wish training included an Internet policy” and
“I wish training included acceptable Internet usage.” These values are both about establishing
rules that govern the use of the Internet. Clustering them together and converting them into an
actionable objective can be done in the same step. Converting a value in the form of a wish to an
objective that is actionable is a fairly straightforward process. Just add a verb to the value and
restate it as an objective. In our example, the two Internet usage related values can be clustered
and converted into the objective “ensure training includes an Internet usage policy.” This
converts two values into one actionable objective. Table 4.3 follows the values from the
previous table for the socio-technical group through the clustering and conversion process into
final objectives. Again, for a complete list of this conversion process, see appendix E.

Table 4.3: Socio-technical Group Objective conversion and Cluster Sample
Values
ST1: I wish all employees were issued passwords
ST1: I wish passwords were required for access
ST1: I wish all computers were password protected
ST1: I wish screen saver passwords were utilized
ST2: I wish employees had integrity
ST8: I wish employees were taught about individual
integrity
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with the policy of not
sharing confidential data
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Objectives
Ensure password protection is fully utilized

Ensure training covers employee integrity
Ensure data confidentiality policies are in place

ST7: I wish there were confidentiality policies
ST5: I wish employees were trustworthy
ST2: I wish for trust between the organization and
employees
ST2: I wish employees received training in mutual trust
ST2: I wish employees knew that trusting the company
leads to success
ST5: I wish employees were ethical
ST6: I wish ethics were stressed

Ensure a trust relationship between employees and
the company

Ensure appropriate ethics training

4.3.3 Final Group Objectives

The previous section clustered and converted values to objectives, yielding a final list of group
objectives (see appendix F). The socio-technical group finished with the most objectives at 72.
The social group finished with 37, the technical group finished with 43, and the control group
finished with 49 security objectives. These lists of security objectives do not represent a ranked
order, but instead are represented randomly. In chapter five, the ranking Delphi method is used
to shorten and rank the security objectives of each group.

The significance of the final list of objectives is that it represents the security objectives that the
group members feel are important for maximizing the effectiveness of information security and
information security training. Each objective was analyzed and placed into one of three
categories for group analysis. The technical category (T) represents all objectives there were
technical in nature and require a technical implementation in order to satisfy the objective, such
as “ensuring password protection is fully utilized.” The social category (S) represents all
objectives that are social in nature, such as “ensuring appropriate ethics training.” The general
category (G) represents objectives that are neither technical nor social. General objectives are
often related to how security training should be presented, such as “ensure examples are fully
utilized in security training,” and “ensure training is simple and short.” The pie charts in
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appendix E represent the technical, social, or general orientation of each group’s objectives as
percentages. The next section discusses the group’s final objectives in much more detail and the
significance of their relation to information security policy.

4.4 Discussion:

Taking a closer look at the final security objectives of the four groups, the first result that
emerges is that the socio-technical group created a lot more objectives than did the other groups,
almost 60% more than the average of the other groups. More important than the total number of
objectives created by each group, is the quality of those objectives and the mix of social,
technical and general objectives. Too few social objectives and many technical objectives mean
that security policy will lack adequate social aspects and be technically dominant. Too many
general objectives means the participants were focused too much on aesthetics, such as having
hands-on training and colorful presentations, and not focused enough on social and technical
aspects of security.

The socio-technical group not only had more objectives, but had an adequate representation of
social and technical objectives. Of the 72 total security objectives, 25% were social, 34.72%
were technical, and 40.28% were general objectives. This is a good percentage of social and
technical objectives. It is to be expected that there will be a higher percentage of technical
objectives than social objectives, mainly because there are more technical solutions to
information security than there are social solutions. While there were too many general
objectives from all groups, the socio-technical group was among the best at minimizing them.
Most of the general objectives were appropriate for conducting awareness training, such as using
examples in training, using stimulating videos and involving management in training.
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The socio-technical group’s final list of social security objectives included many objectives that
the literature review stated were most important. In representing the responsibility, integrity,
trust and ethicality of employees (RITE), the group listed multiple objectives. For instance, they
had a security objective to create an ethics training program. Ethical aspects of security are just
as important as technical aspects and companies with ethics programs suffer less economic crime
(Trompeter & Eloff, 2001, ECS, 2007). The group also had security objectives to ensure a
trusting relationship between the employee and the employer and to clearly define the
employee’s roles and responsibilities. In current organizations where employees are empowered
with more responsibility, building a trusting relationship between the employee and the employer
is more important than ever (Dhillon, 2007). In addition, employees need to understand their
roles within the organization, which also includes individual accountability (Dhillon &
Backhouse, 2000). The group also had security objectives relating to the screening of
employees, hiring responsible employees, and promoting the integrity of the individual. Dhillon
and Backhouse (2000) warn about ensuring the integrity of the individual before giving them
access to sensitive resources, so these objectives are also very important.

The socio-technical group was the only group to completely represent all aspects of RITE. Other
important social objectives created by this group include the creation of a mix of formal,
informal, and technical control systems, creating reward systems, acknowledging employee
commitment and employee motivation. The only important social aspect that this group omitted
was creating a security culture, which is a major oversight.

A strong security culture is very

important for information security and has been linked to such things as compliant user behavior
and employees engaging in security measures beyond their mandatory job descriptions
(Ruighaver et al., 2007; Dhillon, 2007; Karyda, et al., 2005; von Solms & von Solms, 2004;
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Leech, 2003; Vroom and von Solms, 2004; D’Arcy & Greene, 2009). While creating a security
culture is very important and not creating a security objective to do so is a significant omission,
the socio-technical group otherwise created a robust list of social security objectives.

On the technical side, the socio-technical group created an adequate list of technical objectives
and represented the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of information. For instance
they included technical objectives to ensure data confidentiality, appropriate access, intrusion
detection, password management, biometric authentication, data monitoring, firewalls, proper
infrastructure planning, and system reliability. Restricting data access to those that are
authorized is crucial to protecting the confidentiality of data (Dhillon, 2007). This group’s
objective for ensuring data confidentiality specifically addresses this task. The integrity of data
is important because it is concerned with the trustworthiness and correctness of the data (Dhillon,
2007). Data that cannot be trusted as correct is worthless data. The socio-technical group’s
objectives for intrusion detection and data monitoring help protect the integrity of data. Beyond
the confidentiality and integrity of data, making it available to those in need is equally
important. This can mean contingency planning, disaster recovery planning, or ensuring the
reliability of data access (Dhillon, 2007). The socio-technical group’s objectives for the use of
firewalls, ensuring system reliability, and proper infrastructure planning relate to ensuring the
reliability of data access.

The socio-technical group also listed technical objectives for

protection from portable devices, physical access to systems, and securing Web servers. Overall,
the socio-technical group created a robust list of social and technical security objectives. These
socio-technical security objectives implemented as the organization’s information security
policies and distributed through the information security training program would come close to
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maximizing overall information security. The only exception would be the lack of a security
culture.

The social group’s final list of security objectives consisted of 27.03% social, 24.32% technical,
and 48.65% general objectives. This is a large percentage of general objectives. The true test is
to evaluate the quality of social and technical objectives against RITE, CIA, and other important
social and technical aspects. It is good to recall here that the social group only received social
training, so any technical security objectives listed were not influenced by the training.
Therefore, it was anticipated that this group would have a robust list of social objectives and a
moderate list of technical objectives. However, the social security objectives listed by this group
in regard to RITE were not as comprehensive as anticipated. They listed objectives for
considering employee integrity and employee ethics, but failed to create security objectives for
defining roles and responsibilities and creating trusting relationships. They also failed to list the
creation of a positive security culture, as did the socio-technical group. The above mentioned are
three important social security objectives omitted by this group and all three were covered in
their training video. It is unclear why the group failed to list these objectives and is perhaps a
topic to be addressed in future research. The group did list other important social objectives,
such as recognizing employee cultural differences, manager emotional intelligence, employee
decision making, corporate values, morale, employee gender differences and the effects of
employee dissatisfaction.

On the technical side of security, the social group also left a few security holes. In support of
CIA, the social group created security objectives for confidentiality and integrity of information,
but failed to create objectives to preserve the availability of data. However, they did list other
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important technical objectives, such as password protection, physical security, personal data
protection, and identity theft.

Overall, the social group’s list of social objectives was incomplete, which is a surprise
considering they received social training. They also created an incomplete list of technical
security objectives, which is understandable considering they did not receive technical training.
There was an overabundance of general objectives, with many relating to conducting awareness
training and some completely unrelated. For instance, how to handle the media is unrelated to
information security and security awareness training, while hands-on training is relevant to
conducting information security training. These socio-technical security objectives when
implemented as the organization’s information security policies and distributed through the
information security training program would not maximize overall information security and
would leave some security holes in both the social and technical areas.

The technical group received technical training and no social training. Therefore, they were
expected to be strong in technical aspects of security, but relatively weak in social aspects. This
group listed 11.63% social objectives, 48.84% technical objectives, and 39.53% general
objectives.

This is the largest percentage of technical objectives from all the groups. In

representing RITE, they created a security objective to address employee roles and
responsibilities, but failed to list objectives in regard to employee integrity, trust, and ethicality.
This was no surprise, but what was a surprise was that the technical group listed security culture,
employee culture and corporate values. This is the only group to create an objective for security
culture and they did not receive training on the topic. This shows that without social training, the
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group still came up with several important social objectives. However, the overall list of social
objectives is poor and not nearly as comprehensive as the social or socio-technical group.

Technical objectives were very strong for the technical group, as they had an abundance of
objectives related to CIA. For instance, they listed data protection, data recovery, data backups
and data confidentiality as security objectives. They also listed many other technical aspects of
information security, such as password protection, physical security, the use of encryption,
auditing, SPAM filtering, phishing, virus detection, worm detection, spyware detection and the
use of virtual private networks.

Overall, the technical group created an incomplete list of social objectives and a robust list of
technical objectives. They also had less general objectives than the other three groups, at
34.9%. Many of those objectives were about the aesthetics of training, such as using bright
imagery, interactive training, hands-on exercises, and using humor in training. These sociotechnical security objectives when implemented as the organization’s information security
policies and distributed through the information security training program would not maximize
overall information security and would leave many security holes in the social side of security.
This type of security depicts the scenario in today’s organizations, as we learned from the
literature review; organizations today have technically oriented information security policy and
training (Rotvold, 2008; CWS, 2010; Fulford & Doherty, 2003).

The control group represents managers that get no formal training on how to maximize
information security, which is the status quo for most organizations (Hone & Eloff, 2002). The
training this group received had nothing to do with information security, so it is expected that the
group will produce a weak list of social objectives and a moderate list of technical objectives. In
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regard to percentages, the control group’s final list of security objectives included only 6.12%
social objectives, but had 44.9% technical and 48.98% general objectives. This is a very low
percentage of social objectives and large percentage of general objectives. Out of 49 total
objectives, only 3 were socially related. Two of those social objectives related to RITE’s trust
and ethics components and the third related to social engineering. Only the control group
included social engineering as a security objective, which was somewhat of a surprise. Beyond
those three objectives, which were very good, the control group was missing many other social
aspects of information security and was by far the worst representation of social objectives of all
the groups.

The control group’s list of technical objectives was much more comprehensive. All aspects of
CIA were represented. For instance, the group listed data confidentiality, data backup, and
encryption as technical security objectives. They also included physical security, wireless
networking, intrusion detection, firewall configuration, virus detection, SPAM detection and
domain naming service security.

Overall, the control group had an incomplete representation of social objectives and a nice
representation of technical objectives. It was a surprise that their technical security objectives
were well represented. The social group also did not receive technical training, but was only
able to produce a moderate list of technical objectives. The control group listed far too many
general objectives and had the largest percentage out of all the groups at 48.98%. Like the other
groups, many were related to information security training, like having interactive training, using
examples and using qualified trainers.

These socio-technical security objectives when

implemented as the organization’s information security policies and distributed through the
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information security training program would not maximize overall information security and
would leave many security holes in the social area of security.

In regard to social objectives, the socio-technical group created 20 total social objectives,
compared to 10 for the social group, 5 for the technical group, and 3 for the control group. The
socio-technical group was the only group to create a robust list of social objectives and to list
satisfactory objectives for RITE, which is somewhat of a surprise that they were the only group
to do it. The social group received the same training on RITE as the socio-technical group, but
failed to enlist trust, and roles and responsibilities. However, the social group did have a
moderate list of social objectives and performed better than the technical and control groups.
Both the technical and control groups had insufficient lists of social security objectives.

For the technical objectives, the socio-technical group created 25 total technical objectives,
compared to 9 for the social group, 21 for the technical group, and 22 for the control group.
Only the social group failed to have a comprehensive list of technical objectives, failing to
satisfy the availability of data part of CIA. All other groups satisfied CIA and listed plenty of
additional technical objectives.

The lists of security objectives from all four groups produced a few other interesting results. For
instance, the results of the control group are similar to the technical group, in that the social
aspects of information security policy and training would be poor and the technical aspects of
information security policy and training would be excellent. It was not expected that the control
group would have excellent technical representation. This implies that training managers on the
technical aspects of security only is no better than not training them at all. With no training,
managers are still aware of the technical aspects of security. However, the results are mixed in
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that the social group did not receive technical training either and produced only a moderate list of
technical objectives. The social group’s second surprise was that they only produced a moderate
list of social objectives as well. Since they received in depth social training, it was expected
their social list of security objectives would be excellent. Another unexpected result was that the
technical group was the only group to list the creation of a security culture as a security
objective. They did not receive social training and the social and socio-technical groups did, but
neither of the latter groups listed that objective. That was the only surprise for the sociotechnical group. They otherwise produced an excellent list of social and technical security
objectives.

4.5 Conclusion:

The objective of this chapter was to demonstrate the impact of different kinds of information
security training on information security policy formulation. The chapter started with the
creation of four training videos, including a socio-technical video, a social only video, a
technical only video, and a control video. Groups of managers were formed and each group
watched one of the videos. Following the video, each group participant wrote down their values
for maximizing the effectiveness of information security and information security training.
Following Keeney’s value-focused thinking methodology, the values were converted and
clustered into lists of value-based security objectives. Each group’s security objectives were
analyzed in regard to the nature and scope of the information security policy they would inform.

Overall, the socio-technical group had the most comprehensive list of security objectives,
satisfying both RITE and CIA. They were the only group to have satisfied both and have many
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other important social and technical objectives. The social group failed to completely satisfy
both RITE and CIA, but had moderate lists of social and technical objectives. The technical and
control groups both had excellent lists of technical security objectives, but weak lists of social
security objectives. The output of this chapter is an unranked list of security objectives
representative of each group’s values. Chapter five uses the ranking Delphi method to narrow
and rank the lists of security objectives to discover which objectives the groups feel are most and
least important.
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5. Ranking Delphi Analysis
5.1 Background:

The last chapter used Keeney’s value-focused thinking methodology to create lists of valuebased security objectives from four groups of panelists. The nature and scope of each list of
security objectives was analyzed for their social and technical aspects as deemed important from
the literature review. For instance, the lists were analyzed for representation of the
responsibility, integrity, trust and ethicality of individuals (RITE) and the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of information (CIA) in addition to other important social and technical
security objectives. Also discussed in chapter four was the nature and scope of the information
security policy informed by each list of security objectives. What we do not know from chapter
four is the degree of importance attached to each security objective. Which security objectives
would get eliminated if the security budget was reduced? Recall that the lists of value-based
objectives are wish lists developed by the participants without other constraints such as budgets.
In the real world, there may be money to do some things and not others. The purpose of chapter
five is to use a ranking Delphi method to shorten the lists and rank the remaining security
objectives. The shortened ranked lists will tell us which security objectives the participants feel
are most and least important.

According to Schmidt’s (1997) guidelines for conducting ranking-type Delphi research, three
phases must be conducted. The first phase involves discovering the issues pertaining to a
particular topic. This was accomplished with the value-focused method discussed in chapter
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four, where each group produced an unranked list of objectives they thought were important for
maximizing the effectiveness of information security and training. The socio-technical group
listed 72 objectives, the social group had 37 objectives, the technical group had 43 objectives,
and the control group had 49 objectives. This chapter starts with Schmidt’s phase two, which
was to shorten the lists before they could be arranged in a ranked order.

Phase two of Schmidt’s guidelines states that the panelists are to be asked to shorten the list to no
less than 10% of the original number of objectives and no more than 100 objectives. An ideal
list would be somewhere around 20 objectives, according to Schmidt, but could certainly be
more or less depending on the topic. Since none of the groups had more than 100 objectives to
begin with, the upper limit was not a constraint. According to Schmidt’s guidelines, participants
were told there was no correct number of final objectives, but to include what they believed were
the most important objectives from the list. Once each group member submitted a shortened list
of what they believed were the most important objectives from the original list, a final list was
created. This was accomplished by retaining objectives that appeared on a majority of the
participant’s shortened lists. For example, if 60% of the participants thought a particular
objective was important and they included that objective on their shortened list, then that
objective would be included in the final list. If a particular objective was only represented by
40% of the participant’s shortened lists, then it did not get included in the final list. Phase two
could be repeated if necessary to shorten the list further.

Phase three of Schmidt’s guidelines created a group ranking of the final list of objectives from
most important to least important. This phase involved asking the group members to rank the
final list of objectives from what they believed were the most important objectives to the least
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important objectives and each participant was given a randomly ordered list of objectives to
start. Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (Kendall’s W) was then determined by analyzing the
ranked lists from the group members, which was used to determine group consensus. The higher
the coefficient, the better group consensus was. There were multiple iterations of this process,
with each iteration producing a newly ranked list of objectives based on the group mean rank of
each objective. The new group ranking was then sent back to each group member to be ranked
again. This process was repeated until one of two things happened. The first is when Kendall’s
coefficient of concordance is .7 or greater and the group agrees further iterations would not
significantly improve consensus. A coefficient of .7 or greater indicates strong agreement on the
ranked list of objectives. The second stopping point could be if the group’s coefficient levels off
at some point below .7 and does not significantly increase with further iterations. This would
mean the group failed to reach strong agreement on the final ranked list of objectives and they
would never be in strong agreement.

The next few sections of this chapter discuss phases two and three of Schmidt’s guidelines as
they pertain to this research. Section 5.2 narrows the long lists of objectives from the valuefocused thinking chapter down to manageable lists of final objectives. Section 5.3 discusses the
ranking process through multiple iterations and produces a final ranked list of objectives from
each group. Section 5.4 discusses the ranked lists and the affect on information security policy
and section 5.5 concludes the chapter.
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5.2 Determining the Most Important Objectives:

Each group was given a randomly ordered list of objectives that their group produced in the
value-focused thinking piece of this research. They were asked to keep the objectives they
believed were most important and discard the rest. They were given no particular goal for a final
number of objectives they should have. This process was accomplished via e-mail with each of
the participants. Once the shortened list was received from each of the participants, a final list of
objectives was produced. This was accomplished by keeping objectives that appeared on the
shortened lists of the majority of group members, according to Schmidt’s guidelines. Since three
of the groups had ten members and one of the groups had eleven members, it was decided that an
objective would be kept for the final list if it was found on six of the participants shortened lists.
Six participants agreeing to the objective as important would be in the majority for all groups,
whereas five would not be the majority for any of the groups. The shortened unranked lists of
objectives for each group can be found in appendix G. The socio-technical group shortened their
list to 12 objectives they believed were most important. The social group shortened their list to
23, the technical group to 22, and the control group to 25 objectives. The number of final
objectives for each group falls within Schmidt’s goal of greater than 10% of the original list and
less than 100 objectives. Also included in the tables in appendix G is the percentage of
participants from each group that included that objective in their shortened list. The higher that
percentage, the more group members that believed the objective was important enough to include
on their final list of objectives. The lists are sorted by percentage of inclusion from participants
and should not to be confused with the ranking process discussed in the next section.
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5.3 Ranking the Objectives:

The previous step narrowed each group’s list of objectives down to what they believed were the
most important objectives, which yielded a much shorter list of objectives for each group. The
next step was to rank the objectives from most important to least important. A randomly ordered
list was sent to each participant for ranking. The participants were told the list is randomly
ordered and to not imply any ranking. PASW-17, formally known as SPSS-17, was used to
perform statistical analysis on the ranked lists. In order to use PASW to determine the mean
rank and group consensus, each objective was translated into an alphabetic letter.

The random

list of objectives that was sent to each group participant was represented in PAWS as the letters
of the alphabet as seen on tables 5.1 and 5.2 for the social group. The participants only received
a list of objectives without the letters, but the researcher uses the letters for the columns in
PASW’s data view. The social group had 23 objectives, so the columns in PASW were labeled
A-W to represent the 23 objectives. The rows in PASW were numbered 1-10 to represent the 10
participants in the social group. To explain this process as efficiently as possible, the social
group was chosen for this example because that group had group consensus and stopped after
two iterations and the others stopped after three.

Table 5.1: Social Group Objective Conversion to Letters Iteration One
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.

Ensure hand’s on training
Ensure managers are involved in providing training
Ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees
Ensure training addresses corporate information theft
Ensure training addresses data protection
Ensure training addresses employee ethics
Ensure training addresses employee integrity
Ensure training addresses factors affecting employee decision making
Ensure training addresses how employee dissatisfaction affects security
Ensure training addresses strong passwords while minimizing the need to write them down
Ensure training addresses the relationship between emotional intelligence and security
Ensure training addresses the social interaction between companies and individuals
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M.
N.
O.
P.
Q.
R.
S.
T.
U.
V.
W.

Ensure training considers employee cultural differences
Ensure training covers legal aspects of security
Ensure training covers personal data security
Ensure training covers privacy rights
Ensure training covers the most common threats and how to prevent them
Ensure training describes corporate values
Ensure training includes confidentiality policy
Ensure training includes continuing education as threats change
Ensure training includes technical aspects
Ensure training is up to date with current security issues
Ensure training utilizes real world examples, including the corporate consequences of bad security

Table 5.2 is the data view from PASW for the social group’s first iteration. The letters A-W
from table 5.1 that represent the objectives are the columns in PASW. The ten participants are
the rows. The data that fills the cells are the actual rankings provided by each of the participants
for iteration one. For example, participant number one thought that “ensure training covers the
most common threats and how to prevent them” was the most important objective. This can be
seen by looking at row “Part 1” for participant one and column “Q,” where that participant
placed the number one. Because the number one is in that column, this means that participant
listed that objective as number one in their ranking. All 23 of their rankings are listed in this
manner.

Recall that the participants did not receive a list with the letters, but only the

objectives. This means that the researcher had to apply the letters back to each participant’s
ranked list based on table 5.1. Think of it as a conversion process from objectives to letters for
easy entry into PASW. Once PASW gives the results, they can be easily converted from letters
back to objectives. This process of using letters to represent the objectives in PASW was
performed for all participants for each group and for each iteration.

Table 5.2: Social Group PASW Input for Iteration One

Part. 1
Part. 2

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

N

O

P

Q

R

S

T

U

V

W

6

18

7

19

8

10

9

11

22

12

21

20

23

13

5

14

1

15

16

2

4

3

17

22

2

3

16

7

17

18

10

21

11

9

8

23

12

5

19

4

13

20

15

6

1

14
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Part. 3
Part. 4
Part. 5
Part. 6
Part. 7
Part. 8
Part. 9
Part. 10

9

13

3

17

14

7

20

18

21

23

12

22

5

6

16

11

1

15

19

4

10

8

2

23

8

2

10

11

3

4

15

16

17

18

19

21

9

12

13

6

1

14

20

22

5

7

1

23

5

21

22

2

3

18

4

20

9

10

11

13

14

19

8

12

16

15

17

6

7

19

8

17

2

6

15

7

21

9

12

3

10

11

18

1

13

4

16

14

5

23

22

20

1

7

2

10

3

16

17

20

21

18

22

23

19

8

4

5

11

12

13

14

15

9

6

8

7

6

17

18

9

5

19

2

22

3

4

20

10

16

15

11

12

21

13

23

14

1

19

17

18

11

10

9

12

13

8

23

5

14

15

2

3

4

20

1

16

6

22

7

21

22

5

10

17

4

6

11

19

21

20

18

12

7

13

1

14

15

23

8

16

3

2
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Analysis of the participant’s rankings using PASW yielded the following results for the first
iteration of the social group (table 5.3). Each objective has a mean rank and standard deviation.
This table is sorted by the mean and then standard deviation to break ties. The first column
represents the alphabetic letter originally assigned to each objective, so it is easy to see how the
original random list was moved around to form this ranked list. Objective “C” comes in first,
which is “ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees.” It has the lowest
mean of 7.3. Several objectives have the same mean, such as “O” and “V,” which came in
number 2 and 3 in the ranked list. In such cases, the objective with the lower standard deviation
earns the higher ranking, according to Schmidt’s guidelines. This is why objective “O” comes in
second with a standard deviation of 6.111 and objective “V” comes in third with a standard
deviation of 6.29.

Table 5.3: Social Group First Iteration Sorted by Mean

C
O
V
Q
F
E
N
W

Std.
Objective
Deviation
7.3
5.926
Ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees
7.7
6.111
Ensure training covers personal data security
7.7
6.29
Ensure training is up to date with current security issues
8.1
6.19
Ensure training covers the most common threats and how to prevent them
9.4
5.232
Ensure training addresses employee ethics
10.3 6.129
Ensure training addresses data protection
10.4 4.452
Ensure training covers legal aspects of security
10.4 7.183
Ensure training utilizes real world examples, including the corporate consequences of bad

G
B

10.6 6.096
10.8 6.663

Letter Mean

Ensure training addresses employee integrity
Ensure managers are involved in providing training
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T
11
6.164
R
12
6.65
K
12
7.318
P
12.7 5.012
A
13
8.894
D
14
5.676
L
14.2 6.477
I
14.5 7.934
U
14.5 8.155
M
15.5 6.654
S
15.7 3.802
H
16.4 3.893
J
17.8 4.662
Kendall’s W = .193

Ensure training includes continuing education as threats change
Ensure training describes corporate values
Ensure training addresses the relationship between emotional intelligence and security
Ensure training covers privacy rights
Ensure hand’s on training
Ensure training addresses corporate information theft
Ensure training addresses the social interaction between companies and individuals
Ensure training addresses how employee dissatisfaction affects security
Ensure training includes technical aspects
Ensure training considers employee cultural differences
Ensure training includes confidentiality policy
Ensure training addresses factors affecting employee decision making
Ensure training addresses strong passwords while minimizing the need to write them down

In addition to the mean rank and standard deviation, PASW also yields Kendall’s Coefficient of
Concordance, also known as Kendall’s W, which is reported at the bottom of the table. Kendall's
Coefficient of Concordance (W) is used to calculate consensus among three or more people.
Kendall’s W ranges from 0-1, with zero indicating no agreement and one indicating full
agreement. For the first iteration, the social group’s consensus was .193, which is very weak
agreement according to Schmidt’s scale (see chapter 3). Another round must be done to see if
the group is capable of achieving better agreement.

The second round of ranking for the social group started with each participant receiving the
group ranking results from the first round. The new list was created using the mean rank from
round one, as seen in table 5.4. This is the first time each participant saw the ranked objectives as
a group. Again, letters are added to the ranked list for easy input into PASW, but the participants
only receive the ranked objectives and not the letters. Each participant was asked to make any
changes they believed were necessary, such as moving objectives up and down the list to satisfy
their individual values. If they believed the list was satisfactory, they did not have to change
anything. Group consensus is expected to increase at this point because individuals usually only
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move the objectives they feel strongly about and leave the others alone. The more that get left
alone, the greater the group consensus.

Table 5.4 represents the social group’s first list of ranked objectives with letters assigned for
representation in PASW. This group of assigned letters A-W is different than the original list
sent to participants, as the letters now represent the first ranking and not the randomly ordered
list. Just like in the first round, the researcher converts the participant’s newly ranked list for
round two to the letters represented in table 5.4 and enters them into PASW. The results from
PASW are then converted from letters back to objectives.

Table 5.4: Social Group Objective Conversion to Letters Iteration Two
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
O.
P.
Q.
R.
S.
T.
U.
V.
W.

Ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees
Ensure training covers personal data security
Ensure training is up to date with current security issues
Ensure training covers the most common threats and how to prevent them
Ensure training addresses employee ethics
Ensure training addresses data protection
Ensure training covers legal aspects of security
Ensure training utilizes real world examples, including the corporate consequences of bad
Ensure training addresses employee integrity
Ensure managers are involved in providing training
Ensure training includes continuing education as threats change
Ensure training describes corporate values
Ensure training addresses the relationship between emotional intelligence and security
Ensure training covers privacy rights
Ensure hand’s on training
Ensure training addresses corporate information theft
Ensure training addresses the social interaction between companies and individuals
Ensure training addresses how employee dissatisfaction affects security
Ensure training includes technical aspects
Ensure training considers employee cultural differences
Ensure training includes confidentiality policy
Ensure training addresses factors affecting employee decision making
Ensure training addresses strong passwords while minimizing the need to write them down
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Table 5.5 displays the results from PASW for the group’s second ranking iteration. The letters in
the left column represent the previous ranking, so you can see which items moved up and down
the list. As you can see, letter “A” remained in the top spot, which means the participants did not
change the number one ranking for that objective. Its standard deviation is also very low,
indicating strong agreement on the number one ranking. Kendall’s W increased dramatically to
.744, which means the group now has strong consensus. According to Schmidt, the researcher
should ask the participants if they feel a third iteration will produce any better results. If a
majority of the group feels that a third iteration will strengthen consensus, then a third iteration
should be performed. In this case, the majority of the social group’s participants responded that
an additional iteration would not improve consensus, so this was the final ranking for the social
group.

Table 5.5: Social Group Second Iteration (Sorted by Mean)

A
C
E
D
B
H

1.10
4.40
4.90
5.10
7.10

Std.
Deviation
0.32
3.44
1.52
2.23
6.67

7.50

2.84

F
I
G
J
K
L
M
O
P
N
R
Q

7.70
8.20
8.50
10.00
11.30
11.80
13.10
13.50
14.20
14.50
16.20
17.00

4.14
2.70
1.35
1.89
4.03
4.10
3.54
6.13
3.65
0.85
5.05
3.74

Letter

Mean

Objective
Ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees
Ensure training is up to date with current security issues
Ensure training addresses employee ethics
Ensure training covers the most common threats and how to prevent them
Ensure training covers personal data security
Ensure training utilizes real world examples, including the corporate
consequences of bad security
Ensure training addresses data protection
Ensure training addresses employee integrity
Ensure training covers legal aspects of security
Ensure managers are involved in providing training
Ensure training includes continuing education as threats change
Ensure training describes corporate values
Ensure training addresses the relationship between emotional intelligence and
Ensure hand’s on training
Ensure training addresses corporate information theft
Ensure training covers privacy rights
Ensure training addresses how employee dissatisfaction affects security
Ensure training addresses the social interaction between companies and
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S
18.70
2.54
T
18.90
4.20
U
19.70
2.54
V
20.20
3.91
W
22.40
1.90
Kendall’s W = .744

Ensure training includes technical aspects
Ensure training considers employee cultural differences
Ensure training includes confidentiality policy
Ensure training addresses factors affecting employee decision making
Ensure training addresses strong passwords while minimizing the need to

The process described above was for the social group, but the same process was used with the
socio-technical, technical, and control groups. The final ranked list of objectives for each group
with Kendall’s W results can be found in appendix G. The social group had consensus after the
second round and so did the socio-technical group when they had a Kendall’s W of .734 after the
second iteration, but the socio-technical group decided to go another round and improved their
consensus to .825, while the social group agreed to stop after the second round. For the sociotechnical group, one hundred percent of the group felt they could do better with the additional
round.

The technical group was the only group to not reach a strong consensus. A Kendall’s W of .627
falls between moderate and strong agreement- according to Schmidt’s guidelines, which is
perfectly fine. A Kendall’s W of .7 is desirable, but not mandatory. When a group appears to
stall or makes little progress with successive iterations according to Kendall’s W, as this group
did with a score of .582 advancing to .627, the researcher may stop if the group agrees they can
no longer make progress. In this case, the majority of the technical group agreed that no further
progress could be made with an additional iteration. One interesting point should be made about
this group. One of the ten participants believed very strongly about their rankings and those
rankings were dramatically different than the rest of the group. While nine of the ten participants
were coming to a consensus, this one individual was standing out in disagreement. If that one
individual were excluded from the group, the group consensus would have been .890. The
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difference between .890 that could have been and the .627 that the group stopped with can be
explained by one individual participant who strongly disagreed with the others.

The control group finished with a very strong consensus of .992. However, it should be noted
that only four of the eleven participants made any changes to the final ranking. This means they
were satisfied with the results of second round. The four that did make changes only made
minor changes, thus resulting in an almost perfect group consensus.

5.4 Discussion:

Chapter four concluded with a long list of security objectives for each group. The percentages of
social, technical, and general objectives were noted for each group. More importantly, the
objectives chosen by each group were compared against the social objectives for RITE, the
technical objectives of CIA, and other important socio-technical objectives. Chapter five’s goal
was to have the groups rank what they thought were the most important objectives to information
security. The ranking process makes the group narrow the list by eliminating some objectives
and keeping others. The objectives that remain are then ranked from most important to least
important. To analyze the results of the final rankings, it is important to ask some of the same
questions we did with the full objective lists from chapter four. What are the social, technical,
and general objective percentages from the final rankings? How do the final rankings compare
to RITE, CIA, and other important socio-technical objectives? In addition, what important
objectives were in the original list of objectives, but did not make it to the final rankings list?
Eliminating important objectives would mean the group did not feel they were important enough
to keep on the final ranked list. Another question to answer is what objectives did the groups
feel were worthy of a top ten ranking?

The most important question to answer is how
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information security policies are affected by the now shortened list of security objectives. All of
these questions will be answered for each group next.

The final percentages of social, technical, and general objectives are displayed in figure 5.1. All
of the groups maintained percentages similar to what they had with the complete list in chapter
four. The socio-technical and social groups both reduced the percentage of general objectives
and increased technical objectives, which is a positive note. The social group also increased their
percentage of social objectives. The technical group reduced their general objectives by 3%,
adding that percentage to their social objectives. The control group is the only group that
deteriorated by increasing the general objective percentage by 18% at the expense of lowering
technical and social objective percentages.

Social

0.33

Technical

General

0.36

0.39

0.68
0.42

0.25
Socio-technical

0.26

0.5
0.28

0.35
0.14
Social

Technical

Figure 5.1: Group Percentages
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0.04
Control

As was discussed in chapter four, the percentages of social, technical, and general objectives are
not as important as the quality of the chosen objectives. The socio-technical group started with
the most robust list of 72 objectives and narrowed it down to 12, by far the shortest ranked list of
all the groups. In doing so, the group failed to include many important objectives they had in the
initial list. Significant objectives they included relating to RITE are “ensure clearly defined roles
and responsibilities,” and “ensure potential employees are screened before being hired,” which
can relate to the integrity of the employee. However, the group eliminated the two other
important RITE objectives relating to trust and ethics. Other social objectives dropped by this
group include the creation of a mix of formal, informal, and technical control systems, creating
reward systems, acknowledging employee commitment and employee motivation.

From CIA, the group included “ensure data confidentiality policies are in place,” which of course
relates to the confidentiality of data. They also included “ensure computers are updated
regularly,” which can relate to availability of data. Maintaining computers and networks is
essential for ensuring data is accessible by those that need it when they need it. However, the
group eliminated their objectives relating to the integrity of data, which leaves some security
holes related to CIA. The group also eliminated the technical objectives for implementing
firewalls, protection from portable devices, physical access to systems and securing Web
servers.

The socio-technical group eliminated many important objectives when they narrowed their 72
objectives to 12. For instance, ethics training did not make the final list because it was only
chosen by 30% of the respondents for inclusion in the final list. Others that did not make the
final list include employee integrity (20%), protecting databases from intrusion (30%), and
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building a trust relationship between employee and employer (50%). It was a surprise that
ethics, employee integrity, and building trust relationships scored so low and the first two were
not even close to making the final list. Those topics were stressed as very important in the video
training the group received. Overall, the socio-technical group left some holes in security by
eliminating important objectives. They also included too many general objectives, though the
percentage decreased when compared to the larger list. Overall, the socio-technical group ended
with an incomplete list of social and technical security objectives, which is definitely a setback
from the excellent socio-technical objectives they did have. These socio-technical security
objectives implemented as the organization’s information security policies and distributed
through the information security training program would not maximize overall information
security and would leave some security holes in both the social and technical areas.

The social group was able to keep most of the important objectives that they had originally
listed. Though this group did not fully represent RITE and CIA to begin with, they did keep
what objectives they did have relating to those concepts. They ranked employee ethics and
employee integrity both in the top ten, which is great for social aspects that often get ignored.
Other important social objectives that made the list relate to employees, such as understanding
social interactions between individuals (employees) and their employers, factors affecting
employee decision making and employee cultural differences. Social objectives that were
dropped from the ranked list include employee morale, which only 30% of the participants
thought was important, and employee gender (10%).

The technical objectives listed by the social group were sparse to begin with. Beyond
confidentiality and data protection, their ranked list included the use of strong passwords and
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personal data protection. Technical objectives dropped from the longer list related to physical
security and identity theft. Also making the final list was an overabundance of general
objectives. Overall, the social group kept most of the important socio-technical objectives they
originally had, but they started with an incomplete list of social and technical objectives.

These

socio-technical security objectives when implemented as the organization’s information security
policies and distributed through the information security training program would not maximize
overall information security and would leave some security holes in both the social and technical
areas.

The technical group started with a list strong in technical objectives and weak in social
objectives, but they had listed a few surprise social objectives. The good news is that almost
every social objective originally listed was included on the final ranked list of objectives. They
maintained their surprise social objectives relating to roles and responsibilities and developing a
security culture. The only important social objective that was eliminated related to employee
cultural differences. This group also did well maintaining their technical objectives in the final
list. All objectives relating to CIA were maintained and the only important objective eliminated
related to physical security, which only 20% of the participants thought was important. Overall,
the technical group maintained the important socio-technical objectives and maintained their
weak showing for social objectives and excellent showing of technical objectives. These sociotechnical security objectives when implemented as the organization’s information security
policies and distributed through the information security training program would not maximize
overall information security and would leave some security holes in the social side of
information security.

101

The control group started with a strong technical list of objectives and a very weak social list of
objectives. They only had three social objectives out of forty-nine to start. Unfortunately, only
one of those was included in the final list, which was the need for ethics training. Only 20% of
the group believed employee trust was important and 10% thought social engineering was
important. The group maintained many of the original technical objectives, but eliminated some
important ones, including some related to CIA. The most notable technical objectives eliminated
were encryption, which only 20% of the participants found important, firewalls (50%), SPAM
(40%), virus scanning (30%), and intrusion detection (20%). While the group started with an
adequate list of technical objectives, they finished with an incomplete list by eliminating too
many important objectives. These socio-technical security objectives when implemented as the
organization’s information security policies and distributed through the information security
training program would not maximize overall information security and would leave some
security holes in both the social and technical areas.

Analyzing the top 10 objectives from each of the groups is a little more revealing as to what the
groups believed were important objectives. In times of budget constraints, the top 10 have the
best chance of getting implemented. As in the original list of objectives, the socio-technical
group outperformed the others. This group had the least number of general objectives in the top
ten, with 30%, and only one general objective in the top five. They had 40% technical
objectives, which was better than all the other groups, and 30% social objectives, which was
equal to the best from the other groups. The top three objectives were social objectives and
included two from RITE, relating to responsibilities and integrity. Several of the technical
objectives related to confidentiality and availability of information from CIA. This is the best
top 10 of all the groups, but still leaves many security holes.
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The social group had the second best outcome, but overall was not very good. The group had a
lot of general objectives in the top ten, at 60%, including the top two ranked objectives. The
other four included two social and two technical objectives. The two social objectives included
two pieces from RITE, ethics and employee integrity. One of the technical objectives related to
the integrity of information from CIA.

The technical group had poor socio-technical representation from the top 10 objectives, with
60% general objectives, 10% technical, and 30% social. The top four objectives were general
objectives. It is surprising that the group that received technical training would only have one
technical objective in the top ten, which was ranked number ten, and three times as many social
objectives. That one technical objective related to the confidentiality of information from CIA.
Building a security culture was ranked number seven.

The control group was by far the worst performer with the top ten objectives. Ninety percent of
the top ten were general objectives. There were no social objectives and one technical objective,
which related to data confidentiality of information from CIA. Overall, the top 10 security
objectives for the control group would provide little or no security.

5.5 Conclusion:

This chapter asked the groups to narrow down their long lists of security objectives by keeping
the objectives the group believed were most important. They were then asked to rank the
objectives from most important to least important. Overall, the socio-technical group dropped
some important socio-technical objectives, such as objectives relating to employee ethics and
employee integrity. While they started off well with a robust list, they narrowed it too much,
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leaving out important objectives and compromising security. The social group started with a
moderate list of socio-technical objectives and maintained most of them in the final ranked list.
The technical group started with strong technical objectives and weak social objectives and
decided to keep many of those for the final ranked list. On the other hand, the control group also
started with a strong list of technical objectives and a weak list of social objectives, but made it
weaker by eliminating all but one social objective from the final ranked list. On the technical
side, the control group eliminated several important objectives, such as encryption, which is
important for ensuring the integrity of data in CIA.

Analyzing the final ranked list of objectives and the top ten objectives from each group makes it
clear that the socio-technical group produced the best list of objectives, even though they
narrowed their list too much and eliminated some important objectives. The socio-technical
group still had the strongest showing, especially if we only analyze the top ten objectives. The
social group had the second best performance, ranking ethics and integrity in the top ten.
Analysis also makes it clear that the technical and control groups had the worst lists of
objectives. The technical group did a good job of keeping important objectives in the final
ranked list, but failed to include them in the top ten. The control group performed poorly from
the beginning and got worse as they eliminated important objectives from the final ranking and
filled 90% of the top ten with general objectives.
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6. Discussion
6.1 General Discussion:

The purpose of this research was to investigate how different kinds of information security
training affect the nature and scope of information security policies within a firm. Previous
research had not investigated this connection and it was not known if such a relationship existed.
Four groups of current or potential managers were shown different types of information security
training; (1) socio-technical training, (2) social training, (3) technical training, and (4) control
group training. Each group then listed their values toward information security and those values
were clustered and converted into security objectives using Keeney’s (1992) value-focused
thinking methodology. A manager’s value-based security objectives are what managers use to
make security decisions. Their value-based security objectives toward maximizing information
security indicate the nature and scope of the information security policies they will create. This
research found that the nature and scope of information security training given to managers does
influence the nature and scope of information security policies. Making this connection changes
our understanding of the relationship between managers, information security policy and
information security training.

Prior to this research, the connection between these constructs was fuzzy at best. According to
information systems security research, managers create the information security policies and
information security training is based on those policies (Hone & Eloff, 2002; Rotvold, 2007;
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Figure 6.1: Prior Policy to Training Relationship Understanding

CSI, 2006, 2007; Straub & Welke, 1998). The training teaches employees about the policies
with the intent of them using and following what they learned to better protect information
systems. The connection between managers, policies, and training is the extent to which
information systems security literature previously understood the relationship (figure 6.1).

What this dissertation’s findings suggest is that the relationship is not flat and does not flow in
one direction from the manager to the training, but in fact comes full circle back to the manager.
Security awareness training is intended for all employees, including management. This means
that the managers that create information security policy influence the nature and scope of
information security training that they themselves will get as part of their regular security
training. A significant finding of this research is that training affects policy, which creates the
loopback seen in figure 6.2.

Managers are affected by the nature and scope of the information security training they receive.
The training influences or reinforces their way of thinking about security and thus the
information security policy they create or modify, which leads to the creation or modification of
future information security training.
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Figure 6.2: Policy to Training Relationship

A more detailed understanding of this relationship suggests that the nature and scope of
information security training that a manager receives shapes the manager’s values toward
information security (figure 6.3). A manager’s values impact the manager’s objectives toward
information security, which influences the nature and scope of corporate security policies they
create. The corporate security policies are high level security policies that are the basis for lower
level procedural security policies, which in turn is the basis for information security training.
The loop back to the managers is through the training. The information security training is
intended for all employees, including the managers that created the security policy in the first
place. More importantly, middle managers that will someday create corporate information
security policy are also influenced by the training, thus helping to maintain the cyclic nature and
scope of security policy and training.

All Employee
Information
Security Training

Manager’s
Values

Manager’s
Individual
Objectives

Corporate
Security
Policy

Figure 6.3: Low Level Policy\Training Relationship
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The problem with this cycle is that current information security policy and information security
training is technical in nature (Rotvold, 2008; CWS, 2010; Fulford & Doherty, 2003).
Therefore, manager’s values and objectives toward information security must be technically
oriented, so security policy and training become technically oriented. This technically oriented
information security training then reinforces current manager’s technical thinking and influences
new manager’s values and objectives into technical thinking. This represents the state of
information security policy and information security training in organizations today, which is a
major problem.

There has to be a break in the cycle to introduce socio-technical aspects of security. The
literature review strongly indicates that socio-technical aspects of security are necessary for
maximizing information security (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000, 2001; Trompeter & Eloff, 2001;
Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Dhillon, 2007; Siponen, 2001). This dissertation suggests that
giving managers’ socio-technical information security training will impact their values and
objectives toward information security, thus impacting the information security policy they
create. The security policy then created will be influenced by the manager’s value-based
objectives for securing information systems. According to the cycle, creating socio-technical
security policy will lead to socio-technical information security training, which in turn will start
a new cycle of socio-technical security policy and training, thus maximizing information
security. This process is defined in more detail later in this chapter under the emergent issues
section 6.3.1.

Another reason there needs to be a break in the cycle is because of the heavy dependence on
checklists. We know that 70% of companies use checklists, which are technically oriented
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(GISS, 2008; Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001). Checklists seem like a
great idea for managers that are unaware of what should be included in security policies and have
only been exposed to technically oriented training. Both their basis for security thinking and
their value-based objectives for securing information systems are technically oriented. Since
industry standard security guidelines are technically oriented, using them as the basis for security
policies seems like the proper course of action. However, doing so leads to technically oriented
corporate and procedural security polices, which leads to technically oriented information
security training. The result is less than optimal information security. Also, the technically
oriented information security training leads to the next generation of managers that have
technically oriented value-based security objectives.

To demonstrate the relationship between information security training and information security
policy created by managers, four groups of current or potential managers were given various
kinds of training. The control and technical groups will be discussed first. The control group
received no relevant training and was used to compare the other three groups. This means that
participants were asked to list their objectives for securing information systems based on their
current values without any influence from the training video. They had to rely on their own
feelings, experiences, and education about how they wished to maximize information security.
The technical group received relevant technical training and represents companies that offer
technically oriented information security training currently. Neither group received training on
the social aspects of security.

Results indicate that both groups did an excellent job representing technical objectives and both
represented social objectives poorly. The technical group did slightly better in both areas, but
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not significantly. The control group’s results indicate that no training at all satisfies a great deal
of the technical aspects of security, as they fared very well with listing technical objectives. The
control group did satisfy all aspects of CIA and included several other important objectives. CIA
strands for the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information.

The major problem with both of these groups is the lack of social aspects of security, which
research has stated as important for maximizing information security (Dhillon and Backhouse,
2000, 2001; Trompeter & Eloff, 2001; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Dhillon, 2007; Siponen,
2001). Both groups had major deficiencies and did not come close to satisfying the requirements
of RITE and were missing many other important social objectives. RITE stands for the
responsibility, integrity, trust and ethicality of individuals. However, the technical group did list
a couple of important social objectives, including the creation of a security culture. They were
the only group of the four to list this objective, which is very important for information security.

The significant difference between the control group and the technical group was the ranking of
the security objectives. This tells us what objectives each group feels are the most important.
The original list of objectives was reduced in size by keeping the objectives that the majority of
the group believed were more important and the rest were eliminated. The shortened list was
then ranked. The technical group’s final list of objectives kept many of the important technical
objectives and the most important social objectives. Creating a security culture was introduced
by only one of the ten participants, yet 90% of the group agreed creating a security culture was
important enough to keep in the final list and the objective finished ranked 7th out of all
objectives.
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In contrast to the technical group that maintained most of the best objectives in their final
ranking, the control group eliminated many of their important objectives, including many that
related to CIA. The control group only had 3 social objects out of 49 total objectives to begin
with and then eliminated two of them from the final rankings. The only positive point is that the
one they kept was creating an ethics program, but the objective barely made the list. Two
participants suggested ethics in the initial list and 55% of the group agreed to keep it on the final
list and it finished outside the top 10 in the final ranking. It is clear from the results of the
technical and control groups that companies with technically oriented training and companies
with no training leave large gaps in information security. Both groups supported technical
aspects of security but mostly ignored the social aspects.

The socio-technical and the social groups had different outcomes than did the technical and
control groups. The social group did not have as strong a result for social objectives as was
anticipated, though the result was better than the technical and control groups. Overall, the
social group had an inadequate list of social objectives. They failed to fully represent RITE, but
did include several other important social objectives. On the technical side, the social group’s
final list of objectives was not as robust as the technical and control groups. But the group did
produce a moderate list of technical objectives. A positive point for the social group is their
realization of the important social and technical objectives. In their shortened list of ranked
objectives, they kept most of their important social and technical objectives and kept all of their
objectives relating to CIA and RITE. Employee ethics and employee integrity were both ranked
in the top ten objectives.
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The socio-technical group received social and technical information security training and
produced the best mix of socio-technical objectives out of all the groups. The socio-technical
group produced a robust list of social objectives and was the only group to include all of the
objectives relating to RITE. The major social aspect omission from the socio-technical group,
and the social group, was the creation of a security culture. Only the technical group included
that objective. The surprise is not so much that the technical group listed it when they did not
receive training about security culture, but that the social and socio-technical groups did receive
security culture training and failed to include it in their objective lists. The socio-technical group
also produced a robust list of technical objectives, representing all aspects of CIA and beyond.

While the socio-technical group started with an excellent list of social and technical objectives,
the ranking Delphi study indicates they did not realize the importance of some of those
objectives. The complete representation of RITE was stripped down in the final ranking to only
two of those constructs. They also dropped some important technical objectives, including the
integrity of data component of CIA. Examples of important objectives dropped by the sociotechnical group include employee ethics and integrity, motivation, commitment, and intrusion
detection.

Overall, the socio-technical group produced the best list of security objectives and was the only
group to fully represent RITE and CIA and include many other important security objectives.
This demonstrates that training did affect their values toward securing information systems. The
disappointing result from this group is that they eliminated many of those important security
objectives in their ranked list. The social group’s results were also a little disappointing because
they failed to fully represent RITE. However, they did include several other important social
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security objectives. The technical and control groups did not have many surprises. Both created
a robust list of technical objectives and a poor list of social objectives, but the technical group
was a little better in both areas.

6.2 Research Questions:

This research had two primary research questions related to the effect of training given to
managers on their values toward security of information systems and the security policy they
create. Value-focused thinking research was used to ascertain individual values toward securing
information systems from four groups of managers that completed four different training
programs. The security values of each group were converted into security objectives and
clustered into similar objectives. Each group’s list of security objectives were then reduced and
ranked according to importance. The first research question discusses the group’s values toward
securing information systems in relation to the nature and scope of the training they received.
Did the training affect the way managers think and feel about securing information systems?
The second research question discusses the security policy implications in relation to each
group’s value-based objectives. Managers will create security policy based on their value-based
objectives, so will that security policy maximize information security?

6.2.1 Influence of Training on Values:

The first research question asked to what extent manager’s values toward securing information
systems are influenced by the nature and scope of information security training they receive.
Each group listed their values toward securing information systems after watching one of four
different training videos. One’s values define all a decision maker cares about in a given
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decision situation (Keeney, 1994). The values listed by the participants from each group
describe how they feel and care about securing information systems at a personal level. Based
on the responses of the technical, social, and socio-technical groups compared to the responses of
the control group, one can see that the nature and scope of information security training has
influence on manager’s values toward securing information systems, though the results are
mixed.

The control group represents a company that does not train managers on the importance of sociotechnical security. Their values would be molded by their education, personal experiences, and
beliefs. The resultant values of the control group were technically dominant and very weak
socially. This means that with no training, manager’s basic beliefs toward securing information
systems would be to primarily use technical solutions and little or no social solutions. In the
control group’s original list of security objectives, only 3 socially oriented value-based security
objectives were represented. However, the group listed 22 technically oriented value-based
security objectives, such as data confidentiality, data backup, and passwords. The complete list
of technically oriented value-based security objectives was very good for securing information
systems and represented all components of CIA. Overall, the control group, with no training,
had an adequate representation of technically oriented value-based security objectives and a poor
representation of socially oriented value-based security objectives. The difference between the
results from the control group and the results of the other three groups is attributed to the training
those other groups received.

The technical group’s training represents training that occurs in most companies today. It is
technical in nature and does not include social aspects of security. The values of the group’s
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participants following the training were also technical in nature and were weak in representing
the social aspects of security. However the technical group’s value-base objectives were a little
more robust than were the control group’s technically oriented value-based security objectives.
Among the technical group’s 25 technical values were additional concepts, like encryption,
malware, and phishing. The technical group’s superior technical values are attributed to the
technical training they received. As with the control group, the poor social representation is
attributed to the lack of social training imparted in both groups.

The social group received only social training and no technical training. Therefore, if their
values were affected by the training, then it would be expected that their technically oriented
value-based security objectives would be similar to the control group’s values. However, the
results indicate that the social group’s value-based objectives toward technical solutions for
information security would provide only moderate information security, which is not as strong as
the control group’s technical objectives. The social group produced only 9 technically oriented
security objectives, compared to 22 for the control group. It appears that social-only training
affected the manager’s values in a negative way, leading them to produce far few technical
objectives than the control group.

The social group’s socially oriented value-based objectives were expected to be better than the
control group and the technical group’s objectives. The control group and the technical group
did not receive social training, so the social group’s socially oriented value-based objectives can
be compared to both. The social group’s socially oriented value-based objectives were better
than the control group and the technical group. The social group had 10 total socially oriented
value-based objectives, compared to 3 from the control group and 5 for the technical group. The
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social group also listed many socially oriented value-based objectives that the control and
technical groups did not, like, employee integrity, employee dissatisfaction, emotional
intelligence, social interactions between companies and employees, and cultural differences.
These additional values were topics discussed in their training video and the inclusion of these
topics in the group’s value-based security objectives is attributed to the training.

The socio-technical group is the only group that received both social and technical training, so
the expectation would be that this group’s values toward social and technical aspects of security
would be stronger than the control group. Since the control group and the social group did not
receive technical training, the technical values of the socio-technical group can be compared to
both. The results show that the socio-technical group created 25 technically oriented value-based
security objectives, compared to 22 for the control group and 9 for the social group. This is
comparable to the control group and far better than the social group. The social values of the
socio-technical group were also well represented, with 20 in all, and better than the other groups,
even the social group that also received social training.

Overall, the nature and scope of information security training does affect the manager’s values
toward securing information systems, but more so for social values than technical values.
Groups that received technical training had similar representation of technical values than did
groups that did not receive technical training. This is attributed to people already having
technically oriented values going in. Groups that received social training had a much better
social value representation than did groups that did not receive social training. An unexpected
result is the negative impact on technical values from receiving only social training and no
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technical training, where the social group’s technically oriented value-based objectives were far
less than the other groups. These results indicate that training has an effect on values.

6.2.2 Implications for Information Security Policy:

The second research question asked to what extent value-based objectives influence the nature
and scope of information security policy. To answer this question, categories were created to
represent the quality of the information security policy that would be created from the manager’s
value-based objectives. For the social aspects of information security, five components were
identified from the literature review as most important. Those are the responsibility, integrity,
trust, and ethicality (RITE) of individuals and the creation of a security culture. Five categories
used to rate the inclusion of the five social components are very good, good, moderate, poor, and
very poor (see table 6.1). All five of these components must be represented in the information
security policy in order to maximize information security and receive a very good rating. For the
technical components, the three components found to be most important from the literature
review were confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of information. The three categories
used to rate the inclusion of these components were very good, moderate and very poor (see
table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Security Policy Categorization Criteria
Categories
Very Good
Good
Moderate
Poor
Very Poor

Social
Full support of RITE and a security culture
(5 components)
4 of 5 components
3 of 5 components
2 of 5 components
1 or less component
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Technical
Full support of CIA
(3 components)
2 of 3 components
1 or less component

This dissertation used the value-focused thinking methodology to produce a list of value-based
security objectives for each of the four groups. That list was then reduced and ranked using a
ranking Delphi methodology, producing a shorter list of security objectives. Both lists are
analyzed in this section in regard to the information security policy they would inform. The
quality of that policy is based on the categories described in table 6.1. The security policy based
on the longer unranked lists of security objectives will be discussed first, followed by a
discussion of the shorter, ranked lists (see table 6.2).

Information security policy informed by the value-based security objectives created by the sociotechnical group came the closest to maximizing information security. The social policy was
categorized as good and not very good only because the group failed to include the creation of a
security culture. Information security policy that does not provide for the creation of a strong
security culture is not maximizing information security. On the technical side, the information
security policy was very good and supports all aspects of CIA. By far, the socio-technical
group’s information security policy produced the strongest overall information security of all the
groups.

The social group’s information security policy informed by their value-based security objectives
was a disappointment. It was anticipated that their social security policy would be good or very
good, but instead it was poor. They failed to create policy for instituting a security culture as
well as two of the four components of RITE. On the technical side, security policy from the
social group was also less than adequate. They were the only group to have moderate technical
security policy and not fully represent CIA, while all the other groups produced very good
technical policy.

118

The technical group and the control group both produced poor social security policy. This fit
into expectations because both groups did not receive training on the social aspects of security
and they both produced a poor list of socially oriented value-based objectives, thus leading to
poor social security policy. On the technical side, both the technical group and the control group
produced very good technical security policy. Of course this is no surprise for the technical
group since they received technical training and produced an excellent list of technically oriented
value-based objectives. The control group also produced an excellent list of technically oriented
value-based objectives and their very good technical security policy was a minor surprise.
Employees are predominately exposed to technically oriented policies and these get reinforced
through technically oriented information security training. It was therefore expected that all
participants from all groups would have a technically oriented view for protecting information
systems, not from the training given in this dissertation, but from their own education and
personal experiences. The training in this dissertation would only enhance that technical view if
they received technical training. It was expected that the control group would have moderate
technical information security policy, but not very good policy. Very good technical security
policy required the representation of all aspects of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
(CIA) of information. The expectation was that the control group would represent most, but not
all aspects of CIA.

Table 6.2: Socio-technical Security Policy (all objectives)
Group
Socio-Technical
Social
Technical
Control

Social Policy
Good
Poor
Poor
Poor
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Technical Policy
Very Good
Moderate
Very Good
Very Good

Table 6.3 represents the information security policy created with the value-based security
objectives from the shortened and ranked list of security objectives from chapter five. The
ranking Delphi method called for the original list to be shortened before it was ranked. Doing so
eliminated many objectives from each group’s list, some of which were important for
maximizing information security. If constraints, such as budgets, meant that managers could not
implement all value-based security objectives in security policy- which would they choose to
implement and which would they chose to eliminate. The ranking Delphi method gave us this
answer by keeping only what the managers considered the most important value-based security
objectives and discarding the rest. The security policy implemented based on these value-based
security objectives is the biggest surprise of this dissertation.

The socio-technical, social, and technical groups all produced poor social security policy and the
control group produced very poor social security policy. The surprise here is that the sociotechnical group did not consider the trust and ethicality pieces of RITE important enough to keep
in their final list of ranked objectives. This prevented the group from producing good social
security policy and made them present poor social security policy. In a time of budget
constraints the socio-technical group would consider eliminating ethics training as a means of
security. The social, technical, and control groups all had poor social policy in the original list,
so it was no surprise that the social and technical groups remained poor and the control group
sank a little lower to very poor.

The technical aspects of information security policy also produced some unexpected results with
the socio-technical group. The group eliminated value based security objectives relating to the
integrity of data, so the quality of their technical security policy decreased from very good in the
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initial list to moderate in the ranked list. The social group started with moderate technical
security policy and continued with moderate technical security policy in the ranked list. The
technical group started with very good technical security policy and continued with very good
technical security policy in the ranked list. The control group decreased from very good
technical security policy to moderate technical security policy in the ranked list because they
eliminated one of their important CIA objectives.

Table 6.3: Socio-technical Security Policy (ranked objectives)
Group
Socio-Technical
Social
Technical
Control

Social Policy
Poor
Poor
Poor
Very Poor

Technical Policy
Moderate
Moderate
Very Good
Moderate

Overall, the social and technical groups maintained their important value-based security
objectives from the original list to the ranked list, so the quality of their information security
policy remained the same. The socio-technical and control groups both eliminated important
value-based security objectives relating to RITE and CIA, so the quality of their information
security policy diminished.

If constraints did not exist and the organization could create security policy based on the original
list of value-based security objectives, the socio-technical group by far would produce the
highest quality information security policy. The social group would produce the worst. Both the
technical and control groups would produce poor social policy and very good technical policy.
The technical group represents how organizations are handling things today. The literature
review showed that organizations predominately had technically oriented security policy.
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If constraints are a problem, such as budget cuts, the information security policy produced from
the ranked list of value-based security objectives leaves a lot of security holes. The technical
group produced the highest quality information security policy, which comprised poor social
policy and very good technical policy. The socio-technical and social groups tied for second
with poor social policy and moderate technical policy. The control group came in last with very
poor social policy and moderate technical policy.

6.3 Emergent Issues:

This dissertation has shown that specialized information security training given to managers can
influence their values for protecting information systems and the information security policy they
create. The emerging issues stemming from such findings are in the area of information security
training, policy planning and policy creation. The next section discusses the information security
training giving to all employees and the specialized information security training that should be
given to management. The following section discusses the implications of such training on
policy planning and creation.

6.3.1 Information Security Training:

Information security training is a method of educating all employees on how best to protect an
organization’s information systems. Rotvold (2008) reported that it is imparted to employees
most often once a year by IT staff. The literature review also told us that the nature and scope of
information security training is based on information security policies and that both were
technically oriented in today’s organizations (Rotvold, 2008; CWS, 2010; Fulford & Doherty,
2003; Straub & Welke, 1998). In order to change the nature and scope of information security
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training to socio-technical, information security policy must change its nature and scope to sociotechnical. This can be accomplished by creating another type of information security training
that is to be given to managers, and not just the managers that create and modify information
security policies, but to all managers. This training needs to be in addition to the training given
to all employees and specifically given to management (figure 6.4). Like the training given to
the socio-technical group in this dissertation, the training needs to teach both social and technical
aspects of information security. There are several reasons it should be given to all managers and
not just those that create or modify information security policy. One is that some of those middle
managers will eventually work their way up to be the ones creating and modifying policy and the
earlier they understand the socio-technical perspective, the better. Another reason to include all
managers is because all managers will need to be involved to implement some socio-technical
aspects of security, such as creating a strong security culture.

Figure 6.4 represents managers receiving two types of training, one being the regular training
giving to all employees that is based on the procedural security policy. The second training is a
socio-technical training that teaches managers about the importance of socio-technical security
and how to create and modify information security policy. Like the socio-technical group in this
dissertation, the goal of this training is to produce socio-technical security policy by influencing
manager’s values and individual objectives toward securing information systems. Once the
managers implement socio-technical security policy, the regular information security training
given to all employees will then become socio-technical. This will not happen overnight, but
instead will take some time for the new socio-technical security policies to be implemented and
for the previously technically oriented information security training to be modified to become
socio-technical to reflect the new policies. The loopback depicted in the diagram reflects the
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new socio-technical procedural security policy’s influence on information security training given
to all employees. Once the cycle is complete and policies and training become socio-technical,
managers will then receive socio-technical security training as a part of the regular training
program that all employees receive as well as socio-technical training on how to create and
modify socio-technical information security policies.

All Employee
Information
Security Training

Manager’s
Values

Manager’s
Individual
Objectives

Corporate
Security
Policy

Procedural
Security
Policy

Management
Socio-technical
Information
Security Training

Figure 6.4: New Policy to Training Relationship

At the least, the special training given to managers should cover the concepts of RITE, CIA, and
the creation of a security culture (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000; Dhillon, 2007). The concepts of
RITE are the responsibility, integrity, trust, and ethicality of individuals. Examples include
creating proper responsibility and authority structures, background checks, building a trusting
culture and ensuring good ethical principles. The concepts of CIA are the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of information. Examples include ensuring appropriate access to data,
backing up data, encrypting data, data integrity checks, and maintaining a functioning network
and equipment. The creation of a security culture is also very important for maximizing
information security (Ruighaver et al., 2007; Dhillon, 2007; Karyda, et al., 2005; von Solms &
von Solms, 2004; Leech, 2003; Vroom and von Solms, 2004). A strong security culture has been
linked to such things as compliant user behavior and employees engaging in security practices
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beyond their mandatory job descriptions (D’Arcy & Greene, 2009). Beyond those already
mentioned, other socio-technical aspects of security that should be discussed include describing
the formal, informal and technical systems (Dhillon, 2007), leadership styles, management
commitment, user involvement, reward systems, motivation, group association and interpreting
and dealing with negative silent messages.

The goal of this training is to influence the values of the managers that receive it in regard to
what they believe are the best ways of maximizing information security. If the nature and scope
of their values are influenced to be socio-technical, then their value-based security objectives for
protecting information systems will also be socio-technical. Like this dissertation’s sociotechnical group’s original list of security objectives, the managers receiving this training will
also have strong value-based security objectives. Those value-based objectives will in turn
inform the information security policy they create or modify and that information security policy
will then become socio-technical. This would mean security policies would support the creation
of a security culture and would include policies supporting RITE and CIA. As these policies
trickle down and inform the creation of new information security training, employees will start
learning about their roles and responsibilities, accountability and about good ethical principles.
Reward systems will be created, users will be more involved, management will be more
committed, and trusting relationships between employees and the employer will be established.
These among others mentioned earlier will strengthen the organization’s security culture, all of
which leads to maximized information security.
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6.3.2 Policy Planning and Creation:

The development of information security policies does not just start with a to-do list that can be
checked off as completed. Managers have to know what assets need to be protected and
determine what policies are best for protecting those assets. This usually involves some form of
risk analysis and SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis. Before
creating policies, it just makes sense to understand what it is you have that needs protection, the
level of importance the assets have for the organization, what the cost would be if protection
fails, what the threats to the assets are, where the threats come from, what policies are currently
in place to protect the assets, and anything else that will help determine the best policies to
create, modify or eliminate.

Baskerville and Siponen (2002) state that organizations should first have a meta-policy about
how to create, modify, and implement information security policy. A meta-policy is a policy
about how to handle the creation, modification, and elimination of security policies. Meta-policy
details who is responsible for making policies, when policy creation is to take place, how
policies are made, and how and when policies are reviewed, modified or eliminated. This
dissertation research believes that meta-policy should include training for all managers, and
especially those involved in policy creation and modification. Meta-policy dictates everything
from who makes the policies to how and when they are created, modified and eliminated. It
should also include the training for those involved in this process.

Once managers have received training, completed the analysis of the assets, and determined the
strengths and weaknesses of the current security policy, they are ready to create, modify, or
eliminate information security policies. We know from the literature review that checklists are
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used by 70% of organizations (CWS, 2010). However, we also know that checklists are
technical by nature and lack flexibility to changing business environments (Baskerville &
Siponen, 2002; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001). Managers should understand that they can use
checklists, but only as references for the technical aspects of security and only if they fit the
organizations business requirements and processes. The technical aspects of security have never
been the problem; the problem has been the lack of social aspects. In addition to the technical
solutions to information security as informed by checklists, managers must still ensure the
creation of the social aspects of security they learned about in their training.

One social aspect that should never be overlooked is the creation of a strong security culture.
To create a strong security culture, it needs to be tied to the information security policies.
Managers can dictate the behavior of employees by “expressing collective values, norms, and
knowledge, through defining specific policies” (Solms & von Solms, 2004, p. 277). In research
from Ruighaver et al. (2007), the authors highlight several factors of good security culture. One
of them is developing a degree of trust and accountability between employees and employers,
which is a part of Dhillon and Backhouse (2000)’s RITE and should be included in the security
policies. Another factor of good security culture identified by Ruighaver et al. (2007) was that
employees should be educated on their roles and responsibilities. This was another part of RITE
and should also be included in the information security policies. The two other parts of RITE
that should also be part of the information security policy and support the security culture are the
integrity and ethicality of individuals. Integrity can start with a background check. Ethicality
can be positively influenced through a formal ethics training program. Companies with ethics
programs suffer less economic crime (Trompeter & Eloff, 2001, ECS, 2007). Beyond creating
policies that support a strong security culture and represent the social aspects of RITE and the
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technical aspects of CIA, policies should also incorporate some of the social concepts described
in the training section, such as involving users, creating reward systems and motivating
employees.

6.4 Conclusion:

This chapter reported the findings of this research, answered the primary research questions and
discussed emergent issues. A significant finding of this research was that the nature and scope of
information security training giving to managers affects the nature and scope of their values.
Another significant finding was that the quality of information security policy was affected by
manager’s value-based security objectives. The group of managers receiving socio-technical
training would produce the highest quality information security policies based on their original
list of value-based security objectives. The group that received no training would produce the
worst information security policies.

The implications of these findings lead us to believe that

specialized socio-technical training should be given to managers and that this training should be
part of a meta-policy within the organization. If managers were to receive socio-technical
training, the security policies they create or modify would be socio-technical. Socio-technical
policies would lead to socio-technical information security policy given to all employees, thus
maximizing information security.
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7. Conclusion
7.1 Overview of the Research:

This dissertation argues that the nature and scope of information security training that managers’
receive impacts the nature and scope of the information security policies they create. It is argued
that the training affects manager’s values toward maximizing information security and that their
value-based objectives influence the nature and scope of the information security policy they
create. The motivation for this research stems from a recent trend in information systems
security research; that the best way to maximize information security is a socio-technical
approach (Backhouse & Dhillon, 1996; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000, 2001; Trompeter & Eloff,
2001; Siponen, 2001; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Dhillon, 2007). While the research trend has
come to this conclusion, the means for achieving socio-technical security is mostly unanswered.

This research attempts to achieve socio-technical security through the heart of the information
security program, the information security policies and the information security training
program. Information security policies are the guiding principles for securing information
systems and information security training is the education given to employees to teach them how
to best protect information systems using the methods described in the policies. Information
security training is primarily based on the information security policies (Rotvold, 2007; CSI,
2006, 2007).

129

A major problem discussed in the literature review is that current information security policies
and information security training is predominately technical in nature, ignoring the social aspects
of security (Rotvold, 2008; CWS, 2010; Fulford & Doherty, 2003). This may be because 70% of
organizations use standardized guidelines (checklists) to create security policies and the reliance
on checklists is expected to rise (GISS, 2008). However, checklists have many shortcomings,
including the lack of flexibility to changing business environments and the lack of attention to
social aspects of security (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001).
Organizations that rely on checklists to create their security policies will no doubt have
technically oriented security policies and training. Another reason that policies and training may
be technical in nature and the use of checklists is high is that managers that create information
security policies lack the skills and knowledge to do so (Hone & Eloff, 2002). This lack of
knowledge leads managers to turn to other sources for help, such as standardized checklists
(Hone & Eloff, 2002).

To potentially solve these problems, this dissertation created four types of information security
training and used four groups of managers to see if there was an effect on the information
security policy they would create. The four types of training were socio-technical training, social
only training, technical only training, and control group non-related training. The experimental
design called for the groups to watch their respective videos and then write down what topics
they believed were most important if they were a manager in charge of maximizing information
security and the effectiveness of the information security training program. This exercise is part
of Keeney’s (1992) value-focused thinking methodology where each group produces a list of
values. The values represent how managers truly feel about maximizing information security.
Following the methodology, the values were converted and clustered into lists of value-based
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security objectives for each group. The value-based security objectives represent what the
managers wish to strive toward in order to maximize information security. When faced with the
decisions involved with creating the organizations information security policy that maximizes
information security, the managers will use their value-based security objectives. The lists of
values and value-based objectives created by each group were used to answer two research
questions.

This dissertations first research question asked as to what extent manager’s values toward
securing information systems are influenced by the nature and scope of information security
training they receive. The findings indicate that values are affected by training, but the results
are mixed. The control group with no relevant training produced an excellent list of technical
values and a poor list of social values. The technical group that received only technical training
also produced an excellent list of technical values and a poor list of social values, which was
expected. The socio-technical group that received both technical and social training produced an
excellent list of technical values and an adequate list of social values. This confirmed that the
social training affected the values of the socio-technical group. The social group was the group
that produced the mixed results. They received only social training, yet produced a poor list of
social values. However, they did have many more social values than the control or technical
groups. This indicates that their values were affected by the training, but not as significantly as
with the socio-technical group. The social group’s technical values were also not as good as the
other groups. While the other three groups had excellent lists of technical values, the social
group had a moderate list. This indicates that social only training may have had a negative
impact on producing technical values.
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This dissertations second research question asked to what extent value-based objectives
influence the nature and scope of information security policy. This question was answered in
two parts. The first part used the full lists of value-based security objectives to determine the
quality of information security policy they would inform. The second part answered the same
question, but with a shortened and ranked list of security objectives. The second list was
produced using a ranking Delphi methodology developed by Schmidt (1997). Following the
ranking Delphi method, the groups were asked to reduce their original lists of value-based
objectives by keeping only those objectives they believed were most important and discarding
the rest. This process produced a shortened list of security objectives that the groups then ranked
from most important to least important. The ranking process took several iterations.

Information security policy informed by the value-based objectives from the original lists
represented the highest quality for the socio-technical group. Their value-based security
objectives would have created good social policy and very good technical policy. They were the
only group that would have produced good social policy, as the other groups all would have
created poor social policy. For technical security policy, the technical and control group’s would
have produced very good policy and the social group would have produced moderate policy.
The socio-technical group would have produced the best overall security policy of the four
groups.

The shortened lists that resulted from using the ranking Delphi methodology produced different
results. Because the original lists of security objectives were shortened, some groups eliminated
important security objectives. In particular, the socio-technical group eliminated many important
value-based security objectives and the effect on information security policy was dramatic.
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Information security policy based on the shortened ranked list would have produced poor social
policy and moderate technical policy. This indicates that managers from this group did not
believe many of the important security objectives were actually important, so they were
eliminated from the list. If security policy were created based on the shortened list of objectives,
overall security would be dramatically weaker. The social and technical groups both maintained
their quality of information security policy with the shortened lists. However, the control
group’s potential security policy got weaker as they also discarded some important security
objectives. Their potential social security policy dropped from being poor to very poor and their
potential technical security policy dropped from being very good to moderate.

Overall results of this dissertation indicate that information security training given to managers
does affect their values toward securing information systems. The quality of information
security policy informed by the manager’s value based security objectives is also affected by
training. In order to maximize information security with socio-technical aspects of security,
managers should receive socio-technical information security training. The results indicate that
managers receiving socio-technical training would produce socio-technical security policies.

7.2 Contributions:

The most important part of a dissertation is the contribution the research makes to knowledge.
There are several contributions this research makes that cross the practical, methodological, and
theoretical realms. The first two subsections describe the practical and theoretical contributions
this research makes to information systems security. The last subsection describes the
methodological contribution that can be applied not only to the information systems discipline,
but beyond.
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7.2.1 Practical:

The practical contribution this research makes explains how organizations should go about
creating, and modifying information security policies to maximize overall information security.
Done properly, organizations will no longer have such a strong dependence on security
checklists and will have socio-technical information security policies. To accomplish this, this
dissertation calls for all organizations to have a specialized information security training program
for managers that teaches them the importance of socio-technical security. The socio-technical
training should cover the important technical aspects of security as well as the important social
aspects of security, such as the concepts of RITE, CIA, and the creation of a security culture. If
done properly, manager’s values toward securing information systems will be affected by the
training and result in socio-technical security policies. The security policies will inform sociotechnical versions of information security training that is given to all employees. The result is
maximized information security through socio-technical information security policies and a
socio-technical information security training program.

7.2.2 Theoretical:

The theoretical contribution of this dissertation is through a model that describes information
security policy and information security training as affecting one another (figure 7.1). The prior
understanding of this relationship was that it was a one way relationship where information
security policy affected information security training, where the training is based on the policies.
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Figure 7.1: Policy to Training Relationship

However, this model suggests that the makeup of information security training also affects
information security policies. The primary reason managers create technically oriented
information security policies is that they do not know any better. This could be because the only
training they have seen is the information security training given to them each year. The control
group in this dissertation demonstrates what the literature review told us in that organizations
currently have technically oriented information security policies and training. Managers
receiving technically oriented training over the years become technically oriented toward
securing information systems, as we saw in the control group’s excellent technical security
policy. Adding a specialized training for managers to the existing information security training
program can break this cycle of technically oriented policies and training and lead to a new
socio-technical cycle.

7.2.3 Methodological:

The methodological contribution of this dissertation was the use of the value-focused thinking
approach as the input to the ranking Delphi study. No other study has been found that combined
these methodologies. The ranking Delphi methodology consists of three phases, the first of
which is the discovery of issues. This is where panelists brainstorm for an initial list of issues
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pertaining to the topic under study. The second and third phases are to shorten the list and rank
the issues. Some researchers choose to alter the first phase by introducing the panelists to a
predetermined list of issues (Keil, et al., 2002; Lee & Anderson, 2006; Kasi et al., 2008). The
panelists do not have any input as to the makeup of this predetermined list of issues. They only
get to shorten the list and rank the remaining issues. This dissertation instead chose to use the
value-focused thinking approach to determine the initial list of issues, called objectives in this
research. The value-focused thinking approach is superior to phase one’s brainstorming activity
in that the panelist’s values are determined. The output of phase one is still a list of issues
(objectives), but obtained through the participants’ values.

In addition, there is no

predetermined list and the same panelists are used for all three phases of the ranking Delphi
methodology.

7.3 Limitations:

There are two major limitations to this research, including generalizability and thoroughness of
training. The non-random selection of MBA students to represent managers is a limitation on
several fronts. The first is that while over 90% of them were managers, not all of them were
managers. Those that were not managers were studying to become managers, but were not
currently employed as managers. The second limitation with using students was that they were
junior managers and not managers that created or modified information security policies. Their
average number of years as managers was relatively low. The last limitation with using MBA
students is generalizing results to all managers. While the non-random selection represented 31
different companies, the results are only generalizable to other non-random selections of MBA
students.
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The second major limitation of this research is the training given to the participants. Each
training video was 35 minutes in length, which is a short period of time to adequately teach the
complicated concepts of socio-technical security. In order to cover all the topics necessary, each
topic was discussed quickly and efficiently. This may have led to an under emphasis on certain
topics.

7.4 Future Research Directions:

Given the limitation, this research still produced significant results. However, future research
directions should attempt to minimize the limitations. The next logical step should be to conduct
this study with a random selection of managers and not MBA students. Another research
direction could be an action research study involving managers that create or modify information
security policy. Those manager’s values could be ascertained before and after training as a pre
and post test. The training should be socio-technical training and the video should be lengthened
to at least an hour to give more time to adequately address all the topics. The video could also be
replaced with a one hour lecture. The information security policies should be analyzed before
the training and at some point after the training to see if the training affected the creation or
modification of security policies. Information security training given to all employees should
also be analyzed before and after the training given to managers to see if it too was affected by
the management training.

If follow-up studies demonstrate that training managers affects information security policy and
information security training by making them both more socio-technical in nature, then another
study should try to determine if socio-technical security affects security incidents. The number
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of security incidents by insiders and outsiders could be monitored for a time period before and
after the implementation of socio-technical security.
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Appendix A: Data Collection Form

Name: ____________________________

Place of Employment (optional): __________________

Email: ____________________________

Years Employed at Above Employer: ______________

Alt. Email: _________________________

Years Employed in Similar Work: ________________

Phone: ____________________________

Years of Management Experience: _________________

Sex: (circle one): Male; Female

Age (circle one): 18-24; 25-29; 30-34; 35-39
40-44; 45-49; 50-54; >54

Study Description: The purpose of this study is to maximize information security and the effectiveness
of the information security training program.
Information Security Training: the method of educating all employees on how best to protect an
organization’s information systems.
Please write down and briefly describe what topics you believe are most important if you were a manager
in charge of maximizing information security and the effectiveness of the information security training
program. Think about what topics should be considered to most effectively secure information systems.
Draw more lines and write on the back if necessary.

1. ________________________________________________________________________
2. ________________________________________________________________________
3. ________________________________________________________________________
4. ________________________________________________________________________
5. ________________________________________________________________________
6. ________________________________________________________________________
7. ________________________________________________________________________
8. ________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix B: Video Content

Socio-Technical Video Outline:
What are the major issues and challenges of managing corporate information security?
•
•

Subverting the controls
Insider threat

How do we manage the insider threat?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Formal, informal, technical systems
Policies
Procedures
Processes
Guiding principles
Security culture
Legal systems, international systems, standards, regulatory aspects

Can you give examples of the technical, formal, and informal systems?
•

Communication example
o Email (technical communication)
o Rules and procedures for email (formal communication)
o System of obligations (informal communication)

How do these systems relate to corporate information security?
•
•
•

•

•
•

Security is when one of the systems fails
Controls need to be in place for all three systems
Informal controls
o Norms
o Security Culture
o Supports the technical and formal systems
Formal controls
o Checks and balances are in place
o Processes are clear
o Rules and procedures communicated properly
Technical controls
o Access rights
Need a mix of control systems
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•

Managerial training educates managers on how to balance these systems.

Can you elaborate on these systems more?
•

Access control and password control
o Organizational fit of the employee
o Access is a function of the role within the organization
o Integrity of the person
o Responsibility and authority structures must be defined first
o Passwords assess depends on them
o Formal structures must be addressed first

How can you assure proper resources are allocated to create authority and responsibility
structures?
•
•
•
•

High resources and high authority = good situation
o Sufficient resources allocated properly
Limited resources and limited authority = problem situation
o No resources allocated to security or allocated incorrectly
Limited resources and high authority = innovation
o Look for creative ways to ensure good security
High resources and limited authority = wastage
o Hard to get security executed

Do you think authority and resource allocation come into play because of the unique
characteristics of the organization?
•
•

Yes, it’s a function of organizational culture, management style, and leadership styles
Leadership styles
o Authoritative
o Consultative
o Delegate

There have been a lot of advances in encryption and secure communication. How do you
ensure that these advances get inculturated into the corporation?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Encryption algorithms
Deterrents
o Consequences of non-compliance
Leadership commitment is needed
Good governance
High management commitment and high deterrence
o High compliance
Low management commitment and low deterrence
o High vulnerability
High management commitment and low deterrence
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•
•

o Sloppy management
Low management commitment and high deterrence
o Fear
o Unhappy working
Some reasons for subverting controls
o Unhappy working conditions
o Personal factors
o Opportunity is there (broken process)

What are the three most important things for ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of data?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

User involvement
o Creating controls
o Nuances of technical and formal controls
Process integrity
Resources and good resource allocation
Low user involvement and bad process integrity
o Bad security governance
High user involvement and high process integrity
o Good security governance
High user involvement and low process integrity
o Average security governance
o Need to improve process integrity
Low user involvement and high process integrity
o Average security governance
o Need to improve user involvement

How do you ensure you are complying with regulations?
•
•

High user involvement and high process integrity = compliance
Regulations are afterthoughts
o Something went wrong in the past

How do you ensure total security? What are the takeaways from this conversation?
•

•
•
•

Technical measures
o Passwords
o User access to data resources
o Confidentiality
o Integrity of data
o Availability of data
Proper responsibility and authority structures
Integrity of people
o Background checks
Trust of people
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•
•

o Verify the trust
o Ensure a trusting culture
Ethics
o Ensure good ethics
o Follow ethical principles
CIA and RITE

Social Video Outline:
What do you think is the most important element for managing security?
•
•
•

People
o take care of the needs of the people
Good security culture
RITE: responsibility, integrity, trust, ethicality of people

How do you mange the people and culture?
•
•
•
•

Motivating and influencing people through good leadership
Power of groups and management of security
People relationships
Positive and negative intentions

How does all of that relate to how security gets managed?
•
•
•
•

Belief systems influence attitudes
Security culture aspects
Hospital example
o Tracking nursing care time with patients
o Resulted in disgruntled employees, which is bad for security
Security problems can occur for several reasons
o Work situation (disgruntled people)
o Personal factors (divorce, addiction, etc.)
o Opportunity (broken processes)

Are there any tools or techniques that can used to teach these kinds of social systems?
•

Understand incoming silent messages from groups or organizations
o Interpret and deal with negative messages
o Group associations
o How do you learn, defend yourself, interact with others, hobbies, etc?
o There is a message emendating from the work situation
 Understanding negative messages is critical to security
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Dhillon Privacy Interview:
•
•

Privacy
Identity theft

Social and Emotional Intelligence Video Segment:
•
•
•
•
•

Awareness of feelings
Management of emotions
Empathy
Leader’s emotional and social intelligence
Enhancing leadership and culture

Technical Video Outline:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Computer updates
Viruses
Secure email
Malware
Data backup
Physical Security
Encryption
Passwords
Firewalls
Phishing
Acceptable Internet Usage
Acceptable Email Usage

Control Video Outline:
•
•

Sexual harassment
Anger Management
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Appendix C: Information Security Training Videos
The training videos are large files and are available upon request from the author.
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Appendix D: Raw Values to Common Form
Table D1: Socio-technical Group Common Form
Raw Data from Participant
Issue passwords to all employees.
In order to get access, an employee must enter his or her
password.
Create your own network and upload all company
computers with only needed for work software
programs.
Limit Internet access, remove unneeded software and
hardware, such as USB ports.

All computers must be password protected, something as
easy as screen saver passwords might deter an intruder.
More data and overall executive powers should be
available as employees get promoted.

At the same time, the simple data available let’s say to
clerks should not be available to executives. Each
person should deal and have access to the data needed
for his or her job performance.
I wish the company should have the right employee in
the right place in the company.
Integrity of the people in the organization, trust between
the organization and the employees are more important
than everything.
The company should know that the employee is doing
the right thing for the company.
Lack of commitment of the employee and lack of
responsibility would make lower the success of the
organization and also security of the system.
Every organization should have technical, formal, and
informal control systems.
Processes, procedures, rules should be clearly
understood by the employees.
One of the control systems cannot work alone so you
need the mix of systems.
The training that would be given to the employee should
involve mutual trust.
Because success is going to come with employees.
Employees need to trust the company.
Higher motivation with good incentives may help the
company to gain good user involvement.

Formatted in common form as wishes
ST1: I wish all employees were issued passwords
ST1: I wish passwords were required for access
ST1: I wish the company would create its own network
ST1: I wish company computers only had necessary
software installed
ST1: I wish Internet access was limited
ST1: I wish unnecessary software was removed
ST1: I wish unnecessary hardware was removed
ST1: I wish unnecessary USB ports were removed
ST1: I wish all computers were password protected
ST1: I wish screen saver passwords were utilized
ST1: I wish more data was available to promoted
employees
ST1: I wish more executive power was given to
promoted employees
ST1: I wish data only be available to those that need it

ST2: I wish companies would correctly place employees
ST2: I wish employees had integrity
ST2: I wish for trust between the organization and
employees
ST2: I wish companies knew if employees were right for
the company
ST2: I wish companies would hire employees with high
commitment and responsibility
ST2: I wish organizations had technical, formal, and
informal control systems
ST2: I wish processes, procedures, and rules were
clearly understood by employees
ST2: I wish organizations had a mix of control systems
ST2: I wish employees received training in mutual trust
ST2: I wish employees knew that trusting the company
leads to success
ST2: I wish companies used incentives and motivation
to gain good user involvement
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The company structure and good risk assessment would
help the company to keep the balance of security.
Educate employees about the importance of security.
Make sure that they know that it will have a direct affect
on their salaries and careers.
Make sure people are familiar with the basic procedures,
passwords, logging in, logging off, not sharing
confidential data, and so forth.

Reward employees for notifying about any kind of lack
of integrity in data and security systems.

Make sure that employees know that security is a serious
issue and any kind of bad behavior will be punished.
Make sure that employees well understand their level of
access.
Good infrastructure, IDS, firewall.

Good policy allowing people to do what they need to do
and still be secure and have integrity.
Integrity of database/protection against intrusion through
database (like SQL injection).
Secure web server.
Get good people through screening.
Set up controls = corporate policies and standards
People awareness about security and how it affects its
surroundings.
Ethics – people need to be ethical and trusting.
Consequences of non-compliance (fear).
Situations outside of the obvious, for example
blackberry security.
Roles and responsibilities (formal). For example,
supervisor approves refunds in excess of $2500.
Resources – structure of compliance team. Let people
know that corporate security is more than one person in
a cubicle.
Why? – Reasons for security. Explain to end users who
do not always see the benefit or consequence.
Make computer settings so that no information is
remembered or can be.
Use fingerprints or iris scanning for actual access to
localities with sensitive data.

ST2: I wish companies had good company structure and
risk assessment
ST3: I wish employees were trained in the importance of
security
ST3: I wish employees were told security was related to
their salaries and careers
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with basic
procedures
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with password
policy
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with procedures of
logging in and logging off
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with the policy of
not sharing confidential data
ST3: I wish employees were rewarded for notifying
management about data integrity breaches
ST3: I wish employees were rewarded for notifying
management about security breaches
ST3: I wish employees were notified about the
seriousness of security
ST3: I wish employees were punished for bad behavior
ST3: I wish employees understood their level of access
ST4: I wish companies had a good infrastructure
ST4: I wish companies had IDS
ST4: I wish companies had firewalls
ST4: I wish companies had policies that allowed people
to effectively work while maintaining security and
integrity
ST4: I wish companies protected the integrity of
databases from intrusion
ST4: I wish companies secured their web servers
ST4: I wish companies hired good people by screening
them
ST4: I wish companies used policies and standards to set
up controls
ST4: I wish employees were aware of security
ST5: I wish employees were ethical
ST5: I wish employees were trustworthy
ST5: I wish there were consequences for noncompliance
ST5: I wish companies were aware of less obvious
threats, such as blackberries
ST5: I wish companies set up proper roles and
responsibilities
ST5: I wish employees were notified that security was
more than just one person
ST5: I wish employees were taught the benefits and
consequences of security
ST6: I wish computers were set to not remember
information
ST6: I wish fingerprints or retinal scans were used to
access sensitive data
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Employee audits, activity tracking, monitor suspicious
activities without instilling distrust.
Background checks for crimes or dishonesty
Make sure users are informed.
Single design so that employees are aware of when
something is awry.
Make clear provisions as to who is allowed in what.
Constantly checking for system glitches, have friendly
hacking identify potential weaknesses and hesitations to
system entry.
Make security tight but not to the point of compromising
work quality.
Reinforce ethics. There is no need for any of this if
people are not compelled to do unethical things.
Assign proper knowledge outlets who should know what
and why.
Keep automated systems limited. People get very use to
the way things ought to be.
Who is allowed to view certain types of information – is
it getting to the right place?
Who can modify this information – like personal records
in case of, for example, hospital and patient
information?
Who can read or go into personal computers.
Can you share information, for example, in many
companies in “development and research department for
new products?” Are they allowed to email or share
facts?
What information is expected of me to know and I am
responsible for.
I wish there were a clear set of rules or guidelines to
follow in the case of security information. What does
the organization expect?
The video should stay away from abstractions. Clear,
concise, colorful examples demonstrating IT security
issues.
Make the video as visually stimulation as possible.
Force the viewer to answer questions at the conclusion
of each example case or scenario.
Emphasize individual integrity in the video as much as
possible.
Incorporate existing management in the video, which
may resonate more with the viewer.
Make a series of videos demonstrating basic advanced
cases on security for the various roles in the
organization.
Don’t speak overly technical, keep it simple and short.
Put the viewer in the shoes of the actor in the video.

ST6: I wish employees were audited, activity tracked,
and monitored without instilling distrust
ST6: I wish background checks were utilized
ST6: I wish employees were informed
ST6: I wish single design was utilized so employees
would recognize when something is wrong
ST6: I wish employees were clear as to who had access
to what
ST6: I wish there was constant checking for system
glitches
ST6: I wish “friendly hacking” was used to identify
weaknesses
ST6: I wish security could be strong without
compromising work quality
ST6: I wish ethics were stressed
ST6: I wish there were knowledge outlets identifying
who should know what and why
ST6: I wish automated systems were limited
ST7: I wish data was only viewable to the appropriate
people
ST7: I wish there were rules in place to identify those
allowed to modify data
ST7: I wish there were rules identifying who had access
to computers
ST7: I wish there were confidentiality policies

ST7: I wish there were clearly defined roles of
responsibilities
ST7: I wish employee expectations were clearly defined.
ST7: I wish there were clearly defined rules
ST7: I wish there were defined expectations regarding
the security of information
ST8: I wish employees were trained with clear, concise,
colorful examples of IS security
ST8: I wish employees were trained with visually
stimulating videos
ST8: I wish trainees were asked questions regarding
topics demonstrated in the training video
ST8: I wish employees were taught about individual
integrity
ST8: I wish management was used in training videos
ST8: I wish there were training for the various roles in
the organization
ST8: I wish training were not too technical
ST8: I wish training were kept simple and short
ST8: I wish training put the viewer in the shoes of the
actor in the video
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Understand what data will be monitored by IT and how
it will be used.
Understand corrective actions that will be taken for
violation of policies (suspension, termination, etc.).
Understand what constitutes inappropriate use of
computers and how it can be used personally.
Understand that there is a “need to know” for data and
by being an employee you do not necessarily have full
access to everything.
Understand that business is not to be conducted on noncompany (i.e. personal) computers or cell phones.
Understand that updated software will be pushed to your
company machine and software will not be installed
without permission.
Understand where policies and procedures are posted,
who owns them, and how to make or suggest changes.

Employees should be well trained in high security areas.
There should be limited access to secure areas.
The organizational structure should be formed in a way
that designates proper access to appropriate people.
The company should demonstrate ways to eliminate
opportunities for broken processes.
The change process should be so that employees know
exactly what to expect and embrace it accordingly.
A demonstration of regulatory compliance should be
covered.
Total security process should include a very thorough
pre-employment process to eliminate any potential risks.
Communication should be formal and streamlined so
that there is no confusion coming if the communication
from that person is not clear. That person would be the
one to correct any misunderstandings.

ST9: I wish there were rules for what data are monitored
ST9: I wish there were rules for how data is used
ST9: I wish punishment were clearly defined for
violations
ST9: I wish there were computer usage policies
ST9: I wish there were data access policies limiting
access to those that need the data
ST9: I wish there were a policy prohibiting company
business on personal computers or cell phones
ST9: I wish computers were updated regularly
ST9: I wish there were a policy limiting the installation
of software without permission
ST9: I wish employees were notified as to where
policies and procedures were posted
ST9: I wish employees were notified as to how to
suggest changes to policies and procedures
ST10: I wish employees in high security areas are well
trained
ST10: I wish there were limited access to secure areas
ST10: I wish organizational structure designated proper
access to the appropriate people
ST10: I wish companies worked to eliminate broken
processes
ST10: I wish employees knew what to expect with a
change process and embraced it
ST10: I wish regulation compliance was covered with
employees
ST10: I wish employees were screened before hiring
ST10: I wish corporate communication were clear and
concise, eliminating confusion

Table D2: Social Group Common Form
Raw Data from Participant
Importance of customer privacy.
How to handle correspondence (e-mail) appropriately.
What information to release and what information to
withhold from 3rd parties.
How to secure your own data, lock your systems.
While you are away from your computer, do not leave
private information out and unattended.
How to handle the media when applicable.
I would like to see less online tutorial based training.
I would like to see more hands on or actual interaction

Formatted in common form as wishes
S1: I wish security training included the importance of
customer privacy
S1: I wish security training included how to handle
email appropriately
S1: I wish security training included confidentiality of
information from outside parties
S1: I wish security training included personal data
security
S1: I wish security training included physical security of
data around employee computers
S1: I wish security training included how to handle the
media
S2: I wish security training were not online training
S2: I wish security training were hands on
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with real security issues.
I would like to see more education given to protecting
home personal computer users or the “average”
computer user.
I would like to see password security strengthened.
Current organizations require too many, so people write
them down.
I would like to see more average and novice computer
training given to employees. I think general computer
knowledge would have a positive impact on overall
security.
Continuing education as trends change.
Needs to be current, like bleeding edge current, or else
something will get the upper hand.
Needs to make good points that seem relevant to
employees.
Go over the most common security threats and train how
to prevent them.
Clearly explain rights, especially corporate e-mail,
privacy, etc. Leave no loophole.
I wish they would actually demonstrate the
consequences of a security breach.
I wish the training was not so technically specific. Not
everyone is computer minded.
I wish they would actually explain why it was necessary
to have a security policy.
I wish they would convey that a person’s “mood”
actually affects their decision making ability.
Contrary to previous statements, I wish they would put
the “fear of God,” or express the importance of proper
information security decisions on a personal level.
Above all, convey that people do make mistakes and let
them know it is not the end of the world.
I believe security awareness training should include a
description of the corporation’s values and what it
expects of its employees regarding ethical and moral
issues.

In addition to the technical and legal aspects of security
training, it should include some of the factors that
contribute or facilitate security incidents, such as
employee dissatisfaction, and other relevant factors that
could affect an employee’s decision.
The thought process of the individual from different
cultural backgrounds.
How peer pressure can affect one’s perceptions.
How managers can help in providing the awareness.
Values include greater privacy and privacy protection
training. Greater understanding of how user actions
affect overall security within an organization needs to be

S2: I wish security training included interaction with real
security issues
S2: I wish security training included how to protect
home computers
S2: I wish security training included password
strengthening that minimized writing down passwords
S2: I wish security training included novice and
beginner training

S2: I wish security training included continuing
education as threats change
S3: I wish security training should be current and cutting
edge
S3: I wish security training included points relevant to
employees
S3: I wish security training included the most common
threats and how to prevent them
S3: I wish security training included corporate email
privacy rights
S4: I wish security training included the consequences to
the company of security breaches
S4: I wish security training was not too technical
S4: I wish it were explained why a security policy were
necessary
S4: I wish it were explained that a person’s mood affects
decision making
S4: I wish the importance of security were stressed to
employees
S4: I wish employees were told that people do make
mistakes and it is not the end of the world
S5: I wish security training included a description of
corporate values
S5: I wish security training included expectations of
employee moral values
S5: I wish security training included expectations of
employee ethical values
S5: I wish security training included technical aspects
S5: I wish security training included legal aspects
S5: I wish employee dissatisfaction related to security
were addressed
S5: I wish factors affecting employee decision making
were addressed
S6: I wish cultural backgrounds were taken into
consideration
S6: I wish peer pressure were considered
S6: I wish managers were involved in providing
awareness
S7: I wish security training included privacy training
S7: I wish security training included consequences to
corporations for and individuals inappropriate actions
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better knowledge to know the consequence or reaction
of your actions.
Also, security awareness training in a format that the
less technical user can comprehend and is interested in.
I believe the emotional intelligence dimension should be
used. In the book, there are four competencies, two deal
with personal, 2 deal with social. A person needs to
understand how people view them and also understand
their personal background.
I believe in order to prevent security issues, one must be
taught values of high integrity and they must know the
importance of them.
Give examples of how firms that suffered security issues
or incidents and show how it damaged the firm and
people. This may scar or create a sensitive feeling for
the trainee.
Highlight the importance of security within the firm and
show how it is top importance. This may veer potential
threats away.
I would like to see more information based concepts
included in security awareness programs. Identity theft
and more importantly secure company information theft
is a large problem faced by many corporations. This
topic should be the main focus of the training and also
should include: Social interactions between companies
and individuals (how that can negatively affect security),
cultural differences in security technology data
protection, levels of sophistication differences, employee
interactions and use of system applications.
The security awareness is different in my life and the
workplace. My value in my life is basically the political
As a Taiwanese, the
and economic environments.
political issue of China and Taiwan is the big issue. The
economic environment also puts the stress into the daily
life. In the workplace, in traditional Taiwan culture, the
female position always has been un-balanced with
males. The security training I wish that it would focus on
the value of the culture transition and the female value in
employee value.

S7: I wish security training interested the less technical
user
S8: I wish security training included emotional
intelligence

S8: I wish security training included values of high
integrity
S8: I wish security training included real examples of
incidents and the damage caused

S8: I wish security training stressed the importance of
security
S9: I wish security training included identity theft
S9: I wish security training included corporate
information theft
S9: I wish security training included social interaction
between companies and individuals
S9: I wish security training included cultural differences
S9: I wish security training acknowledged the various
levels of sophistication
S9: I wish security training included data protection
S9: I wish security training included appropriate
employee usage of applications
S10: I wish security training considered culture (not
corporate culture)
S10: I wish security training considered sex
(male\female)

Table D3: Technical Group Common Form
Raw Data from Participant
The suggestions for passwords were very helpful. We
are required to change our password every 60 days, but
there are very few requirements.
The phishing piece was good. Well known (the scams)
but good to see it frequently.
Storing data backups: it never occurred to me to keep
backups in a separate location.
Virus scan part was good too. I didn’t know that weekly
patches were available.

Formatted in common form as wishes
T1: I wish there were stricter requirements for
passwords
T1: I wish there was phishing training available to
employees
T1: I wish there was backup training available to
employees
T1: I wish there was virus training available to
employees
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Security awareness should be interactive rather than just
plain video presentation to help answer any questions or
concerns the viewers may have regarding the topic.
Little more awareness could be given on viruses, worms,
spam, etc. which will help the tech support maintenance
efforts.
Email security should also include topics like avoiding
“reply all” whenever possible, threats from “pharming,”
just like “phishing.”
Employees should be made aware of protecting
passwords in a safe place and not sharing company
information with outside people.
Email and web surfing monitoring policies should be
explained in detail.

As for email communication, I think the security
awareness training should also mention those attachment
files which are highly possible to have viruses, such as
.exe, website links, and compressed files.

Users should be taught to delete any other email
addresses displayed in the specific email when users are
forwarding it.
I wish security awareness training was simplistic.
I wish it entailed actual examples of past events and the
consequences as a result of negligent actions.
I wish employees could see the real harm and financial
recovery and protection cost for security awareness.
Perhaps it would help them to adopt a mindset of “this is
a critical issue.”
I wish the training would provide the basic abc’s of data
protection and the greatest threats against such data.
I wish that security awareness training was more concise
and gave clear reference points for employees to access
help after training.
Stress management.
Corporate values.
Security policies and procedures.
Filters/audits.
Email security.
Antiviral software.
Encryption.
Internet navigation – spyware.
Password training.
Device hardware security.
Backup databases.
Appropriate storage facilities.

T1: I wish virus updates were known to employees
T2: I wish security awareness training were interactive
with someone to answer questions
T2: I wish virus training were more in depth
T2: I with worm training were more in depth
T2: I wish spam training were more in depth
T2: I wish email security was included in training
T2: I wish pharming training were available (like
phishing)
T2: I wish password protection were included in training
T2: I wish there were policies about confidentiality of
information
T2: I wish email policies were adequately explained to
employees
T2: I wish Internet policies were adequately explained to
employees
T3: I wish security training included the risk of e-mail
attachments
T3: I wish security training included the risk of web
links
T3: I wish security training included the risk of e-mail
compressed files
T3: I wish security training included deleting previous
recipients email addresses on forwarded emails
T4: I wish security training were simplistic
T4: I wish training included past examples and
consequences to the company
T4: I wish training informed employees of the cost of
security awareness
T4: I wish training could change the mindset of
employees to make them aware of “critical issues”
T4: I wish training taught the basics of data protection
T4: I wish training taught the greatest threats to data
T4: I wish training were concise
T4: I wish training provided employees with ways to get
help after the training (reference points)
T5: I wish security training included stress management
T5: I wish security training included corporate values
T5: I wish security training included security policies
T5: I wish security training included security procedures
T5: I wish security training included filters
T5: I wish security training included audits
T5: I wish security training included email security
T5: I wish security training included antivirus software
T5: I wish security training included encryption
T5: I wish security training included Internet navigation
T5: I wish security training included spyware
T5: I wish security training included password training
T5: I wish security training included device hardware
security
T5: I wish security training included database backup
T5: I wish security training included appropriate storage
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Adverse affects financial etc.
I believe there could be more hands-on workshops, such
as how to use the TrueCrypt software to encrypt
confidential files. It would be much more effective to
show employees the importance of IT security through a
hands-on approach.
I wish training should have more in depth training so I
can understand all issues and I also wish it showed how
to avoid it means how I practically do it at work, or
home to be a victim of security breach.
I also wish that before starting IT security training, they
should consider audience level of knowledge about
security.
First thing that should be included in such a video is the
physical security that is provided at the workplace.
There should be a detailed explanation of what needs to
be done in case of different types of emergencies.
The different aspects of the online security. Things that
need to be included are what are the different online
threats and how to effectively deal with those.
Full hard disk encryption.
Exercise every year to make sure that data from backup
devices can be retrieved.
Keep 2 backups in physically separated places, far away,
east coast vs. west coast.
Email encryption always.
Use of VPN while out from secured network.
Create security culture.
Define roles and responsibilities.
Handle cultural issues which may impact security
standards.
Security awareness training needs to be based on details
specific to the company and utilize company specific
examples. If this is not possible industry specific
training should be used. People tend to tune out when
shown generic videos.
Also, strictly showing a video is a poor way to get across
any type of training. Training should be as interactive as
possible.
Another important factor is humor. Humor if properly
used can leave a lasting impression on an audience
without losing the point your making.
Using bright imagery also helps.

facilities
T5: I wish security training included the adverse affects
of bad security
T6: I wish security training included hands on
workshops

T7: I wish security training were more in-depth
T7: I wish security training demonstrated all issues and
ways to avoid them
T7: I wish trainee knowledge level were taken into
consideration before training
T8: I wish security training included physical security
T8: I wish security training included appropriate
responses to various emergencies
T8: I wish security training included online threats and
how to deal with them.
T9: I wish security training included full hard disk
encryption
T9: I wish security training stressed the importance of
annual backup recovery practice to make sure it works
T9: I wish security training included the need to keep
more than one backup separated physically
T9: I wish security training included email encryption
T9: I wish security training included the usage of VPN’s
when out of the office
T9: I wish security training included creating a security
culture
T9: I wish security training defined roles and
responsibilities
T9: I wish security training included how to handle
cultural issues that may affect security
T10: I wish security training included company or
industry specific examples

T10: I wish security training included were interactive

T10: I wish security training included humor for a
lasting impression
T10: I wish security training included bright imagery
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Table D4: Control Group Common Form
Raw Data from Participant
It is important to have some sort of interaction with the
audience ala the first session, not just to be lectured to as
in the second session or with an interview don by a
perhaps celebrity DJ.
It is also important for the person giving the training to
have some legit credentials and to look the part.
It is not as important to emphasize the negatives or
punishments of breaking or lax security. It is much
more important to stress the benefits achieved.
I wish they would be informative on past security
breaches.
I wish they would say what to do when security is
breached (guidelines on reporting).
I wish they would train on how to handle incidents.
What happens/consequences?
If it is confidential.
I think that there needs to first be a demonstration on
what computer security awareness is.
I feel that computer security awareness training should
show breaches of security.
I feel it should show how security is performed properly.
To end the training, there should be a shorts segment to
summarize what was learned.
Role of security and security awareness. Aspects of
security awareness.
Benefits and challenges of security awareness.
Consequences of poor security awareness.
Personalize the issues to me role in the workplace.
Speeches of security at my workplace.
Training must be strong and interactive.
Past examples of security issues at my workplace.
Punishments of noncompliance.
Common security holes, downloading of files from
company computers, taking home company files via
email, flash drive, CD, etc.

Physical access to the building.
Do not hand out your ID.

Formatted in common form as wishes
C1: I wish security training included interaction with
trainees

C1: I wish trainers had appropriate credentials and
looked the part
C1: I wish training emphasized the benefits of following
security policy, instead of emphasizing the punishment
or negatives of not following security policy
C2: I wish security training included examples of past
security breaches
C2: I wish security training included guidelines for
reporting security breaches
C2: I wish security training included how to handle
incidents
C2: I wish security training included consequences of
security breaches
C2: I wish security training included confidentiality
C3: I wish security training included demonstrations
C3: I wish security training included examples of
breaches
C3: I wish security training demonstrated how to
properly perform security
C3: I wish security training included a summary of what
was taught
C4: I wish security training included the role of security
C4: I wish security training included the benefits and
challenges of security
C4: I wish security training included corporate
consequences of bad security
C4: I wish security training included personalization to a
particular role in the company
C4: I wish security training included lectures at the
workplace
C4: I wish security training were strong
C4: I wish security training were interactive
C4: I wish security training included examples from the
trainee’s workplace
C4: I wish security training included punishments for
non-compliance
C5: I wish security training included common security
vulnerabilities
C5: I wish security training included Internet policy
C5: I wish security training included policy taking home
corporate information via email attachment
C5: I wish security training included policy taking home
corporate information via portable media
C5: I wish security training included physical security
C5: I wish security training included policy on corporate

164

Security is everyone’s job, not just IT. Be realistic in
your assumptions.
Do not dumb it down to the point of being insulting, but
don’t talk over their heads either.
Don’t make policies so strict that employees feel
distrusted.
Recognize that they will use the Internet for personal
business and plan for that.
Keep it interesting and keep the employees involved,
short and to the point.
Maintaining secure email account enables a sexually
harassed employee to know there is verification and
evidence of the harassment they suffered.
People need to be aware of their actions and
consequences thereof.
I wish people respected privacy of others at the office as
this seems to lead to problems.
I wish people would do less inappropriate things on the
Internet during business hours; it is distracting and could
get us in trouble.
People do not do a good job of protecting company
information when they leave the office (i.e. leave their
Others could damage the
computer logged on).
company and us wind up in a lawsuit.
Anti-virus software.
Password identification.
Firewall software.
Information and data backup.
Consistent security policy.
Published formal standard.
Host network intrusion detection.
Ethics Training.
Control of workstation.
Encourage violations reporting.
Knowledge basics of computers and networking.
Discuss Internet Protocol, routing, Domain Name
Service, access points, firewalls, and other network
devices.
Cover the basics of cryptography, security management,
and wireless networking.
Give managers and other employees “how to develop
security policies,” like ethical code of conduct,
employee’s disciplines, basic activities to keep computer
network safe (passwords secrecy).
Give knowledge about threats and problems that a
network may face, such as hacking, social engineering,
virus attack, network failure, etc.
Now the tools to tackle them such as antivirus, good
configuration, contingency planning, etc. Good idea
would be to give students some topics of security of

ID’s
C5: I wish security training stressed the importance of
everyone being involved
C5: I wish security training taught at the level of the
trainee
C5: I wish security was not so strict that employees felt
distrusted
C5: I wish it was recognized that employees were going
to use the Internet for personal use
C5: I wish security training were interesting
C6: I wish security training included email policy

C7: I wish security training included employee
consequences
C7: I wish security training included personal privacy of
others at the office
C7: I wish security training included and Internet policy

C7: I wish security training included physical security of
their workstations

C8: I wish training covered anti-virus software
C8: I wish training included password protection
C8: I wish training included firewall configuration
C8: I wish training included data backup
C8: I wish training included consistent security policy
C8: I wish there was a published formal standard
C8: I wish training included host network intrusion
detection
C8: I wish training included ethics training
C8: I wish training included workstation control
C8: I wish training included violation reporting
C9: I wish training included firewalls
C9: I wish training included Internet Protocols
C9: I wish training included Domain Name Service
C9: I wish training included Access Points
C9: I wish training included encryption
C9: I wish training included security management
C9: I wish training included wireless networking
C9: I wish training included ethical conduct
C9: I wish training included passwords

C9: I wish training included hacking threats
C9: I wish training included social engineering
C9: I wish training included virus attacks
C9: I wish training included network failures
C9: I wish training included contingency planning
C9: I wish training included special training, such as
CCNA, CCNP, MCSC, and Linux
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courses like, CCNA, CCNP, MCSC (window’s server)
and Linux. This will help students how to configure
secured network and tools to tackle when failure occurs.
Virus – use of genuine antivirus (no pirated versions).
Keep the anti-virus updated.
Do not ask and store information from the customers
that you do not require. For example, if your industry
type does not need the social security number of the
customers, don’t ask for it.
Do not download random files from the Internet,
especially movies or videos.
Password training – use a strong password (no date of
birth, name, etc.) instead a mix of numbers and
alphabets. Keep changing the password frequently. Do
not share your passwords with others.
All company information should be discussed via
company emails and equipment only.
When someone sends a reply it would be better if they
sent it without the attachment which has been previously
snet so that mail boxes don’t get clogged.
Setting up and updating of proper antivirus systems.
Set screen saver passwords when leaving the desk. Set
up automatic configuration of screen saver passwords.
Password change periodically, including bios passwords.
Protection from SPAM.

C10: I wish training included virus training
C10: I wish training included customer data
confidentiality
C10: I wish training included a policy to only keep
necessary customer information
C10: I wish training included acceptable Internet usage
C10: I wish training included strong password training

C10: I wish training included a policy about not using
personal emails or devices for company data
C11: I wish training discusses email attachments
C11: I wish training taught employees to not send
attachments back to the original sender when replying to
emails
C11: I wish training included antivirus training and
scanning
C11: I wish training taught employees to use screen
saver passwords
C11: I wish training included a policy about changing
BIOS passwords frequently
C11: I wish training included protection from SPAM
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Appendix E: Group Clustering
Table E1: Socio-Technical Group Clustering
ST3: I wish employees were rewarded for notifying
management about data integrity breaches
ST3: I wish employees were rewarded for notifying
management about security breaches
ST5: I wish employees were ethical
ST6: I wish ethics were stressed
ST5: I wish employees were trustworthy
ST2: I wish for trust between the organization and
employees
ST2: I wish employees received training in mutual trust
ST2: I wish employees knew that trusting the company leads
to success
ST2: I wish employees had integrity
ST8: I wish employees were taught about individual
integrity
ST2: I wish companies would correctly place employees
ST2: I wish companies knew if employees were right for the
company
ST2: I wish companies would hire employees with high
commitment
I wish companies would hire responsible employees
ST4: I wish companies hired good people by screening them
ST6: I wish background checks were utilized
ST10: I wish employees were screened before hiring
ST3: I wish employees were punished for bad behavior
ST5: I wish there were consequences for non-compliance
ST9: I wish punishment were clearly defined for violations
ST7: I wish data was only viewable to the appropriate
people
ST9: I wish there were data access policies limiting access to
those that need the data
ST1: I wish data only be available to those that need it
ST3: I wish employees understood their level of access
ST6: I wish employees were clear as to who had access to
what
ST7: I wish there were rules in place to identify those
allowed to modify data
ST7: I wish there were rules identifying who had access to
computers
ST10: I wish organizational structure designated proper
access to the appropriate people
ST1: I wish more data was available to promoted employees
ST8: I wish employees were trained with clear, concise,
colorful examples of IS security
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Ensure a reward system for disclosing security
breaches
Ensure appropriate ethics training

Ensure a trust relationship between employees and
the company

Ensure training covers employee integrity
Ensure employees are a good fit for the position
before they are hired
Ensure the hiring of committed employees
Ensure the hiring of responsible employees
Ensure potential employees are screened before
hiring
Ensure employees are aware of consequences of
non-compliance

Ensure data access is limited to appropriate
individuals

Ensure rules to identify who has appropriate access
to computers
Ensure organizational structure designates proper
access to the appropriate people
Ensure promoted employees have more access to
data
Ensure examples are fully utilized in security
training

ST8: I wish employees were trained with visually
stimulating videos
ST8: I wish trainees were asked questions regarding topics
demonstrated in the training video
ST8: I wish management was used in training videos
ST8: I wish there were training for the various roles in the
organization
ST8: I wish training were not too technical
ST8: I wish training were kept simple and short
ST8: I wish training put the viewer in the shoes of the actor
in the video
ST1: I wish company computers only had necessary
software installed
ST1: I wish unnecessary software was removed
ST9: I wish there were a policy limiting the installation of
software without permission
ST2: I wish organizations had technical, formal, and
informal control systems
ST2: I wish organizations had a mix of control systems
ST6: I wish security could be strong without compromising
work quality
ST4: I wish companies had policies that allowed people to
effectively work while maintaining security and integrity
ST6: I wish employees were audited, activity tracked, and
monitored without instilling distrust
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with basic procedures
ST7: I wish there were clearly defined roles of responsibility
ST5: I wish companies set up proper roles and
responsibilities
ST7: I wish employee expectations were clearly defined.
ST7: I wish there were defined expectations regarding the
security of information
ST7: I wish there were clearly defined rules
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with the policy of not
sharing confidential data
ST7: I wish there were confidentiality policies
ST9: I wish there were a policy prohibiting company
business on personal computers or cell phones
ST9: I wish there were a policy prohibiting company
business on personal cell phones
ST1: I wish the company would create its own network
ST1: I wish Internet access was limited
ST1: I wish unnecessary hardware was removed
ST1: I wish unnecessary USB ports were removed
ST1: I wish more executive power was given to promoted
employees
ST2: I wish processes, procedures, and rules were clearly
understood by employees
ST2: I wish employees received training in motivation
ST2: I wish employees received training in commitment
ST2: I wish employees knew that and end user commitment
leads to success
ST2: I wish companies used incentives and motivation to
gain good user involvement
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Ensure training with visually stimulating videos
Ensure trainees are asked questions to verify
understanding of training concepts
Ensure management appears in training videos
Ensure training is appropriate for the various roles
within the organization
Ensure training is not too technical
Ensure training is simple and short
Ensure video training attempts to put the trainee in
the shoes of the actor
Ensure only appropriate software is installed on
corporate computers
Ensure there are software installation polices in
place
Ensure a mix of the technical, formal, and informal
control systems

Ensure the highest security while minimizing effects
on employee’s ability to work effectively

Ensure clearly defined roles and responsibilities

Ensure data confidentiality policies are in place
Ensure there is a policy concerning company
business on personal computers
Ensure there is a policy concerning company
business on personal cell phones
Ensure companies create their own networks
Ensure there is an Internet usage policy
Ensure unnecessary hardware, including USB ports,
are removed from computers
Ensure promoted employees are given more
executive powers
Ensure employees clearly understand processes,
procedures, and rules
Ensure employees receive motivation training
Ensure employees receive commitment training
Ensure user involvement through incentives and
motivation

ST2: I wish companies had good company structure
ST2: I wish companies had good risk assessment
ST3: I wish employees were trained in the importance of
security
ST3: I wish employees were notified about the seriousness
of security
ST4: I wish employees were aware of security
ST5: I wish employees were taught the benefits of security
ST3: I wish employees were told security was related to
their salaries and careers
ST3: I wish employees were familiar with procedures of
logging in and logging off
ST4: I wish companies had a good infrastructure
ST4: I wish companies had IDS
ST4: I wish companies had firewalls
ST4: I wish companies secured their web servers
ST4: I wish companies used policies and standards to set up
controls
ST4: I wish companies protected the integrity of databases
from intrusion
ST5: I wish companies were aware of less obvious threats,
such as blackberries
ST5: I wish employees were notified that security was more
than just one person
ST5: I wish employees were taught the corporate
consequences of bad security
ST6: I wish computers were set to not remember information
ST6: I wish fingerprints or retinal scans were used to access
sensitive data
ST10: I wish there were limited access to secure areas
ST6: I wish employees were informed
ST6: I wish single design was utilized so employees would
recognize when something is wrong
ST6: I wish there was constant checking for system glitches
ST6: I wish “friendly hacking” was used to identify
weaknesses
ST6: I wish there were knowledge outlets identifying who
should know what and why
ST6: I wish automated systems were limited
ST9: I wish there were rules for what data are monitored
ST9: I wish there were rules for how data is used
ST9: I wish there were computer usage policies
ST9: I wish computers were updated regularly
ST9: I wish employees were notified as to where policies
and procedures were posted
ST9: I wish employees were notified as to how to suggest
changes to policies and procedures
ST10: I wish employees in high security areas are well
trained
ST10: I wish companies worked to eliminate broken
processes
ST10: I wish employees knew what to expect with a change
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Ensure companies have proper structure
Ensure companies have proper risk assessment

Ensure employees understand the importance of
security

Ensure employees are told security is related to their
salaries and careers
Ensure employees are trained on logging on and off
computers
Ensure companies have a good infrastructure
Ensure companies properly use intrusion detection
systems (IDS)
Ensure companies properly use firewalls
Ensure companies have secure web servers
Ensure companies use policies and standards to set
up controls
Ensure companies protect databases from intrusion
Ensure companies are aware of less obvious threats,
such as personal portable devices
Ensure employees are aware that security is
everyone’s responsibility and not just an individual
Ensure employees are given examples of corporate
consequences of bad security
Ensure computers are set to not remember
information
Ensure the use of fingerprints or retinal scans to
protect sensitive data
Ensure limited physical access to secure areas
Ensure employees are informed
Ensure the utilization of single design
Ensure constant checking for system glitches
Use “friendly hacking” to identify security
weaknesses
Create knowledge outlets identifying who should
know what and why
Limit the use of automated systems
Define what data is to be monitored
Define rules as to how data is used
Create acceptable computer usage policies
Ensure computers are updated regularly
Ensure employees are aware of where they can
access policies and procedures
Ensure employees know how to suggest changes to
policies and procedures
Ensure employees in high security areas are well
trained
Ensure companies work to eliminate broken
processes
Ensure employees understand what to expect with a

process and embraced it
ST10: I wish regulation compliance was covered with
employees
ST10: I wish corporate communication were clear and
concise, eliminating confusion

change process
Ensure employees understand regulation compliance
Ensure corporate communication is clear and
concise

Table E2: Social Group Clustering
S1: I wish security training included how to handle email
appropriately
S3: I wish security training included corporate email privacy
rights
S2: I wish security training were not online training
S2: I wish security training included novice and beginner
training
S7: I wish security training interested the less technical user
S9: I wish security training acknowledged the various levels
of sophistication
S4: I wish security training was not too technical
S3: I wish security training should be current and cutting
edge
S6: I wish managers were involved in providing awareness
S2: I wish security training were hands on
S3: I wish security training included points relevant to
employees
S2: I wish security training included interaction with real
security issues
S4: I wish security training included the consequences to the
company of security breaches
S7: I wish security training included consequences to
corporations for and individuals inappropriate actions
S8: I wish security training included real examples of
incidents and the damage caused
S3: I wish security training included corporate email privacy
rights
S7: I wish security training included privacy training
S1: I wish security training included the importance of
customer privacy
S9: I wish security training included cultural differences
S10: I wish security training considered culture (not
corporate culture)
S6: I wish cultural backgrounds were taken into
consideration
S5: I wish employee dissatisfaction related to security were
addressed
S5: I wish factors affecting employee decision making were
addressed
S4: I wish it were explained that a person’s mood affects
decision making
S6: I wish peer pressure were considered
S1: I wish security training included confidentiality of
information from outside parties
S1: I wish security training included personal data security
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Ensure in-depth training on acceptable email use
Minimize the use of online training

Ensure training is appropriate for the trainee’s level
of expertise

Ensure training is up to date with current security
issues
Ensure managers are involved in providing training
Ensure hand’s on training
Ensure training is relevant to all employees

Ensure training utilizes real world examples,
including the corporate consequences of bad
security

Ensure training covers privacy rights

Ensure training
differences

considers

employee

cultural

Ensure training addresses
dissatisfaction affects security

how

employee

Ensure training addresses
employee decision making

factors

affecting

Ensure training includes confidentiality policy
Ensure training covers personal data security

S1: I wish security training included how to handle the media
S1: I wish security training included physical security of data
around employee computers
S2: I wish security training included how to protect home
computers
S2: I wish security training included continuing education as
threats change
S2: I wish security training included password strengthening
that minimized writing down passwords
S3: I wish security training included the most common
threats and how to prevent them
S4: I wish it were explained why a security policy were
necessary
S4: I wish the importance of security were stressed to
employees
S4: I wish employees were told that people do make
mistakes and it is not the end of the world
S5: I wish security training included a description of
corporate values
S5: I wish security training included expectations of
employee moral values
S5: I wish security training included expectations of
employee ethical values
S5: I wish security training included technical aspects
S5: I wish security training included legal aspects
S8: I wish security training included emotional intelligence
S8: I wish security training included values of high integrity
S8: I wish security training stressed the importance of
security
S9: I wish security training included identity theft
S9: I wish security training included corporate information
theft
S9: I wish security training included social interaction
between companies and individuals
S9: I wish security training included data protection
S9: I wish security training included appropriate employee
usage of applications
S10: I wish security training considered sex (male/female)

Ensure security training includes how to handle the
media
Ensure training addresses physical security,
including employee work spaces
Ensure training addresses protecting employee’s
home computers
Ensure training includes continuing education as
threats change
Ensure training addresses strong passwords while
minimizing the need to write them down
Ensure training covers the most common threats and
how to prevent them
Explain why security policies are necessary
Ensure the importance of security is addressed with
all employees
Ensure employees are told that making mistakes is
alright
Ensure training describes corporate values
Ensure training addresses employee moral
Ensure training addresses employee ethics
Ensure training includes technical aspects
Ensure training covers legal aspects of security
Ensure training addresses the relationship between
emotional intelligence and security
Ensure training addresses employee integrity
Ensure employees are aware of the importance of
good security
Include identity theft in security training
Ensure training addresses corporate information
theft
Ensure training addresses the social interaction
between companies and individuals
Ensure training addresses data protection
Ensure training address acceptable software usage
policy
Ensure training takes into consideration an
employee’s gender

Table E3: Technical Group Clustering
T1: I wish there were stricter requirements for passwords
T2: I wish password protection were included in training
T5: I wish security training included password training
T2: I wish security awareness training were interactive with
someone to answer questions
T10: I wish security training included were interactive
T4: I wish security training were simplistic
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Ensure training includes strict password policy

Ensure interactive training
Ensure simplistic training

T4: I wish training were concise
T7: I wish security training were more in-depth
T7: I wish trainee knowledge level were taken into
consideration before training
T10: I wish security training included humor for a lasting
impression
T10: I wish security training included bright imagery
T6: I wish security training included hands on workshops
T4: I wish training included past examples and consequences
to the company
T5: I wish security training included the adverse affects of
bad security
T10: I wish security training included company or industry
specific examples
T2: I wish email security was included in training
T2: I wish email policies were adequately explained to
employees
T5: I wish security training included email security
T3: I wish security training included the risk of e-mail
compressed files
T1: I wish virus updates were known to employees
T1: I wish there was virus training available to employees
T2: I wish virus training were more in depth
T5: I wish security training included antivirus software
T2: I wish worm training were more in depth
T3: I wish security training included the risk of e-mail
attachments
T3: I wish security training included the risk of web links
T9: I wish security training included full hard disk
encryption
T9: I wish security training included email encryption
T5: I wish security training included encryption
T4: I wish training taught the basics of data protection
T4: I wish training taught the greatest threats to data
T9: I wish security training stressed the importance of
annual backup recovery practice to make sure it works
T9: I wish security training included the need to keep more
than one backup separated physically
T5: I wish security training included appropriate storage
facilities
T1: I wish there was backup training available to employees
T5: I wish security training included database backup
T4: I wish training could change the mindset of employees
to make them aware of “critical issues”
T9: I wish security training included creating a security
culture
T1: I wish there was phishing training available to
employees
T2: I wish pharming training were available (like phishing)
T2: I wish spam training were more in depth
T2: I wish there were policies about confidentiality of
information
T2: I wish Internet policies were adequately explained to
employees
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Ensure concise training
Ensure in-depth training
Ensure training to the knowledge level of the trainee
Ensure humor is included in training
Ensure training includes bright imagery
Ensure hands on training

Ensure training includes company or industry past
examples of security breaches

Ensure training includes email acceptable use policy
Ensure email
attachments

training

includes

the

risk

of

Ensure email training includes the risk
attachments
Ensure training includes the risk of web links
Ensure training includes hard disk encryption

of

Ensure in-depth virus and worm training

Ensure training includes email encryption
Ensure training includes encryption
Ensure training includes data protection
Ensure training stresses annual data recovery
practice
Ensure training stresses the need for physical
separation of multiple backups
Ensure training includes data backup

Ensure the creation of a security culture

Ensure training includes phishing
Ensure training include in-depth spam
Ensure data confidentiality training
Ensure Internet usage policy is explained

T3: I wish security training included deleting previous
recipients email addresses on forwarded emails
T4: I wish training informed employees of the cost of
security awareness
T4: I wish training provided employees with ways to get
help after the training (reference points)
T5: I wish security training included stress management
T5: I wish security training included corporate values
T5: I wish security training included security policies
T5: I wish security training included security procedures
T5: I wish security training included filters
T5: I wish security training included audits
T5: I wish security training included Internet navigation
T5: I wish security training included device hardware
security
T5: I wish security training included spyware
T7: I wish security training demonstrated all issues and
ways to avoid them
T8: I wish security training included physical security
T8: I wish security training included appropriate responses
to various emergencies
T8: I wish security training included online threats and how
to deal with them.
T9: I wish security training included the usage of VPN’s
when out of the office
T9: I wish security training defined roles and responsibilities
T9: I wish security training included how to handle cultural
issues (people culture) that may affect security

Ensure training includes deleting previous recipients
email addresses in forwarded emails
Ensure employees are told the cost of security
awareness
Ensure employees have access to references and help
after training
Ensure stress management is included
Ensure training on corporate values
Ensure training on security policies
Ensure training on security procedures
Ensure training on the use of filters
Ensure training covers audits
Ensure training on navigating the Internet
Ensure training on the security of device hardware
Ensure spyware training
Ensure all security issues are demonstrated with
ways to avoid them
Ensure physical security is included
Ensure appropriate responses to various security
incidents
Ensure training on avoiding online threats
Cover VPN usage for telecommuting
Ensure roles and responsibilities are defined
Ensure training covers people’s cultural differences

Table E4: Control Group Clustering
C2: I wish security training included examples of past
security breaches
C3: I wish security training included examples of breaches
C4: I wish security training included examples from the
trainee’s workplace
C2: I wish security training included consequences of
security breaches
C4: I wish security training included corporate
consequences of bad security
C1: I wish security training included interaction with
trainees
C4: I wish security training were interactive
C4: I wish security training included lectures at the
workplace
C5: I wish security training were interesting
C3: I wish security training included a summary of what
was taught
C1: I wish trainers had appropriate credentials and looked
the part
C4: I wish security training included personalization to a
particular role in the company
C5: I wish security training was taught at the level of the
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Ensure past examples of security breaches in training
Ensure security
workplace

examples

from

the

trainee’s

Ensure examples of the corporate consequences of
security breaches

Ensure interactive training
Ensure training in the form of lectures
Ensure interesting training
Ensure a summary of topics at the end of training
Ensure qualified trainers
Ensure training is directed to specific job roles
Ensure training matches expertise level

trainee
C3: I wish security training demonstrated how to properly
perform security
C4: I wish security training included punishments for noncompliance
C7: I wish security training included employee
consequences
C7: I wish security training included physical security of
their workstations
C5: I wish security training included physical security
C7: I wish security training included Internet policy
C5: I wish security training included Internet policy
C10: I wish training included acceptable Internet usage
C5: I wish it was recognized that employees were going to
use the Internet for personal use
C2: I wish security training included guidelines for
reporting security breaches
C2: I wish security training included how to handle
incidents
C5: I wish security training included policy taking about
home corporate information via email attachment
C5: I wish security training included policy about taking
home corporate information via portable media
C1: I wish training emphasized the benefits of following
security policy, instead of emphasizing the punishment or
negatives of not following security policy
C2: I wish security training included confidentiality
C10: I wish training included customer data confidentiality
C4: I wish security training included the role of security
C4: I wish security training included the benefits of security
C4: I wish security training included the challenges of
security
C5: I wish security training included common security
vulnerabilities
C5: I wish security training included policy on corporate
ID’s
C5: I wish security training stressed the importance of
everyone being involved
C5: I wish security was not so strict that employees felt
distrusted
C6: I wish security training included email policy
C11: I wish training discusses email attachments
C7: I wish security training included personal privacy of
others at the office
C8: I wish training covered anti-virus software
C9: I wish training included virus attacks
C10: I wish training included virus training
C11: I wish training included antivirus training and
scanning
C8: I wish training included password protection
C9: I wish training included passwords
C10: I wish training included strong password training
C11: I wish training taught employees to use screen saver
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Ensure appropriate security demonstrations

Ensure training includes consequences for noncompliance

Ensure training includes physical security

Ensure training includes Internet usage policy

Ensure training provides guidelines for incident
reporting

Ensure training provides guidelines for transporting
corporate data home
Ensure training emphasizes the benefits of following
policy and not the negatives of not following policy
Ensure training includes data confidentiality
Ensure training demonstrates the benefits of security
Ensure training acknowledges the challenges of good
security
Ensure training covers the most common
vulnerabilities
Ensure training covers corporate identification card
policy
Ensure training stresses the involvement of everyone
Ensure proper security without employees feeling
distrusted
Ensure training includes email policy
Ensure training
coworkers

includes

personal

privacy

of

Ensure training includes virus scanning, detecting,
and updating

Ensure training includes strong password policy

passwords
C11: I wish training included a policy about changing BIOS
passwords frequently
C8: I wish training included firewall configuration
C9: I wish training included firewalls
C8: I wish training included data backup
C8: I wish training included consistent security policy
C8: I wish there was a published formal standard
C8: I wish training included host network intrusion
detection
C8: I wish training included ethics training
C9: I wish training included ethical conduct
C8: I wish training included workstation control
C8: I wish training included violation reporting
C9: I wish training included Internet Protocols
C9: I wish training included Domain Name Service
C9: I wish training included Access Points
C9: I wish training included encryption
C9: I wish training included security management
C9: I wish training included wireless networking
C9: I wish training included hacking threats
C9: I wish training included social engineering
C9: I wish training included network failures
C9: I wish training included contingency planning
C9: I wish training included special training, such as
CCNA, CCNP, MCSC, and Linux
C10: I wish training included a policy to only keep
necessary customer information
C10: I wish training included a policy about not using
personal emails or devices for company data
C11: I wish training included protection from SPAM
C11: I wish training taught employees to not send
attachments back to the original sender when replying to
emails
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Ensure training includes firewall configuration
Ensure training includes data backup
Ensure security policy is consistent
Ensure a published formal standard
Ensure training on host network intrusion detection
Ensure employees receive ethics training
Ensure training on workstation control
Encourage reporting violations
Ensure training covers Internet Protocol (IP
addresses)
Ensure training covers Domain Name Services
(DNS)
Ensure training covers access points
Ensure training covers encryption
Ensure training includes security management
Ensure training includes wireless networking
Ensure training includes hacking threats
Ensure training includes social engineering
Ensure training covers how to handle network
failures
Ensure training includes contingency planning
Ensure employees get specialized certification
training, such as CCNA, CCNP, MCSC, and Linux
Ensure there is a policy to only keep necessary
customer information
Ensure there is a policy about not using personal
emails or devices for company data
Ensure training includes protection from SPAM
emails
Ensure employees are taught to not send attachments
back to the original sender when replying to emails

Appendix F: Final Group Objectives
Table F1: Socio-Technical Group Final Objectives
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Objective
Ensure password protection is fully utilized
Ensure a reward system for disclosing security breaches
Ensure appropriate ethics training
Ensure a trust relationship between employees and the company
Ensure training covers employee integrity
Ensure rules to identify who has appropriate access to computers
Ensure organizational structure designates proper access to the appropriate people
Ensure promoted employees have more access to data
Ensure examples are fully utilized in security training
Ensure training with visually stimulating videos
Ensure trainees are asked questions to verify understanding of training concepts
Ensure management appears in training videos
Ensure training is appropriate for the various roles within the organization
Ensure training is not too technical
Ensure training is simple and short
Ensure video training attempts to put the trainee in the shoes of the actor
Ensure only appropriate software is installed on corporate computers
Ensure a mix of the technical, formal, and informal control systems
Ensure the highest security while minimizing effects on employee’s ability to work
effectively
Ensure clearly defined roles and responsibilities
Ensure data confidentiality policies are in place
Ensure there is a policy concerning company business on personal computers
Ensure there is a policy concerning company business on personal cell phones
Ensure companies create their own networks
Ensure there is an Internet usage policy
Ensure unnecessary hardware, including USB ports, are removed from computers
Ensure promoted employees are given more executive powers
Ensure employees clearly understand processes, procedures, and rules
Ensure there are software installation polices in place
Ensure employees receive motivation training
Ensure employees receive commitment training
Ensure user involvement through incentives and motivation
Ensure companies have proper structure
Ensure companies have proper risk assessment
Ensure employees understand the importance of security
Ensure employees are told security is related to their salaries and careers
Ensure employees are trained on logging on and off computers
Ensure companies have a good infrastructure
Ensure companies properly use intrusion detection systems (IDS)
Ensure companies properly use firewalls
Ensure companies have secure web servers
Ensure companies use policies and standards to set up controls
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43. Ensure companies protect databases from intrusion
44. Ensure companies are aware of less obvious threats, such as personal portable devices
45. Ensure employees are aware that security is everyone’s responsibility and not just an
individual
46. Ensure employees are given examples of corporate consequences of bad security
47. Ensure employees are a good fit for the position before they are hired
48. Ensure the hiring of committed employees
49. Ensure the hiring of responsible employees
50. Ensure potential employees are screened before hiring
51. Ensure employees are aware of consequences of non-compliance
52. Ensure data access is limited to appropriate individuals
53. Ensure computers are set to not remember information
54. Ensure the use of fingerprints or retinal scans to protect sensitive data
55. Ensure limited physical access to secure areas
56. Ensure employees are informed
57. Ensure the utilization of single design
58. Ensure constant checking for system glitches
59. Use “friendly hacking” to identify security weaknesses
60. Create knowledge outlets identifying who should know what and why
61. Limit the use of automated systems
62. Define what data is to be monitored
63. Define rules as to how data is used
64. Create acceptable computer usage policies
65. Ensure computers are updated regularly
66. Ensure employees are aware of where they can access policies and procedures
67. Ensure employees know how to suggest changes to policies and procedures
68. Ensure employees in high security areas are well trained
69. Ensure companies work to eliminate broken processes
70. Ensure employees understand what to expect with a change process
71. Ensure employees understand regulation compliance
72. Ensure corporate communication is clear and concise
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Figure F1: Socio-technical Orientation Percentage
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General

Table F2: Social Group Final Objectives
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Objective
Ensure in-depth training on acceptable email use
Minimize the use of online training
Ensure training is appropriate for the trainee’s level of expertise
Ensure training is up to date with current security issues
Ensure managers are involved in providing training
Ensure hand’s on training
Ensure training is relevant to all employees
Ensure training utilizes real world examples, including the corporate consequences of
bad security
Ensure training covers privacy rights
Ensure training addresses data protection
Ensure training considers employee cultural differences
Ensure training addresses how employee dissatisfaction affects security
Ensure training addresses employee integrity
Ensure training addresses factors affecting employee decision making
Ensure training includes confidentiality policy
Ensure training covers personal data security
Ensure security training includes how to handle the media
Ensure training addresses physical security, including employee work spaces
Ensure training addresses protecting employee’s home computers
Ensure training includes continuing education as threats change
Ensure training addresses strong passwords while minimizing the need to write them
down
Ensure training addresses employee ethics
Ensure training covers the most common threats and how to prevent them
Explain why security policies are necessary
Ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees
Ensure employees are told that making mistakes is alright
Ensure training describes corporate values
Ensure training addresses employee morale
Ensure training includes technical aspects
Ensure training covers legal aspects of security
Ensure training addresses the relationship between emotional intelligence and security
Ensure employees are aware of the importance of good security
Include identity theft in security training
Ensure training addresses corporate information theft
Ensure training addresses the social interaction between companies and individuals
Ensure training addresses acceptable software usage policy
Ensure training takes into consideration an employee’s gender
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Figure F2: Social Group Orientation Percentage

Table F3: Technical Group Final Objectives
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Objectives
Ensure in-depth training
Ensure training to the knowledge level of the trainee
Ensure humor is included in training
Ensure hands on training
Ensure training includes company or industry past examples of security breaches
Ensure training includes strict password policy
Ensure training includes email acceptable use policy
Ensure email training includes the risk of attachments
Ensure training includes the risk of web links
Ensure training fully utilizes encryption
Ensure simplistic training
Ensure training includes data protection
Ensure training stresses annual data recovery practice
Ensure training stresses the need for physical separation of multiple backups
Ensure training includes bright imagery
Ensure training includes data backup
Ensure the creation of a security culture
Ensure training includes phishing
Ensure training includes in-depth SPAM training
Ensure training covers people’s cultural differences
Ensure data confidentiality training
Ensure concise training
Ensure Internet usage policy is explained
Ensure training includes deleting previous recipients email addresses in forwarded
emails
Ensure employees are told the cost of security awareness
Ensure employees have access to references and help after training
Ensure in-depth virus and worm training
Ensure stress management is included
Ensure training on corporate values
Ensure roles and responsibilities are defined
Ensure training on security policies
Cover VPN usage for telecommuting
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33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Ensure training on security procedures
Ensure interactive training
Ensure training on the use of filters
Ensure training covers audits
Ensure training on navigating the Internet
Ensure training on the security of device hardware
Ensure spyware training
Ensure all security issues are demonstrated with ways to avoid them
Ensure physical security is included
Ensure appropriate responses to various security incidents
Ensure training on avoiding online threats
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Figure F3: Technical Group Orientation Percentage
Table F4: Control Group Final Objectives
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Objective
Ensure interactive training
Ensure a summary of topics at the end of training
Ensure training matches expertise level
Ensure training includes consequences for non-compliance
Ensure training includes physical security
Ensure training includes wireless networking
Ensure training includes hacking threats
Ensure a published formal standard
Ensure training on host network intrusion detection
Ensure employees receive ethics training
Ensure training on workstation control
Ensure training includes data backup
Ensure training includes firewall configuration
Encourage reporting violations
Ensure training covers Internet Protocol (IP addresses)
Ensure training covers encryption
Ensure training includes security management
Ensure training includes social engineering
Ensure training covers how to handle network failures
Ensure training includes strong password policy
Ensure training includes contingency planning

180

Orientation
G
G
G
G
T
T
T
G
T
S
T
T
T
G
T
T
G
S
T
T
T

22. Ensure employees get specialized certification training, such as CCNA, CCNP,
MCSC, and Linux
23. Ensure training includes Internet usage policy
24. Ensure training provides guidelines for incident reporting
25. Ensure training is directed to specific job roles
26. Ensure training provides guidelines for transporting corporate data home
27. Ensure training emphasizes the benefits of following policy and not the negatives
of non-compliance
28. Maximize examples in training
29. Ensure training includes data confidentiality
30. Ensure training demonstrates the benefits of security
31. Ensure trainers are qualified
32. Ensure training includes virus scanning, detecting, and updating
33. Ensure training covers Domain Name Services (DNS)
34. Ensure training covers access points
35. Ensure interesting training
36. Ensure training acknowledges the challenges of good security
37. Ensure security policy is consistent
38. Ensure training covers the most common vulnerabilities
39. Ensure training in the form of lectures
40. Ensure training covers corporate identification card policy
41. Ensure training stresses the involvement of everyone
42. Ensure appropriate security demonstrations
43. Ensure proper security without employees feeling distrusted
44. Ensure training includes email policy
45. Ensure training includes personal privacy of coworkers
46. Ensure there is a policy to only keep necessary customer information
47. Ensure there is a policy about not using personal devices for company data
48. Ensure training includes protection from SPAM emails
49. Ensure employees are taught to not send attachments back to the original sender
when replying to emails

T
G
G
G
G
G
G
T
G
G
T
T
T
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
S
G
T
T
T
T
T

6.12%

Social

48.98%
44.90%

Figure F4: Control Group Orientation Percentage
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Technical
General

Appendix G: Delphi Results
Table G1: Socio-Technical Group Shortened List
Percentage Selected by
Group Participants

Objective
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Ensure data confidentiality policies are in place
Ensure there is an Internet usage policy
Ensure clearly defined roles and responsibilities
Ensure employees clearly understand processes, procedures, and rules
Ensure data access is limited to appropriate individuals
Ensure employees are aware of consequences of non-compliance
Ensure companies are aware of less obvious threats, such as personal
portable devices
8. Ensure computers are updated regularly
9. Ensure employees are given examples of corporate consequences of bad
security
10. Ensure employees understand the importance of security
11. Ensure password protection is fully utilized
12. Ensure potential employees are screened before hiring

70%
70%
70%
70%
60%
60%
60%
60%
60%
60%
60%
60%

Table G2: Social Group Shortened List
Percentage Selected by
Group Participants

Objective
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Ensure training is up to date with current security issues
Ensure training describes corporate values
Ensure training utilizes real world examples, including the corporate
consequences of bad security
Ensure training includes confidentiality policy
Ensure training addresses strong passwords while minimizing the need to
write them down
Ensure training covers legal aspects of security
Ensure training covers personal data security
Ensure training covers privacy rights
Ensure training covers the most common threats and how to prevent
them
Ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees
Ensure training addresses data protection
Ensure training addresses employee ethics
Ensure training addresses employee integrity
Ensure training addresses corporate information theft
Ensure hand’s on training
Ensure managers are involved in providing training
Ensure training addresses the social interaction between companies and
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90%
90%
80%
80%
80%
80%
80%
80%
80%
80%
80%
90%
80%
70%
70%
70%
70%

individuals
Ensure training includes continuing education as threats change
Ensure training considers employee cultural differences
Ensure training includes technical aspects
Ensure training addresses the relationship between emotional intelligence
and security
22. Ensure training addresses factors affecting employee decision making
23. Ensure training addresses how employee dissatisfaction affects security
18.
19.
20.
21.

70%
70%
60%
60%
60%
60%

Table G3: Technical Group Shortened List
Percentage Selected by
Group Participants

Objective
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Ensure training includes email acceptable use policy
Ensure in-depth training
Ensure email training includes the risk of attachments
Ensure the creation of a security culture
Ensure training on security policies
Ensure training includes data protection
Ensure data confidentiality training
Ensure training includes phishing
Ensure training includes strict password policy
Ensure training includes the risk of web links
Ensure training includes data backup
Ensure training on corporate values
Ensure in-depth virus and worm training
Ensure Internet usage policy is explained
Ensure roles and responsibilities are define
Ensure spyware training
Ensure training fully utilizes encryption
Ensure training includes company or industry past examples of security
breaches
Ensure employees have access to references and help after training
Ensure training on avoiding online threats
Ensure all security issues are demonstrated with ways to avoid them
Ensure training to the knowledge level of the trainee

90%
90%
90%
90%
80%
80%
70%
70%
70%
70%
70%
70%
60%
60%
60%
60%
60%
60%
60%
60%
60%
60%

Table G4: Control Group Shortened List
Percentage Selected by
Group Participants

Objective
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Ensure training includes email policy
Ensure training includes strong password policy
Ensure training includes Internet usage policy
Ensure training includes security management
Ensure training demonstrates the benefits of security
Ensure interactive training
Encourage reporting violations
Ensure a published formal standard
Ensure a summary of topics at the end of training
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91%
82%
82%
73%
73%
73%
64%
64%
64%

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Ensure appropriate security demonstrations
Ensure training includes hacking threats
Ensure training includes physical security
Ensure training provides guidelines for incident reporting
Maximize examples in training
Ensure security policy is consistent
Ensure training includes consequences for non-compliance
Ensure training includes data backup
Ensure training includes data confidentiality
Ensure there is a policy about not using personal devices for company
data
Ensure trainers are qualified
Ensure training covers the most common vulnerabilities
Ensure employees receive ethics training
Ensure training emphasizes the benefits of following policy and not the
negatives of non-compliance
Ensure training matches expertise level
Ensure training on workstation control

64%
64%
64%
64%
64%
64%
64%
64%
64%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%

Table G5: Socio-Technical Group Final Ranking
Mean
Rank
1.20
2.60
3.10
4.50
5.20
6.60
6.70
9.00
9.10
9.10
10.50
11.30

Objective

Orientation

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Ensure employees clearly understand processes, procedures, and rules
Social
Ensure clearly defined roles and responsibilities
Social
Ensure potential employees are screened before hiring
Social
Ensure data access is limited to appropriate individuals
Technical
Ensure employees are aware of consequences of non-compliance
General
Ensure data confidentiality policies are in place
Technical
Ensure employees understand the importance of security
General
Ensure employees are given examples of corporate consequences of bad
General
security
9. Ensure password protection is fully utilized
Technical
10. Ensure companies are aware of less obvious threats, such as personal
Technical
portable devices
11. Ensure there is an Internet usage policy
General
12. Ensure computers are updated regularly
Technical
Kendall’s W
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
.318
.734
.825

Table G6: Social Group Final Ranking
Mean
Rank
1.10
4.40
4.90

1.
2.
3.

Objective

Orientation

Ensure the importance of security is addressed with all employees
Ensure training is up to date with current security issues
Ensure training addresses employee ethics

General
General
Social
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5.10
7.10
7.50
7.70
8.20
8.50
10.00
11.30
11.80
13.10
13.50
14.20
14.50
16.20
17.00
18.70
18.90
19.70
20.20
22.40

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Ensure training covers the most common threats and how to prevent them
Ensure training covers personal data security
Ensure training utilizes real world examples, including the corporate
consequences of bad security
Ensure training addresses data protection
Ensure training addresses employee integrity
Ensure training covers legal aspects of security
Ensure managers are involved in providing training
Ensure training includes continuing education as threats change
Ensure training describes corporate values
Ensure training addresses the relationship between emotional intelligence
and security
Ensure hand’s on training
Ensure training addresses corporate information theft
Ensure training covers privacy rights
Ensure training addresses how employee dissatisfaction affects security
Ensure training addresses the social interaction between companies and
individuals
Ensure training includes technical aspects
Ensure training considers employee cultural differences
Ensure training includes confidentiality policy
Ensure training addresses factors affecting employee decision making
Ensure training addresses strong passwords while minimizing the need to
write them down
Kendall’s W
Round 1
Round 2
.193
.744

General
Technical
General
Technical
Social
General
General
General
Social
Social
General
General
Technical
Social
Social
Technical
Social
Technical
Social
Technical

Table G7: Technical Group Final Ranking
Mean
Rank
4.10
4.20
4.90
5.80
7.00
7.20
7.50
8.70
8.80
9.90
10.90
11.20
13.10
14.20
14.40
15.80
16.00

Objective
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Ensure all security issues are demonstrated with ways to avoid them
Ensure training to the knowledge level of the trainee
Ensure in-depth training
Ensure training on security policies
Ensure training on corporate values
Ensure training includes company or industry past examples of security
breaches
Ensure the creation of a security culture
Ensure employees have access to references and help after training
Ensure roles and responsibilities are defined
Ensure data confidentiality training
Ensure Internet usage policy is explained
Ensure training on avoiding online threats
Ensure training includes strict password policy
Ensure training includes data protection
Ensure training includes the risk of web links
Ensure training includes email acceptable use policy
Ensure email training includes the risk of attachments
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Orientation
General
General
General
General
Social
General
Social
General
Social
Technical
General
Technical
Technical
Technical
Technical
General
Technical

16.80
17.50
17.70
19.10
20.10

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Ensure in-depth virus and worm training
Ensure training includes data backup
Ensure spyware training
Ensure training includes phishing
Ensure training fully utilizes encryption
Kendall’s W
Round 1
Round 2
.270
.582

Technical
Technical
Technical
Technical
Technical
Round 3
.627

Table G8: Control Group Final Ranking
Mean
Rank
1.00
2.00
3.09
4.27
5.45
5.82
6.91
8.09
8.91
9.55
10.91
12.27
12.91
13.91
14.91
16.00
17.00
18.00
19.09
20.00
21.18
22.00
23.18
24.00
24.55

Objective
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Orientation

Ensure training demonstrates the benefits of security
Ensure interactive training
Ensure security policy is consistent
Ensure training includes security management
Ensure training includes email policy
Ensure a published formal standard
Ensure training includes data confidentiality
Ensure trainers are qualified
Ensure training matches expertise level
Ensure training covers the most common vulnerabilities
Ensure employees receive ethics training
Ensure training includes Internet usage policy
Ensure appropriate security demonstrations
Ensure training includes strong password policy
Ensure there is a policy about not using personal devices for company data
Ensure training emphasizes the benefits of following policy and not the
negatives of non-compliance
17. Maximize examples in training
18. Ensure training includes hacking threats
19. Ensure training provides guidelines for incident reporting
20. Ensure training includes data backup
21. Ensure training on workstation control
22. Encourage reporting violations
23. Ensure training includes consequences for non-compliance
24. Ensure training includes physical security
25. Ensure a summary of topics at the end of training
Kendall’s W
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
.130
.675
.992
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General
General
General
General
General
General
Technical
General
General
General
Social
General
General
Technical
Technical
General
General
Technical
General
Technical
Technical
General
General
Technical
General
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